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delighted to join the Digital Commons community, and hope you 
visit us at our new cyberspace home. 
  Finally, amidst all of  these changes, we are interested in 
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we can learn more about our growing audience, and your thoughts 
about the publication. The more we learn about who you are, the bet-
ter we can fulfill our mission to elevate non-traditional and marginal-
ized voices and issues in the law. Plus, participants will enter a raffle 
to win an Ipod shuffle. More information can be found at the survey 
announcement toward the end of  the issue. 
 As the Volume 6 Executive Board makes way for the Vol-
ume 7 leaders, we want to thank our readers, authors, staff, advisors, 
and every other person who helped make Volume 6 and the Strategic 
Plan such a huge success. We are excited about the publication’s fu-
ture and wish The Modern American six more ground-breaking years. 
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A FRAUDULENT SENSE OF BELONGING: 
THE CASE FOR REMOVING THE
 ‘FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP’
By: Anne Parsons 1
I. Introduction
I have been a permanent resident for about 10 
years.  When I decided to apply for US citizenship 
I realized that I might be ineligible because when 
applying for my first driver’s license I also became 
registered to vote.  At the time, I did not understand 
that permanent residents are not allowed to vote. The 
fact that a governmental official asked me to register 
(even though at that point my greencard  was my only 
official ID) and actual issuance of  a registration 
card made me even more ensured [sic] that I am 
an eligible voter.  If  I recall correctly, the Election 
Day was shortly after and I am almost positive that 
I voted during these elections.  However, soon later, 
when talking with another greencard holder I was 
informed that I am not eligible to vote.  Since that 
point on, I never voted and whenever asked if  I wish 
to register I make a point to inform those who ask 
that “as a permanent resident I am not eligible.”  
Other than that, my record is perfectly clean.  Do 
I still have a chance to become naturalized?  Is 
it truly a deportable offense?  Is there a way, and 
should I try to find out whether I actually voted?  
There must be more people who made the same 
mistake as I did, is there a way to find out what 
percentage is denied citizenship on similar grounds?2
 A little known fact in U.S. history is that noncitizens3 
once had the right to vote in local, state, and even national 
elections.4  Today, not only are noncitizens largely prohibited 
from voting, except in a few local jurisdictions, noncitizens may 
lose their chance to become citizens, and face the additional 
threats of  deportation and criminal sanctions for voting or 
merely registering to vote.  While noncitizens have always 
faced consequences for fraud or willful misrepresentation 
of  a material fact under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”),5 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of  19966 (commonly known as “IIRIRA” 
or “IIRAIRA”) changed the law in several ways, including by 
adding specific grounds of  inadmissibility and removability 
related to voting in any local, state, or federal election.7
 This paper criticizes IIRIRA’s addition of  the “false 
claim to citizenship” provision to regulate noncitizen voting 
as inconsistent with the proper role of  immigration law 
in creating and defining the body politic.  Part I explores 
democratic concepts of  citizenship in the context of  
noncitizen voting rights.  This view of  citizenship as political 
voice and belonging, however, must inevitably confront the 
perceived imperative of  the modern nation-state to create 
legal distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.  Part I 
then explores how the U.S. does so by examining theories 
underlying the naturalization process and looking specifically 
at how “citizenship” is defined in current U.S. immigration law.
 Part II briefly examines the connection between 
immigration policy and the gradual erosion of  noncitizen 
voting rights as a backdrop to IIRIRA’s creation of  the 
“false claim to citizenship” provisions.  In Part III, the paper 
argues that the IIRIRA amendments to the “false claim to 
citizenship” provisions have several negative consequences. 
First, the provisions risk unnecessarily excluding or 
deporting viable candidates for citizenship, including long-
time legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) like the individual 
in the epitaph.  Second, these provisions validate unfounded 
concerns about noncitizen voter fraud, thereby further 
polarizing the immigration debate in unproductive ways.  And 
third, the provisions are inconsistent with the underlying goals 
of  the naturalization process, and jeopardize noncitizens’ 
opportunity for meaningful political participation.
 The paper concludes by suggesting various ways 
the false claim to citizenship provisions could be reformed, 
arguing that removing the immigration consequences 
for noncitizens who vote is most in line with democratic 
ideals.  It calls upon immigrants’ advocates to reconsider 
arguments for extending voting rights to noncitizens 
in light of  predicted demographic change and the 
growing push for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
II. What Makes a Citizen?
 The legal definition of  “citizen” is “a person 
who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of  a 
political community, owing allegiance to the community and 
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections.”8 
Constitutional democracies are premised on the notion 
of  consent by the governed, with the vote serving as the 
primary mechanism through which members of  the polity 
realize democratic ideals.9  All democracies index insiders 
and outsiders based on existing members’ collective notions 
of  who constitutes “the people.”  If  formal citizenship 
is the marker of  membership in the political community, 
this means that in a democracy, noncitizens are governed 
by the laws but do not have a formal voice. 10  Why and 
how is formal citizenship taken into account in defining 
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the body politic?  In its reference to naturalization, the 
definition of  citizenship hints at another fundamental 
question: how do nations, and the U.S. in particular, 
determine who becomes a citizen in the first place?
a. Citizenship as Political Voice and Belonging 
 Today, with a few exceptions,11 formal citizenship is 
the primary marker of  an individual’s inclusion or exclusion 
in the body politic in the U.S.12  Despite the fact that certain 
classes of  noncitizens, LPRs in particular, share many 
characteristics with citizens—they pay 
taxes, own property, and serve in the 
armed forces—only citizens can vote. 
And yet, this has not always been the case.
 In his socio-historical account 
of  noncitizen voting rights in the 
U.S., Maryland State Senator and Law 
Professor Jamin Raskin, notes that the 
extension of  voting rights to noncitizens by states stemmed 
from a strong federalist paradigm.13  Depending on the time 
period, states had different reasons for allowing noncitizens 
to vote.14  In the eighteenth century, states extended the 
right to vote to propertied, white, male noncitizens both 
because they exhibited those attributes most valued in 
electors, and because doing so allowed states to justify 
the exclusion of  people without those attributes from 
the ballot by delinking citizenship from the franchise.15 
Later, in the nineteenth century, states used the franchise 
primarily to draw noncitizens to settle in their territory.16
 Raskin derives three interrelated normative 
arguments for alien suffrage based on state’s express or 
implied rationales for allowing noncitizens to vote.  First, 
doing so logically follows from the democratic ideal of  
“citizenship as presence,” in that extending the right to 
vote to noncitizens merely recognizes those individuals’ 
participation in the social life of  the community.17  Second, 
allowing noncitizens to vote serves the practical function of  
assimilating them to local values, a rationale Raskin terms 
“citizenship as integration.”18  A third and similar rationale, 
“citizenship as standing,” reconstitutes the vote as a form 
of  public acknowledgement that noncitizens belong in 
American society.19  The latter two rationales provide strong 
justification for extending the vote to individuals who intend 
to naturalize.  Although current U.S. immigration law does not 
explicitly distinguish between those who intend to become 
citizens and those who do not, LPR status is the closest 
proxy even though LPRs are not required to naturalize.  Not 
surprisingly, serious arguments have been made that LPRs 
should be able to vote at the local level,20 and a few localities 
in the U.S. have extended the franchise to this group.21 
Serious consideration of  the first rationale, however, has 
the potential to lead to a more radical conclusion: that all 
noncitizens with presence and a significant stake in their 
communities should have a voice in all those communities 
in which they participate, whether local, state, or national.22
 Theoretically speaking, however, a democracy is 
not obligated to extend suffrage to noncitizens.23  The U.S. 
Constitution does not deny noncitizens the right to vote, 24 
yet arguably neither does it require it.25  Whether a nation-
state chooses to extend the vote to noncitizens might depend 
on that particular state’s constitutional values in relation 
to noncitizens.26  The more constitutional protections 
a state grants to noncitizens, the 
more important it becomes for 
citizens to maintain the vote as a 
distinguishing and exclusive right.27 
Correspondingly, the more courts 
extend to noncitizens the rights to due 
process, free speech, and association, 
the less crucial the vote is for ensuring 
noncitizens’ political voice and sense of  belonging.28  As 
one scholar points out, this may explain why “[noncitizen] 
suffrage is, at once, insignificant and central” in the U.S.29
b. Citizenship as Membership in a Nation-State
 In today’s world of  increased border restrictions, 
the effect of  immigration law in defining the body politic 
has become increasingly important.30  The increasing 
overlap between immigration, criminal, and national 
security law has greatly enhanced the gate-keeping function 
of  immigration law in the U.S.31  As a prime symbol of  
these conceptual overlaps, IIRIRA’s amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) significantly 
expanded the exclusionary function of  immigration law.
 Historically, immigration law played a minimal role 
in regulating noncitizen voting rights, which instead were 
regulated by state election laws.  Generally, laws that govern 
the lives of  noncitizens already living in the U.S. are termed 
“alienage laws,” as distinct from immigration laws which 
determine who has the right to be present in the first place.32 
In the U.S., both alienage laws that restrict noncitizens’ right 
to vote, and immigration laws that delineate the grounds of  
inclusion and exclusion, play a role in defining the body politic. 
In comparison, in countries such as New Zealand that allow 
noncitizens to vote in national elections, immigration laws 
alone define the people.33  In reality, alienage and immigration 
laws often overlap,34 but they remain nonetheless analytically 
distinct.35  For example, alienage laws often receive strict 
scrutiny by the courts,36 while Congress retains plenary 
power over immigration law.37  Though both types of  laws 
play a role in defining the electorate, essentially, this paper 
argues that using immigration law, rather than alienage law, 
the effect of  immigration law in defining 
the body politic has become 
increasingly important
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to regulate noncitizen voting undermines the democratic 
ideals the immigration system should seek to promote.38
 A society’s immigration statutes reflect its 
perception of  how the process of  national self-definition 
should take place.  Conversely, whether and how a society 
permits noncitizens to vote depends on that society’s 
ideas about how the integration of  
noncitizens should occur.39  According 
to Immigration Scholar and Historian 
Hiroshi Motomura, U.S. immigration 
law is a blend of  three competing 
views of  immigration:  immigration 
as contract, immigration as affiliation, 
and immigration as transition.40  Each view reflects a model 
of  justice based on differing notions of  the relative equality 
between citizens and noncitizens.  Under the contract 
theory, citizens and noncitizens are not equal.41  Lawful 
immigrants have the right to remain in the U.S. only so long 
as they obey the rules.42  For Motomura, contract theory 
is inadequate as an exclusive foundation for immigration 
law because the contract is one-sided—the immigrant 
must take it or leave it.43  This violates the requirement 
of  consent underlying modern democratic politics.44
 Affiliation is the second conceptual foundation 
and serves as immigration law’s counterpart to Raskin’s 
notion of  “citizenship as integration.”  Viewing 
immigration as affiliation means that the longer that 
lawful immigrants remain in the U.S., the more citizen-
like rights they gain.45  Paradoxically, the more the law 
prioritizes a person’s ties to the U.S., the less important 
formal citizenship becomes as a means of  gaining rights.46
One form of  relief  in U.S. immigration law that seems 
to reflect the affiliation concept is cancellation of  removal. 
Cancellation of  removal is a form of  relief  that allows 
noncitizens who are otherwise inadmissible or deportable 
to stay in the U.S. based, in part, on their length of  residence 
in the country and other equities including the presence of  
family, property, or business ties. 47  In general, Motomura 
sees current U.S. immigration law as a blend of  the contract 
and affiliation theories.48  While the rationale for cancellation 
of  removal recognizes the inherent unfairness in severing 
an individual’s ties to the U.S., in reality, the law also contains 
an element of  contract.  To be eligible for cancellation of  
removal, for example, both LPRs and other noncitizens 
(“non-LPRs”) must prove that they have not committed 
certain types of  crimes.49  It is also worth mentioning, though 
perhaps not surprising, that the law as applied to non-LPRs 
includes more stringent “contractual terms” in addition to 
requiring a longer period of  residence to establish eligibility.50
 In contrast to the first two views, immigration 
as transition means that all lawful immigrants are treated 
as potential citizens upon entry and thus benefit from a 
presumption of  equal rights.51  Only when an immigrant 
expresses her intention not to naturalize would that person 
lose her citizen-like rights.52  While not erasing the distinction 
between lawful immigrant and citizen completely, the 
view of  immigration as transition would tend to support 
voting rights for intending citizens.  Motomura argues 
that, historically, the concept of  
transition played an important role. 
In particular, he points to declarations 
of  intent to naturalize, a feature of  
U.S. immigration law from 1795 to 
1952, which could be filed by eligible 
noncitizens several years in advance 
of  a naturalization application, and which elevated the 
noncitizen to a pre-citizen status.53  For Motomura, the history 
of  transition and its emphasis on inclusion is an antidote 
to the logic of  the other two concepts, which pervades 
the U.S.’s increasingly restrictive immigration policies.54
 
c. Citizenship in U.S. Immigration Law 
 If  immigration law plays a role in defining the body 
politic, citizenship and naturalization are the primary means 
by which it does so.  People gain citizenship by birth in the 
U.S.,55 through naturalization,56 or in limited cases, by blood.57 
The naturalization process in the U.S. has traditionally been 
characterized as easy or open by international standards, which 
reflects the importance of  naturalization as a governmental 
objective.58  In other words, the U.S. government can justify 
retaining a firm citizen/noncitizen distinction as an incentive 
for people to naturalize, so long as it compensates by making 
the transition to citizenship a relatively quick process.59
Very generally, to qualify for citizenship, 
naturalization applicants must have lived in the U.S. 
for at least five years as an LPR,60 or three years if  they 
are spouses of  U.S. citizens.61  Applicants must meet a 
minimum period of  physical presence in the U.S.,62 in 
addition to demonstrating “good moral character.”63
 In practice, the transition to citizenship is easy for 
many people, and the denial rate is relatively low.64  Still, 
denial rates do not account for those who fail to apply out 
of  fear of  being denied.  Many potential citizens find the 
English and civics requirements insurmountable obstacles. 
Others may not be able to pay the $675 application fee. 
Still others may not apply out of  fear that past crimes 
or violations of  immigration law will lead to a denial, or 
even deportation.  With IIRIRA’s dramatic expansion 
of  the grounds for inadmissibility to, and removal 
from, the U.S., these fears have gained new currency.
the more the law prioritizes a person’s ties 
to the U.S., the less important formal 
citizenship becomes as a means of  
gaining rights.
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III. From Suffrage to “Falsely Claiming Citizenship”
a. Restrictive Immigration and the Erosion of  Noncitizen Voting 
Rights  
 An undeniable correlation exists between U.S. 
immigration policy and noncitizen voting rights.65 
Noncitizens voted and held local office throughout the 
colonies beginning as early as 1692.66  The extension of  
voting rights to noncitizens in the U.S. occurred during a 
period of  relatively open immigration.  During the early 
colonial period, the federal government left the regulation 
of  immigration, including alien suffrage, largely to the 
states.67  Its first attempt to create uniformity among the 
states came with the passing of  the 1790 Naturalization 
Act, which regulated who could become a U.S. citizen.68 
The federal government only began to centralize 
control of  immigration in the late nineteenth century.
 Not surprisingly, throughout history, “the rise and 
fall of  xenophobic and nationalist tendencies” has greatly 
impacted both immigration law and immigrant voting 
rights.69  During the War of  1812, for example, increasing 
suspicion of  non-English immigrants decreased popular 
support for noncitizen voting, 70 though voting rights 
expanded again in the years leading up to the Civil War.71  At 
the height of  noncitizen voting in 1875, twenty-two states 
and territories had extended the franchise to noncitizens.72 
Beginning that same year, however, the U.S. government 
passed a series of  exclusion laws due in part to the influx of  
Chinese immigrants.73  As anti-immigrant sentiment began 
to rise around the turn of  the century, states one by one 
terminated voting rights for noncitizens.74  The final end to 
noncitizen suffrage roughly coincides with the end of  World 
War I,75 which also put an end to unlimited immigration 
and led to the creation of  a nation-origins quota system.76
 Even though the U.S. government eventually 
centralized control over immigration matters, it did not seek 
to regulate noncitizen voting.  In fact, the government did 
not create a provision barring entry for misrepresentation, 
the statutory precursor to IIRIRA’s false claims provisions, 
until after World War II.77  In 1952, the drafters of  the 
INA supported incorporation of  the misrepresentation 
provision into the permanent statute as an anti-communist 
measure.78  Initially, the INA’s provisions related to false 
claims were narrowly drawn:  noncitizens were only guilty 
of  making a false claim to citizenship if  the claim was 
made to a U.S. government official for the purpose of  
securing admission into the U.S.79  The 1986 Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Amendments80 significantly strengthened 
the fraud provisions, but continued to limit their application 
to noncitizens who made material representation 
for the purpose of  receiving immigration benefits.81
b. IIRIRA: A Fraudulent Sense of  Belonging?
 These provisions changed again for the worse in 1996 
when President Clinton signed IIRIRA into law.  IIRIRA 
closely followed another piece of  legislation, the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of  199682 (“AEDPA”), which 
was enacted one year after the Oklahoma City bombing 
to combat domestic and international terrorism.  IIRIRA, 
on the other hand, focused on illegal immigration reform. 
According to former INS General Counsel, Paul W. Virtue, 
IIRIRA represented the culmination of  
immigration-reform efforts that began with 
the Republican Party assuming majority 
control of  the House and Senate in 1994.  
Congress was faced with the task of  trying 
to strengthen our national security in the 
wake of  the 1992 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, while at the same time, 
trying to find a way to discourage illegal 
migration.  What had started as separate 
bills, one designed to reduce the annual 
number of  family and employment-based 
immigrants to the United States  
(legal immigration) and the other designed 
to address border security and deportation 
issues (illegal immigration), were combined 
in each house and then split again due to 
a concerted grass-roots lobbying effort.  
Separated from the more popular illegal-
immigration bills, the legal-immigration 
measures were defeated in both houses.83
Although Congress rejected the proposed bill on 
restrictions for “legal immigration,” many of  IIRIRA’s 
provisions, including those related to noncitizen voting, 
have nonetheless affected authorized immigrants.84
 Few of  IIRIRA’s sixty-plus provisions are immigrant-
friendly.  To achieve its goal of  curbing unauthorized 
immigration, IIRIRA strengthened border security, initiated 
the border fence project, added three and ten-year bars to re-
admission for immigration violators, tightened eligibility for 
cancellation of  removal, streamlined removal proceedings 
for certain classes of  immigrants, and severely restricted 
judicial review.85  The legislation also instituted electronic 
employment verification pilot programs, and removed 
public benefits for most undocumented immigrants while 
tightening eligibility restrictions for lawful immigrants.86
 Similarly, AEDPA and IIRIRA both expanded 
the criminal and non-criminal grounds of  inadmissibility 
and removal.87  IIRIRA also broadened the fraud 
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provisions of  the INA and made penalties more stringent 
to support efforts to curb unauthorized immigration 
at the border and in the workplace.88  IIRIRA added a 
ground of  inadmissibility, which effectively extended the 
applicability of  the general misrepresentation ground to 
false claims of  citizenship made to private employers.89 
It also added a comparable ground of  removability90 and 
made it a crime to make a false claim of  citizenship.91
 Even though the general false claim to citizenship 
provisions could technically encompass unlawful voting 
by immigrants, Congress added parallel provisions to 
deal specifically with that issue.  Section 347 of  IIRIRA 
creates new grounds of  inadmissibility and removal for 
noncitizens who vote in violation of  “any Federal, State, 
or local constitutional provisions, statute, ordinance, or 
regulation.”92  Though section 347 technically only applies 
to noncitizens who have actually voted, a noncitizen who 
unlawfully registers to vote may also be inadmissible or 
removable under the broad “any purpose” language of  the 
general false claim to citizenship provisions.93  In contrast to 
the unlawful voting provisions, the false claim provisions do 
not require a finding that the individual violated underlying 
election law, only that the person falsely represented herself  
as a U.S. citizen on or after September 30, 1996 for the 
purpose of  registering to vote or voting.94  Unlike the 
general false claims provisions, the provisions that apply 
specifically to unlawful voting are applicable retroactively.95
 Interestingly, IIRIRA creates two separate criminal 
penalties for unlawful voting.  Section 216 makes noncitizen 
voting in federal elections a general intent crime, punishable 
by fine and/or one year prison 
sentence.96  In addition, IIRIRA further 
provides that knowingly making a false 
statement or claim to vote or register 
to vote in any Federal, state, or local 
election constitutes a felony punishable 
by fine and/or five years in prison.97 
In 2000, the Child Citizenship Act98 (“CCA”) added an 
exception to the inadmissibility, removability, criminal 
prosecution, and finding of  lack of  good moral character 
provisions related to false claims to citizenship and unlawful 
voting, but it is extremely limited in its application.99
 Given Congress’s addition of  specific and undeniably 
harsh provisions to deal with noncitizen voting, this was 
presumably an issue of  major concern.  The legislative 
history, however, is silent on these provisions.  On one 
hand, their addition makes sense given Congress’s general 
intent to curb fraud with the enactment of  IIRIRA.  On 
the other hand, the provisions do not even loosely relate to 
the prevention of  unauthorized immigration—the prospect 
of  voting in U.S. elections is not likely a main reason that 
people cross the border without authorization.  Perhaps the 
provisions were meant to appease those voters who believe 
that politicians should not pander to noncitizens who cannot 
vote anyway, though this is merely speculation.  Whatever 
the reason, as discussed below, the impact of  the provisions 
clearly falls hardest on legal immigrants, specifically those 
applying to adjust status and legal permanent residents.
IV. The Negative Consequences of  an Illogical 
Punishment
a. Immigration Consequences of  Falsely Claiming Citizenship
  
 Although noncitizens are prohibited from voting 
in all federal, and most state and local elections, registering 
to vote as a noncitizen is fairly easy and many noncitizens 
may do so inadvertently.  The National Voter Registration 
Act of  1993100 (also known as the “Motor Voter Act”) 
requires states to provide individuals with the opportunity 
to register to vote when they apply for or renew their 
driver’s license.101  Only fifteen states require documentary 
proof  of  citizenship at the Department of  Motor Vehicles 
(“DMV”).102  Many states simply require the driver’s license 
applicant or the DMV clerk to check a box to indicate the 
individual’s citizenship status.103  Other states do not require 
any proof  of  citizenship.104  DMV employees routinely ask 
driver’s license applicants whether they would like to register 
to vote and do not have to verify that the person is actually 
eligible to vote.105  Noncitizens asked by a governmental 
official may assume they are eligible.  Similarly, community-
based organizations and voter registration campaigns may 
also encourage noncitizens to vote. 
Lastly, in contrast to the first two 
situations in which the noncitizen 
registers inadvertently, the possibility 
exists that some noncitizens knowingly, 
and without encouragement, 
register to vote and vote.
 The above scenarios raise a key question—the issue 
of  intent.  The provisions that specifically address unlawful 
voting do not explicitly require intent.  If  a noncitizen 
votes in violation of  federal, state, or local election law, that 
individual may be found inadmissible or removable under 
these provisions.106  Intent does come into play, however, in 
the determination of  whether the noncitizen violated election 
law by voting if  the election statute requires a showing of  
specific intent.  Department of  Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
policy guidelines clarify that in cases where the underlying 
election law requires a finding of  specific intent, adjudicating 
officers must assess the circumstances surrounding 
the voting accordingly.107  If  the officer determines the 
individual knowingly violated the relevant election law, 
the individual is removable subject to the officer’s exercise 
Only fifteen states require documentary 
proof  of  citizenship at the 
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of  prosecutorial discretion.108  If  there is no evidence of  
specific intent and the statute requires such a showing, then 
presumably the individual cannot be deemed removable.
 It is less clear whether an individual can be deemed 
inadmissible or removable absent a showing of  intent 
under the general provisions, which apply to false claims 
of  citizenship for any purpose or benefit under state or 
Federal law.109  The answer may hinge on the meaning of  
“false” in the context of  these provisions, a question which, 
to date, no courts have addressed.  One citizenship expert 
suggested conflicting interpretations of  the provision 
based on two distinct meanings of  “false.”110  A court may 
construe the provision as embodying an intent requirement 
based on the common understanding that false implies 
“intentionally untrue.”111  On the other hand, a court may 
construe Congress’s use of  “falsely claiming” as an attempt 
to distinguish this provision from adjacent ones dealing 
with fraud and misrepresentation.112  The former provision 
would clearly result in fewer immigration consequences 
for noncitizens who are charged with inadmissibility 
or removability under the false claims provisions,113 
but for the moment, there is little indication how the 
immigration agencies are actually implementing them.
 The fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to 
vote may become relevant at four points: application for 
a nonimmigrant visa, application for relief  from removal, 
adjustment of  status, and naturalization.  It is unclear if  
and how the various immigration agencies’ policies for 
handling noncitizen voting issues differ, and whether some 
agencies go to greater lengths than others to determine 
whether a noncitizen has unlawfully voted or registered to 
vote.  Still, the following discussion outlines the provisions’ 
potential to negatively impact noncitizens at each stage.
i. Application for Nonimmigrant Visa
 The provision may impact “nonimmigrants,” a legal 
term used to designate noncitizens whose presence in the 
U.S. is authorized on a temporary basis.114  A nonimmigrant 
visa applicant who violates the false claims or unlawful 
voter provisions can apply for a waiver.115  An otherwise 
inadmissible applicant may only be granted admission 
as a temporary nonimmigrant at the discretion of  the 
Attorney General.116  To qualify for a nonimmigrant visa, 
however, most applicants must demonstrate that they do 
not intend to stay in the United States.117  An individual 
who has previously voted or registered to vote in the U.S. 
will likely have a hard time convincing a consular office 
that she does not have the intention of  staying.118  Thus, 
in most circumstances the waiver will mean very little.
 
ii. Adjustment of  Status
 Under the INA, adjustment of  status is treated 
as an admission to the U.S. 119  Thus, if  a noncitizen 
becomes inadmissible as result of  making a false claim 
to citizenship for the purpose of  voting or registering to 
vote, or voting unlawfully, this will bar her from adjusting 
her status to permanent residence.120  While there is a 
waiver available for immigrants who are inadmissible under 
the general misrepresentation provision, 121 there are no 
waivers available for those who are found inadmissible as 
a result of  false claims to citizenship or unlawful voting.122
 Currently, it is unclear how aggressively DHS 
checks whether an applicant has registered to vote at 
the adjustment of  status stage.  There are no questions 
pertaining to unlawful voting on the adjustment of  status 
application.123  Still, some applicants have been denied on 
these grounds.124  Regardless, given the increasing integration 
of  government databases, a mere change in policy 
could make screening of  this kind routine procedure. 125
iii. Relief  from Removal
 If  a noncitizen is found removable as a result of  
voting-related violations, she can still apply for relief  from 
removal.  Unlawful voting or a false claim to citizenship 
can affect eligibility for relief  in several ways.  First, if  the 
individual is in exclusion proceedings and the violation 
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the individual 
will be statutorily barred from applying for non-LPR 
cancellation of  removal.126  DHS has determined that a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f), the specific intent 
provision, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.127 
There do not appear to be any cases challenging this 
designation, perhaps because convictions for knowingly 
making a false statement or claim to vote or register to vote 
are rare.  In the same policy statement, DHS indicates that a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 611, the general intent provision, 
likely do not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.128 
Interestingly, if  a noncitizen were found to have been 
convicted of  a crime involving moral turpitude as a result of  
unlawful voting or false claims to citizenship, theoretically 
that individual could apply for a discretionary waiver,129 even 
though there is no way to directly waive the false claim to 
citizenship or unlawful voting grounds of  inadmissibility. 
If  the individual is in removal proceedings, rather than 
exclusion proceedings, false claims to citizenship constitute 
an independent bar to non-LPR cancellation of  removal.130
Second, even if  the conviction does not constitute a 
crime involving moral turpitude a violation may preclude an 
individual from establishing good moral character, a statutory 
requirement for certain forms of  relief  such as non-LPR 
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cancellation of  removal and voluntary departure.131  Any 
two or more convictions, regardless of  whether the offenses 
involve moral turpitude, can preclude a finding of  good 
moral character if  the aggregate sentences to confinement 
were five years or more.132  Additionally, confinement to a 
penal institution for 180 days or more bars a finding of  good 
moral character.133  An individual can only avoid the bar if  he 
or she met the narrow exception established by the CCA.134
Lastly, even in the absence of  a criminal conviction, 
a violation negatively factors into the discretionary 
analysis accompanying many applications for relief  
including asylum, voluntary departure, and both LPR 
and non-LPR cancellation of  removal.  For noncitizens 
who lack strong equities, voting or registering to vote, 
could be a deciding factor in a denial of  relief, depending 
on the immigration judge.  Further, many types of  
discretionary decisions are not subject to judicial review.135
  
iv. Naturalization
 The provisions’ biggest impact is likely to be at the 
naturalization stage.  After IIRIRA, all officers conducting 
naturalization interviews are required to ask the applicant if  
she has ever voted or registered to vote in any election in the 
United States.136  In addition, the application for naturalization 
was amended to include questions related to false claims 
and voting.137  If  the individual violated relevant election 
law or made a false claim to citizenship when registering to 
vote or voting, and the applicant does not qualify for one 
of  the CCA exceptions, the adjudicator’s decision to initiate 
removal proceeding is one of  prosecutorial discretion.138
 If  the adjudicator decides that the case merits 
prosecutorial discretion, the adjudicator must still make a 
good moral character finding.139  If  a 
noncitizen has actually been convicted 
under either of  the voting related 
provisions, then the same analysis 
outlined above applies.140  In the 
absence of  a conviction or a finding 
that a conviction constitutes a crime 
involving moral turpitude, DHS policy guidelines suggest 
that if  the violation occurred in the distant past and the 
individual can establish good moral character “in spite of  
making a false claim to U.S. citizenship,” the adjudicator 
may exercise her discretion favorably, though DHS 
guidelines set the bar fairly high.141  If  the adjudicator 
denies the application, the noncitizen must apply for 
administrative review of  the decision within thirty days.142 
If  she fails on the second review, as a last resort, the 
applicant can petition a federal district court to conduct 
a de novo review of  her eligibility for naturalization.143
 It is impossible to tell how often voting-related false 
claims determine the outcome of  an application because 
DHS does not publish statistics of  its denial rate specific 
to these grounds.  It is equally impossible to tell how many 
LPRs do not file applications for fear that they will be denied. 
The lack of  immigrant waiver and very limited exception 
means the laws will have the hardest impact on applicants 
at the adjustment of  status and naturalization stages, in 
other words, the most viable candidates for citizenship.
 
b. Polarizing the Immigration Debate
 Immigration law defines the body politic “by 
establishing a ladder of  accession to permanent residence 
and then formal U.S. citizenship.”144  The immigration 
debate focuses on what set of  criteria a noncitizen must 
be required to meet before her inclusion into the body 
politic.145  Although lawmakers may have rational reasons 
for withholding voting rights for noncitizens,146 it does 
not follow that it is thus rational or necessary to deny 
immigration benefits to and potentially deport noncitizens 
who vote or register to vote in violation of  election law.
 Congress enacted IIRIRA in response to the 
growing fears over “illegal immigration.”147  Ironically, 
since the enactment of  IIRIRA, immigration experts 
have criticized the legislation on the grounds that it has 
contributed to an increase in the number of  unauthorized 
immigrants in the U.S.148  It is no coincidence that IIRIRA 
passed shortly after AEDPA, which Congress enacted 
primarily to combat the threat of  international terrorism. 
Advocates and academics alike have decried the increasingly 
frequent discursive linkages made by lawmakers between 
illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism as a sort of  fear-
mongering.149  While the rule of  law and national security are 
undeniably of  utmost importance to all 
members of  a society, the negative 
consequences of  this rhetoric are 
clear: an increasingly polarized, and 
oftentimes vitriolic, immigration debate.
 The thrust of  the debate is the big 
question of  line drawing—who is “in” 
and who is “out” and, just as important, who has the right to 
decide.  In the context of  voting rights, the debate centers on 
the issue of  voter fraud.  Anti-immigrant advocacy groups 
and media personalities frequently allege that noncitizen 
voting is undermining the integrity of  the electoral process 
and manipulating election outcomes.150  These voices use fear 
of  widespread voter fraud by noncitizens to gain support 
for stricter immigration policies.151  The false claims and 
unlawful voter provisions validate and legitimize those fears, 
regardless of  the real—de minimis—extent of  the problem.
 Those seeking to counter claims of  widespread voter 
fraud by noncitizens frequently argue that voter fraud is rare, 
Immigration law defines the body politic 
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largely because the consequences of  committing voter fraud 
are so disproportionate to the individual’s gain of  a single 
vote.152  Though convincing, this argument is not alone 
sufficient to counter arguments in favor of  maintaining the 
IIRIRA provisions.  For one, if  noncitizen voter fraud is a 
myth then the false claims and unlawful 
voting provisions do no harm.  Likewise, 
one might argue, if  noncitizens do 
commit voter fraud, then the provisions 
are necessary as a deterrent in the 
rational actor’s cost-benefit analysis. 
There are several responses, however, 
that highlight both the irrationality and the destructive effect 
of  IIRIRA’s false claims and unlawful voting provisions.
 First, even if  noncitizens are voting or registering 
to vote, studies have largely debunked the myth that 
noncitizen voting has improperly influenced elections.153 
Those individuals who violate election laws likely do so 
unintentionally.  Either they believe they are citizens, 
or they are not aware that only citizens can vote.  Many 
noncitizens may register to vote, at the DMV for example, 
but never actually cast a vote, in which case they have no 
effect on the outcome of  elections.  There have been a few 
incidents or allegations of  larger-scale voter fraud.154  In 
those types of  cases, however, individual noncitizens are 
led to believe they can vote by trusted community-based 
organizations.  These situations are likely to be rare.  Even 
where noncitizens face draconian enforcement measures, 
like what is currently happening in Arizona,155 immigrant 
advocacy groups are unlikely to risk the political and 
criminal consequences of  encouraging noncitizens to vote 
when alternate methods of  advocacy exist.  Thus, as long 
as advocacy groups are aware of  the voter restrictions, they 
are unlikely to use noncitizen voting as a strategic tool.
 Second, the IIRIRA provisions are not necessary to 
deter voter fraud.  The laws likely do not factor into the 
individual’s decisional calculus because most noncitizens, 
and even many immigration attorneys, are not aware of  
the consequences of  making a false claim to citizenship or 
even what making a false claim entails.156  Even assuming 
that noncitizens are aware of  the consequences of  
making a false claim in the context of  voting, the threat 
of  deportation or denial of  immigration benefits is not 
necessary to deter noncitizens.  Noncitizens who knowingly 
commit voter fraud can be prosecuted under existing 
state and federal laws, which impose significant penalties 
for unlawful voting.157  Immigration law can then treat 
these convictions the same way they treat all convictions. 
From a deterrence perspective, it is simply not necessary 
to create separate grounds of  inadmissibility and removal.
 Using deportation to sanction noncitizens for voting 
or registering to vote is grossly disproportionate to the offense, 
especially if  the noncitizen did so unknowingly.158  A single 
fraudulent vote is not likely to undermine the integrity of  the 
electoral process, and yet, the consequences of  deportation 
to an individual are enormous.159  Neither agency discretion 
nor the availability of  forms of  relief  mitigates this fact.160 
For one, cancellation of  removal and 
other forms of  removal relief  are quite 
limited in their availability.161  Second, 
in both cases, the adjudicator—
either an immigration judge or an 
agency official—is choosing between 
imposing the sanction or not imposing 
the sanction.162  Thus, the exercise of  discretion does not 
“inject proportionality” into the immigration system, simply 
put, because there are no alternative sanctions available.163
 Lastly, even if  noncitizen voting is rare, the IIRIRA 
false claims and unlawful voting provisions are far from 
benign.  For one, the provisions apply not only to those 
who vote, but also to those who register to vote.164  Those 
noncitizens that are found inadmissible or removable 
for either violation are equally negatively impacted—they 
may be denied immigration benefits and face possible 
deportation.165   In addition, the provisions bolster the 
rhetoric of  anti-immigration advocates.  Perhaps most 
disturbing, however, is their symbolic import.  In essence, 
the IIRIRA provisions use elections, the symbol of  the 
democratic process itself, to enforce immigration law.  It 
is difficult to imagine what could be further from the 
aspirational view of  democracy as “citizenship as presence.”166
 
c. An Improper Role for Immigration Law
 The tension between democratic norms of  inclusion 
and the inherently exclusive function of  immigration law 
may never be fully resolved.  Still, as Motomura suggests in 
his analysis of  three different conceptions of  immigration 
law, society can choose the degree to which it incorporates 
notions of  equality into the immigration system.167 
Regardless of  a society’s ultimate decision to incorporate 
noncitizens into the political process, the body politic has 
a duty to ensure that U.S. immigration law both serves the 
needs of  society and reflects societal ideals.168  In this respect, 
IIRIRA’s provisions represent a huge step backwards.
 Motomura’s call to view immigration as transition 
requires revisiting the idea of  extending voting rights to 
noncitizens.169  For Motomura, “immigration as transition 
means treating lawful immigrants as Americans in waiting 
from their first day in this country.”170  Because immigration 
as transition presumes full equality for LPRs who intend 
to naturalize,171 logically, this leads to the conclusion that 
LPRs should have some voting rights.172  Raskin and others 
have convincingly argued that LPRs should be allowed to 
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vote in local elections.173  Motomura echoes these proposals 
with the qualification that voting rights for LPRs should be 
temporally limited to the five-year period during which they 
are not allowed to naturalize.174  Motomura’s proposal to 
view immigration as transition bears significant resemblance 
to the history of  noncitizen voting in the U.S. as described by 
Raskin.  For Motomura, immigration law could do a better 
job of  recognizing the role of  LPRs in modern American 
society (“citizenship as standing”).175  In addition, extending 
the franchise to LPRs serves the 
practical function of  “foster[ing] civic 
education and involvement as aspects of  
integration and transition to citizenship” 
(“citizenship as integration”).176
 Prior to the enactment of  
IIRIRA, noncitizen voting in the 
U.S. most closely resembled Motomura’s second concept 
of  immigration as affiliation.  The logic of  immigration 
as affiliation prescribes that lawful immigrants gain rights 
proportionate to their length of  time in the country.177  In 
a system that is mostly based on the affiliation concept, 
the importance of  naturalization is deemphasized since 
LPRs eventually gain most of  the rights of  citizenship.178 
Motomura points out that in certain European countries that 
closely fit the immigration as affiliation model of  citizenship, 
resident noncitizens are allowed to vote in local elections.179 
If  naturalization is a priority in the U.S., under the affiliation 
rationale, it makes sense to withhold certain rights, such as 
the right to vote, in order to provide noncitizens with the 
incentive to naturalize.180  The withholding of  voting rights, 
however, is only justified so long as noncitizens actually 
benefit from other constitutional protections.181  While it is 
debatable whether the rights of  noncitizens were sufficiently 
protected prior to the enactment of  IIRIRA, when noncitizen 
voting rights were governed exclusively by election law (with 
criminal sanctions attached), the balance, though perhaps 
not ideal, was still justifiable under democratic principles.
 The landscape changed with the enactment of  
IIRIRA, which essentially gave immigration law a role to play 
in regulating noncitizen voting.  This aspect of  immigration 
law now most fully embodies the view of  immigration as 
contract, with the grounds of  inadmissibility and removal 
representing the “terms” of  the contract.  Before, noncitizens 
who voted unlawfully had only to suffer the criminal 
consequences, though still severe, of  their actions.  Now, the 
fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to vote is by itself, 
sufficient grounds for terminating that individual’s “contract” 
to remain in the United States.182  The contract theory of  
immigration, as described by Motomura, is premised on 
the notion that fairness and justice can be achieved through 
notice, promise, and expectations, rather than through any 
assumption that noncitizens are entitled to equal rights.183
 There are numerous problems with this rationale in 
the case of  the false claims and unlawful voting provisions. 
First, the terms of  the contract are unclear—what is a “false 
claim to citizenship” anyway?184  Second, at least in the case 
of  the unlawful voting provision, which applies retroactively, 
noncitizens do not get notice.185  Third, noncitizens may 
not reasonably expect to be denied immigration benefits 
or deported for voting or merely registering to vote. 
Motomura echoes the concerns, discussed above, about 
the inadequacy of  cancellation of  
removal and discretion for preserving 
fairness.186  Lastly, noncitizens have 
little choice over the terms.187  While 
Motomura highlights the unequal 
bargaining power of  noncitizens vis-
à-vis many aspects of  the immigration 
system, nowhere is this more clearly reflected than in the 
IIRIRA provisions: noncitizens may be deported for 
participating, even unknowingly, in the process through 
which their political rights are denied in the first place. 
In that sense, the IIRIRA provisions are doubly punitive.
 While these provisions make up only a small part 
of  the immigration system as a whole, they are nevertheless 
important because of  the values they reflect.  The provisions’ 
attempt to validate the concerns of  some citizens that the 
line between citizen and noncitizen has grown blurry risks 
further marginalizing noncitizens from the political process. 
Noncitizens have the right to participate politically through 
grassroots organizing and other informal channels.188 
Even if  one accepts the premise that denying noncitizens 
the right to vote is a legitimate part of  self-definition in 
a democracy, the IIRIRA provisions go one step too far 
in that they deny noncitizens even the potential to have 
a voice—formal or informal.  In Motomura’s words, “In 
the context of  national self-definition, focusing only on 
promises, notice, and expectations is too narrowly utilitarian 
and cavalier in its dismissal of  equality, even where, as in 
immigration and citizenship, some inequality is assumed.”189
V. Time for Radical Reform?: The Meaning of  
“Citizenship” for Noncitizens
 As currently written, the IIRIRA false claims 
and unlawful voting provisions solidly reject the notion 
of  “citizenship as presence.”  This paper has argued that 
these provisions have threatened rather than protected 
American democratic ideals.  There are many easy fixes 
that could mitigate their effects to some degree.  Congress 
could amend the provisions to explicitly incorporate 
a specific intent requirement, or make an immigrant 
waiver available, similar to one that exists for fraud and 
misrepresentation.  In the end, however, these solutions 
From an advocacy perspective, 
these provisions should be a
 wake-up call.
SPRING 2011 13
do not go far enough.  If  naturalization and integration 
are main goals of  the immigration system, immigration law 
cannot treat formal citizenship as an impermeable border. 
At the very least, the provisions must be removed.  Even 
then, more is required to transition to a system that more 
fully accounts for the true role of  noncitizens in society. 190
 From an advocacy perspective, these provisions 
should be a wake-up call.  Certainly, for the time being, 
immigration attorneys must pay greater attention to the 
implications of  these provisions for their individual clients. 
But, the provisions raise even greater issues in the context 
of  immigration reform: in whatever form it is likely to take, 
it is ironic that those most likely to be affected do not have a 
formal voice in the process.  Advocacy groups should push 
for the removal of  these provisions, which both literally and 
symbolically silence the noncitizen voice.  Advocates should 
also consider pushing for more radical reform, perhaps 
even going so far as to reinvigorate the noncitizen suffrage 
movement.  Given the growing political influence of  recently 
naturalized citizens, 191 the time may soon be right for such 
a movement, even if  its scope is limited to voting rights at 
the local level.192  In the end, if  the project of  self-definition 
excludes individuals like the one whose story began this 
paper, we have to question the validity of  the project.
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Amendment right to donate to U.S. political campaigns 
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Alien Donors: The Participation of  Non-Citizens in the U.S. 
Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503 
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be treated just like citizens in a number of  key areas, 
including family reunification, public education, public 
assistance, voting, and public employment”).
191 See Rob Paral & Associates, Immigration Policy Ctr., 
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policy implications of  noncitizen voting at the national 
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See Anne Parson’s “Inside the Authors’ Studio” interview on our website to learn more about her inspiration for the article, and her 
thoughts about the issues and questions emerging from the article. 
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INSECURE COMMUNITIES: HOW INCREASED LOCALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA THROUGH THE SECURE COMMUNITIES 
PROGRAM MAKES US LESS SAFE, AND MAY VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION 
By: Rachel Zoghlin1
An undocumented immigrant who lives in 
Maryland was recently stopped by the police while walking 
to the Hyattsville Metro Station to go to work.  Short, dark-
skinned and Latino, with long, black hair, the police told 
him that he resembled someone suspected of  mugging an 
old woman a few blocks away.  The police questioned him 
about his whereabouts (home) and what he was doing that 
morning (getting ready for work).  After approximately 
forty-five minutes, the police officers received a signal that 
some the real mugger had been apprehended across town, 
so the officers allowed the man to continue on his commute 
to work.  What would have happened if  he lived in Virginia 
(where Secure Communities is active state-wide) and not 
Maryland (where Secure Communities is only active in 
three counties)?  What if  the police never got the call that 
other officers had located the actual culprit?  A completely 
innocent Mexican waiter with no criminal record, who takes 
English classes, pays his taxes, and supports his family, may 
have been deported.
In the wake of  fiery controversy surrounding 
Arizona’s contentious immigration bill, S.B. 1070, the issue 
of  localization of  immigration enforcement sprung to the 
forefront of  national political debate.  Yet, S.B. 1070 is 
certainly not the first instance of  localities, unhappy with 
federal immigration enforcement, taking matters into their 
own hands.  De-centralization of  immigration enforcement 
is a growing trend, and has been the subject of  much legal 
debate.  Virginia recently adopted one method of  localized 
immigration enforcement, the Secure Communities 
program, making it “active” in all Virginia jurisdictions.2
Similarly, D.C. Police Chief  Cathy Lanier has lobbied for 
the implementation of  Secure Communities in the District 
of  Columbia.3  In the D.C., Maryland and Virginia area, 
advocates on both sides of  the debate have been ramping 
up their efforts to sway legislators and constituents.4
Of  the three million sets of  fingerprints taken at 
local jails between the onset of  the Secure Communities 
program in October 2008 and June of  this year, nearly 47,000 
fingerprints belonged to undocumented immigrants, against 
whom deportation proceedings were initiated.5  Nearly 
half  of  the individuals removed from the United States 
through Secure Communities have never been convicted of  
a crime.6
This article will introduce the Secure Communities 
program within the context of  the increased localization 
of  immigration enforcement.  It will also discuss some 
inherent problems with the program.  Part I will explain 
how the program works and address arguments made for 
and against the program.  Part II will discuss the rights 
maintained by immigrants, and the rights they are denied by 
virtue of  their non-citizen status.  Part III will examine the 
constitutionality of  Secure Communities through an Equal 
Protection lens.  Finally, Part IV will address the future of  
the Secure Communities program and the future of  localized 
immigration enforcement, by discussing the potential impact 
of  pending litigation, legislation, and advocacy within the 
immigration law field.  Part VI will also propose an alternative 
to the localized immigration enforcement movement, and 
will advise interested individuals on ways to advocate against 
the implementation of  the Secure Communities program in 
our local community.
I. The Move Towards Localized Immigration 
Enforcement
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in De Canas v. 
Bica that although the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power . . . [not every 
state law] which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of  
immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional 
power.”7  Still, the Supremacy Clause, in Article VI, clause 2 
of  the Constitution, has been frequently invoked to give the 
Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction over matters as 
international in nature as immigration.  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that state attempts to enact legislation 
governing immigrants and immigration are unlawful because 
they are preempted by Federal law. 8  Reaffirming the Federal 
Government’s power over immigration, the Supreme Court 
remarked that “[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory 
burdens upon the entrance or residence of  aliens lawfully 
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally 
derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have 
accordingly been held invalid.”9  More recently, the Federal 
Government again argued that a state unlawfully preempted 
Federal power by designing and implementing its own laws 
dealing with immigration within the state. For primarily that 
reason, Arizona’s controversial anti-immigration legislation, 
S.B. 1070, has been enjoined.10
Recent studies show that nearly eleven million 
immigrants may be living in the United States without 
documentation.11  Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), a division of  the Department of  Homeland Security, 
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faced with an overwhelming task and caseload, has sought 
alternative means to achieve their objective of  “enforce[ing] 
federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and 
immigration.”12  Over the past decade, increasing numbers 
of  state and local law enforcement agencies have begun to 
collaborate with the federal government to enforce federal 
immigration law.
Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) of  1952 through the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of  199613 to 
facilitate more rigorous enforcement of  immigration laws. 
In particular, section 287(g) of  IIRIRA authorizes the federal 
government to enter into Memorandums of  Agreement 
(MOAs) with state and local law enforcement agencies, so 
that local police can help enforce Federal immigration law. 
In response to the positive reception of  287(g) by state and 
local law enforcement agencies, ICE created the Office of  
State and Local Coordination (OSLC) in 2007.  OSLC builds 
and maintains a handful of  programs, collectively known as 
“ACCESS” (Agreements of  Cooperation in Communities 
to Enhance Safety and Security), which equip local law 
enforcement agents with a wealth of  tools to enforce federal 
immigration law.14  The Secure Communities initiative falls 
under ACCESS’s umbrella of  programs through which local 
law enforcement agencies can help with federal immigration 
enforcement.  Congress further amended sections 274 and 
276 of  the INA to give state and local law enforcement agents 
express authority to enforce the prohibition of  “smuggling, 
transporting, or harboring of  illegal immigrants” and to 
establish “criminal penalties for illegal reentry following 
deportation.”15
Similar to efforts of  the Legislature, throughout 
the George W. Bush Administration, the Executive branch 
ramped up efforts to utilize local law enforcement officials 
in enforcing immigration law.  In 2002, Attorney General 
Ashcroft issued a memorandum stating that the Department 
of  Justice was mistaken in asserting that local officers did 
not have the power to enforce civil immigration violations 
(e.g., overstaying a visa).16  Ashcroft’s memo stipulated that 
local officers have “inherent authority” to make immigration 
arrests based on violation of  civil immigration laws.17  The 
notion that local law enforcement maintains this “inherent 
authority” has been a powerful tool for law enforcement 
agencies attempting to substantiate their role as immigration 
enforcers.  This language has never been written into federal 
regulation, and the actual legal weight of  this memo is 
debated.18 
In increasing numbers, ICE has signed MOAs 
with local law enforcement agencies, giving state and local 
law enforcement officers authority and responsibility to 
enforce immigration laws within the normal course of  their 
duties.19  Although law enforcement officers must undergo 
sensitivity training under 287(g) agreements, and should 
make complaint procedures available in various languages, 
myriad problems remain: prominent racial profiling; chilling 
effect on Latino/a communities; lack of  oversight and 
accountability; potential infringement of  constitutional 
rights and denial of  due process.20
a. About Secure Communities
Although local law enforcement officers have been 
increasingly involved in helping ICE identify and remove 
criminal aliens, Secure Communities takes the localization 
of  immigration enforcement to a new level.  Under 
287(g)/ACCESS programs, local police officers train with 
immigration enforcement to implement federal immigration 
laws by checking immigration status of  individuals 
stopped on the street or brought into jail.21  Under Secure 
Communities, local law enforcement officers (not trained 
by federal immigration enforcement officers) are authorized 
to send the fingerprints of  all individuals charged with, but 
not yet convicted of  crime to ICE, enabling cross-checking 
mechanisms with the Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS) immigration database and the FBI criminal history 
database.22  If  the fingerprints match a DHS or FBI record, 
ICE is automatically notified, even if  the individual has 
never been convicted of  a crime.23  Local police can hold an 
individual suspected of  being in the country illegally for 48 
hours, until ICE arrives to take him or her into custody.24
To achieve its goals, Secure Communities uses 
a three-tiered priority list for detaining and removing the 
most dangerous and high-risk criminal aliens. Level 1, the 
top priority, is to apprehend violent offenders: murderers, 
rapists, kidnappers, and major drug offenders.25  The Level 
2 priority is to identify and remove individuals convicted 
of  minor drug offenses and property offenses such as 
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burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering.26  Level 3 
represents the lowest priority of  aliens to detain and deport 
and includes individuals who commit “public disorder” and 
minor traffic violations, such as driving without a license, or 
running a stop sign.27  Level 3 also includes the catch-all, “all 
others” arrested for other minor offenses.28
The program falls short, however, of  meeting its 
projected goal of  “Identifying and Removing Dangerous 
Threats to [the] Community.”29  In 2009, ICE data showed 
that, of  the 111,000 aliens successfully identified and detained 
through the Secure Communities program, approximately 
11,000 (10%) were charged with or convicted of  “Level 1” 
crimes; meanwhile, the other 90% of  aliens identified and 
detained were charged with or convicted of  lesser crimes, and 
not necessarily “dangerous threats” to their communities.30 
Nearly half  of  those currently detained in immigration 
detention have no criminal convictions at all.31  Moreover, 
five to six percent of  those identified and detained through 
Secure Communities are mistakenly identified as aliens, 
when they are actually U.S. citizens.32
Although the Secure Communities program was 
first introduced under the Bush Administration, it has 
expanded rapidly during the Obama Administration.33  As 
of  July 20, 2010, it was activated in 467 jurisdictions in 
twenty-six states.34  By September 28, 2010, the program 
was activated in 658 jurisdictions in thirty-two states.35  It 
is activated in all Virginia jurisdictions, and in four out of  
twenty-four counties in Maryland.  The District of  Columbia 
has refused police department attempts to implement the 
program.  ICE hopes to make the program available in 
every state by 2011,36 and in effect nation-wide by 2013.37 
As the program grows, political debate surrounding the 
controversial program continues.
b. Problems with Secure Communities 
i. Prominent Racial Profiling
 Although ICE maintains that the goal of  the Secure 
Communities program is to identify and remove dangerous 
criminal aliens, it effectively serves as a green-light for local 
law enforcement agencies to use racial profiling tactics to 
target Latino individuals they suspect to be undocumented 
immigrants.38  Once a law enforcement officer finds a 
pretext to arrest someone, the police officer can bring the 
arrested individual to the station for fingerprinting.  When 
all fingerprints are immediately sent to ICE and the FBI for 
immigration enforcement cross-checking, it matters very 
little what the purpose of  the initial arrest was, and whether 
the arrest ever led to a criminal conviction.  Police officers 
motivated to rid their communities of  Latino immigrants 
not only have an avenue to do so, but because their motives 
are never monitored or questioned, they are given nearly 
limitless power to enforce federal immigration law.
ii. Chilling Effect on Latino/a Communities
 If  police use the Secure Communities program 
as an excuse to identify and deport immigrants, fewer 
immigrants will feel comfortable calling the police to report 
criminal activity.  Alienating a subset of  a community, and, 
in urban neighborhoods, a very substantial percentage of  
the community, frustrates the goals and purposes of  law 
enforcement.  Police will have less information regarding 
the whereabouts of  individuals involved in actual criminal 
activity, because when some community members feel 
targeted and vulnerable, they stop cooperating with local 
police, making the entire community less safe.
iii. Lack of  Oversight and Accountability
 
A program, such as Secure Communities, wholly 
designed by an administrative agency, has never received 
legislative input as to specific procedures for oversight 
or accountability.  Indeed, ICE outlines priorities for the 
Secure Communities program, but it is solely responsible 
for ensuring that those priorities are met; if  they are not 
met, the impetus is on ICE alone to adjust its methods. 
Furthermore, besides the initial agreements between 
ICE and local law enforcement agencies, ICE has shown 
no indication that it intends to train or monitor local law 
enforcement in anti-racial profiling practices when utilizing 
Secure Communities.  Consequently, local law enforcement 
agents are free to use their increased power without 
supervisory guidance or interference.  Finally, ICE has 
been exceedingly reluctant to publish data regarding how 
effective the program has been in achieving its purported 
goals.  The program was launched in October of  2008, but 
ICE only recently, after various Freedom of  Information 
Act (FOIA) requests and complaints filed by advocacy 
groups suspicious of  foul play, acquiesced and published 
data on the number of  arrests connected to the program, 
the type of  criminal records of  aliens identified through the 
program, and the number of  individuals deported through 
Secure Communities.  Despite access to this information, 
many questions remain unanswered.   
iv. Potential Infringement of  Constitutional 
Rights and Denial of  Due Process
Because the Secure Communities program 
implicitly condones the use of  racial profiling (and racial 
discrimination) to achieve its goals, the program must be 
examined through a 
SPRING 2011 23
constitutional lens to ensure the protection of  fundamental 
rights.  If  the program is not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
specific and permissible government purpose, the program’s 
inherent discrimination violates the Equal Protection clause 
of  the Fourteenth Amendment.  Secure Communities is not 
narrowly tailored to suit its purported goal; in fact, it is not 
tailored in the least.  It encourages checking the immigration 
status of  all persons accused and arrested of  crimes, even 
where criminal charges are never pressed and individuals are 
never convicted.  The vast majority of  aliens identified and 
removed through the program have never been convicted 
of  a dangerous crime, or never been convicted of  any crime 
at all.  What is worse, about 5% of  the database “hits” 
through the Secure Communities program identify United 
States Citizens, not criminal aliens.
 Furthermore, as many immigration law scholars 
note, what was once considered a non-punitive consequence 
of  a civil infraction, immigration detention and deportation 
are increasingly likened to criminal punishment.39  As the 
consequences of  civil immigration violations become 
more severe, many argue that individuals involved in the 
immigration system should be afforded more substantial 
due process rights, like in the criminal system.  Without 
such procedural safeguards, our government runs the risk 
of  embodying an unfortunate hypocrisy, glorifying the 
protection of  liberty and freedom at all costs by ensuring 
proper due process before convicting and punishing the 
accused, while simultaneously denying such due process and 
enforcing severe judgments on others accused, on the basis 
of  immigration status.
c. Community Tension
Many advocates of  Secure Communities base their 
support on anti-terrorism efforts.40  Bringing to light the 
fact that some of  the 9/11 terrorists had been stopped for 
minor traffic violations before the infamous plane hijacking, 
some argue that if  local police officers had access to Secure 
Communities technology at the time, the suspects may 
have been identified earlier as criminal aliens, and could 
have been taken into custody and placed in deportation 
proceedings.41  According to some, if  Secure Communities 
had been implemented more broadly, and earlier, the entire 
devastating terrorist attack could have been averted, and 
the lives of  thousands of  innocent people could have 
been saved.42  Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch even 
proposed legislative amendments to immigration law 
that would require all localities to sign on to either 287(g) 
programs or Secure Communities.43
Proponents of  Secure Communities in Ohio praise 
the program as a tool to help identify dangerous criminals 
that would otherwise go undetected.  Butler County Sherriff  
Rick Jones attested, “[i]t’s really a heaven-sent for us. [. . . 
]  I don’t want [criminal aliens] in my community, I’ve got 
enough homegrown criminals here.”44  Indeed, as traditional 
methods of  law enforcement fail to target immigrant 
criminals specifically, Secure Communities helps differentiate 
between American citizen criminals and immigrants.  For 
law enforcement officials seeking to rid their localities of  
criminal aliens, the goals of  Secure Communities certainly 
align with their own.
Similarly, in Virginia, Fairfax County Sheriff  Stan 
Barry remarked that the Secure Communities program 
was “a win-win situation both for the community and law 
enforcement.”45  Barry boasts, “[w]e will be able to identify 
illegal immigrants who commit crimes in Fairfax County 
and get them in the process for deportation, and it does not 
require additional funds or manpower from us.”46  Indeed, 
Fairfax County will be able to identify undocumented 
immigrants much sooner in the criminal process, without 
needing to specifically recruit, employ, or train special teams 
of  law enforcement to deal exclusively with immigration 
enforcement.  Still, despite Barry’s contention that the 
program will not cost Virginia taxpayers money, the State is 
in the process of  building the largest immigration detention 
center in the Mid-Atlantic, a $21 million project that hopes 
to house up to 1,000 immigrant detainees by next year.47
In contrast, opponents of  Secure Communities argue 
that the program ultimately will result in communities being 
less safe.  Noting that Secure Communities enforcement has 
not resulted in significant deportation of  violent or dangerous 
criminals, CASA de Maryland Attorney, Enid Gonzalez, 
remarked that although the Program “claims to keep violent 
criminals off  the streets, [ . . .] it’s just incarcerating innocent 
busboys.”48  Furthermore, many advocates worry that the 
program has a chilling effect on Latino members of  the 
community, dissuading them from coming forward as crime 
victims and witnesses, and thereby enabling actual criminals 
to continue terrorizing the community.  An opponent of  
Secure Communities in Utah, Police Chief  Chris Burbank 
recognized this problem in his own community of  Salt Lake 
City:  “Fighting crime without the help of  one’s community 
[ . . . ] is like trying to disarm a hidden mine by stomping on 
the ground.  By the time you have found the problem, it is 
already too late.”49
Opponents in Virginia argue that the State unjustly 
instituted the Program without the approval or consent of  
the local government.  Although Secure Communities is most 
frequently enacted through individual agreements between 
localities and ICE, Virginia recently implemented Secure 
Communities state-wide, leaving many immigrants’ rights 
advocates in Arlington arguing that it was unfairly instituted, 
since the agreements had not been negotiated with Arlington 
law enforcement, or Arlington County government.50 
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Raising the level of  confusion about the implementation 
and possible dissolution of  Secure Communities, ICE first 
announced there are no opt-out options, but then later 
explained that despite discouragement, cities could opt out.51 
ICE Deputy Press Secretary has stated that localities like 
Arlington cannot opt-out of  the program through ICE, 
rather, the locality must settle the matter with the state 
government.52  Oddly, in a letter dated September 8, 2010, 
Secretary of  Homeland Security Janet Napolitano explained 
to Representative Zoe Lofgren that local jurisdictions could 
opt-out by formally notifying the Assistant Director for 
the Secure Communities Program.53  In early November 
2010, ICE officials met with Arlington County officials, 
and informed them that “local activated communities do 
not have the option of  withholding information from the 
[Secure Communities] program.”54
San Francisco’s Sherriff  repeatedly attempted 
to opt-out of  California’s growing implementation of  
Secure Communities.55  His appeal was denied by the 
State Attorney General,56 but San Francisco advocates 
persisted, searching for ways to escape the implementation 
of  Secure Communities.  On September 1, 2010, after two 
years of  dedicated advocacy by Immigrants’ rights groups 
and Sherriff  Michael Hennessey, ICE finally announced a 
procedure for local jurisdictions to request to opt-out of  
Secure Communities.57  Angela Chan, an attorney at the 
Asian Law Caucus acknowledged the potential impact this 
recent announcement may make: 
It’s a promising development that ICE 
has finally come out and acknowledged 
that the program is voluntary in a written 
statement.  The next step is for ICE to 
follow through and allow San Francisco 
to opt out since both our Sheriff  and our 
Board of  Supervisors have clearly stated 
our city’s request to opt out.58  
Similarly, attorneys and advocates in Arlington, Virginia 
have fervently lobbied state legislators to permit the county 
to opt-out of  the program.59  After indications that opting-
out was possible,60 the Arlington County Board voted to 
withdraw from Secure Communities.61
Whether jurisdictions feasibly can opt-out continues 
to be unclear.  After Arlington announced its intention to 
opt-out, a senior ICE official explained to the Washington 
Post: 
The only way a local jurisdiction could opt 
out of  the program is if  a state refused to 
send fingerprints to the FBI.  Since police 
and prosecutors need to know the criminal 
histories of  people they arrest, it is not 
realistic for states to withhold fingerprints 
from the FBI, which means it is impossible 
to withhold them from ICE.62  
In early October 2010, in stark contrast to its declaration 
one month earlier, ICE announced that local governments 
would not be able to opt-out of  the program.63  ICE 
Director John Morton conceded that “the agency would 
meet with the localities to discuss the issue, but in the end 
the agreement is with the state.”64  After meeting with ICE 
officials on November 5, 2010, Arlington County Manager 
Barbara Donnellan explained to the rest of  the County 
Board, “ICE stated that Secure Communities is a federal 
information-sharing program which links two federal 
fingerprint databases. . . .  The program does not require state 
and local law enforcement to partner with ICE in enforcing 
federal law.”65  Whether local jurisdictions will be free to 
opt-out remains to be definitively explained to confused law 
enforcement and government officials nation-wide.
As the debate grows, and immigrants’ rights groups 
advocate for the end of  the Secure Communities program, 
the concern of  whether and how the program infringes 
upon the rights of  immigrants becomes more ubiquitous. 
Although immigrants to the United States do not enjoy 
all of  the Constitutional rights as American citizens, the 
courts have held that immigrants enjoy some Constitutional 
protection.  As such, the Secure Communities program 
may need careful scrutiny to determine whether it satisfies 
Constitutional precedent.
II. Immigrants’ Rights
In determining whether constitutional rights extend 
to immigrants, courts have frequently considered whether the 
framers of  the Constitution would have meant for terms like 
“persons,” “people,” and “citizens,” to include immigrants. 
If  the terms were intended to include immigrants, which 
immigrants should be included?  Most often, whether 
constitutional rights are afforded to immigrants depends on 
their status.
Some rights guaranteed to United States citizens 
have rarely been afforded to immigrants, and have rarely been 
contested.  For example, interpretations of  the Constitution 
dating back to the early 1800s indicate that aliens were not 
included in “the people of  the several states” who enjoyed 
the right to vote.66  Voting was considered a privilege, or 
at most, a “political right,” subject to the discretion of  the 
State.67  In United States v. Esparaza-Mendoza, the Supreme 
Court determined in 1874 that “citizenship has not in all 
cases been made a condition precedent to the enjoyment 
of  the right of  suffrage.”68  However, scholars note that 
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un-naturalized alien immigrants were not officially excluded 
from suffrage until 1928.69  The conclusion that immigrants 
are not included in “the people of  the several states” has 
left the door open to the determination that immigrants are 
excluded from several other Constitutional protections as 
well.
a. Equal Protection
Despite being denied the right to vote, immigrants 
are afforded some constitutional rights.  Plyler v. Doe ensured 
that immigrants are protected under the Equal Protection 
clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment. 70  In Plyler, a group 
of  undocumented Mexican children sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief  against a Texas statute that excluded them 
from access to free education at state public schools.71  The 
Supreme Court struck down the statute, noting that even 
though the children had not been “legally admitted” to the 
United States, discrimination against them on the basis of  
their immigration status was impermissible because the 
State did not establish a rational basis sufficient to deny the 
benefit of  public education.72  Reflecting on the text of  the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of  the 
laws[,]”73 the court held that “an alien is surely a ‘person’ in 
any ordinary sense of  that term.”74  Because undocumented 
alien children are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
law discriminating against them on the basis of  immigration 
status violated their Constitutional right to Equal Protection 
because, although conserving the state’s financial resources 
may be a legitimate government interest, the law was not 
narrowly tailored enough to advance such an interest.75
Even facially neutral laws have been found to 
violate the Equal Protection clause if  they are applied 
in a racially discriminatory manner against immigrants. 
In the 1880s, many Chinese citizens immigrated to the 
Western United States and opened small businesses.  A 
San Francisco ordinance gave the San Francisco Board 
of  Supervisors the power to oversee and authorize the 
opening and maintenance of  laundromats, particularly 
laundromats in wooden buildings.  Although the ordinance 
was not discriminatory on its face, the custom of  the Board 
of  Supervisors was to deny laundry permits to Chinese 
laundry shop owners.  The Supreme Court held in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins that the arbitrary and discriminatory practices 
of  the Board of  Supervisors, effectively barring Chinese 
immigrants from the entire profession of  owning and 
operating laundromats, constituted racial discrimination and 
therefore infringed upon the Constitutional rights of  Chinese 
immigrant applicants.76  The court noted that, “[t]he rights 
of  the petitioners . . . are not less because they are aliens 
and subjects of  the emperor of  China.”77  Reflecting upon 
protections ensured by the Constitution, in invalidating the 
local ordinance, the Supreme Court stated: 
[I]f, by an ordinance general in its terms 
and form, like the one in question, by 
reserving an arbitrary discretion in the 
enacting body to grant or deny permission 
to engage in a proper and necessary calling, 
a discrimination against any class can be 
made in its execution, thereby evading and 
in effect nullifying the provisions of  the 
national constitution, then the insertion of  
provisions to guard the rights of  every class 
and person in that instrument was a vain 
and futile act.78
In invalidating the San Francisco ordinance, the court 
held that the Equal Protection clause applied universally 
to all people, without regard to race, color, or nationality.79 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reinforced the notion 
that laws based on alienage or immigration status be subject 
to a higher level of  judicial scrutiny.80  As such, “the power 
of  a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants 
as a class is confined within narrow limits.”81
b. Confusion, Abridgement and Reinforcement of  Immigrants’ 
Rights
In the years since Yick Wo, Constitutional rights 
afforded to immigrants have been substantially abridged. 
Indeed, as the court in Mathews v. Diaz noted, “[i]n the exercise 
of  its broad power over naturalization and immigration, 
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable 
if  applied to citizens.”82
In 1904, John Turner, an Irish citizen and immigrant 
to the United States, filed a writ of  habeas corpus after 
his detention and the commencement of  deportation 
proceedings.  Turner was a self-proclaimed anarchist, and 
the 1903 Act to Regulate the Immigration of  Aliens into 
the United States prohibited anarchists from entering the 
country.83  Many later courts have co-opted one famous 
line of  dicta from Turner, in order to further deny rights to 
immigrants: “[An alien] does not become one of  the people 
to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by 
an attempt to enter, forbidden by law.”84  The Supreme 
Court held that the 1903 Act was not an unconstitutional 
abridgment of  First Amendment rights; the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of  free speech did not extend to an 
alien anarchist, particularly when his entry into the country 
was prohibited by an act of  Congress.85
Similarly, in 1945, an Australian citizen and 
immigrant to the United States filed a writ of  habeas corpus 
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appealing his detention and imminent deportation after he 
was determined to be affiliated with the Communist party in 
violation of  an amendment to the Immigration Act of  1917.86 
Unlike Turner, however, the court determined that Bridges’ 
“isolated instances”87 of  affiliation with the Communist party 
did not necessitate his immediate deportation.  Somewhat 
confusingly, the court asserted that aliens residing within 
the United States are afforded Constitutional protections of  
freedom of  speech and freedom of  press.88  In reversing 
the Circuit court’s dismissal of  Bridges’ habeas petition, the 
court reiterated that, 
although deportation technically is not 
criminal punishment . . . it may nevertheless 
visit as great a hardship as the deprivation 
of  the right to pursue a vocation or a 
calling. . . . As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis 
. . . deportation may result in the loss ‘of  all 
that makes life worth living’.89
As such, procedures involving such a deprivation must 
“meet the essential standards of  fairness.”90  The court 
determined that the lower courts misconstrued the definition 
of  “affiliation” when considering Bridges’ relationship to 
the communist party, and therefore his detention under the 
deportation order was indeed unlawful.  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Murphy remarked famously upon the 
importance of  safeguarding Constitutional rights:
The record in this case will stand forever as 
a monument to man’s intolerance of  man.  
Seldom if  ever in the history of  this nation 
has there been such a concentrated and 
relentless crusade to deport an individual 
because he dared to exercise the freedom that 
belongs to him as a human being and that is 
guaranteed to him by the Constitution.91  . 
. .  [T]he Constitution has been more than 
a silent, anemic witness to this proceeding.  
It has not stood idly by while one of  its 
subjects is being excommunicated from 
this nation without the slightest proof  
that his presence constitutes a clear and 
present danger to the public welfare.  Nor 
has it remained aloof  while this individual 
is being deported, resulting in the loss 
‘of  all that makes life worth living,’ . . . .  
When the immutable freedoms guaranteed 
by the Bill of  Rights have been so openly 
and concededly ignored, the full wrath of  
constitutional condemnation descends 
upon the action taken by the Government.  
And only by expressing that wrath can we 
give form and substance to ‘the great, the 
indispensable democratic freedoms,’ to 
which this nation is dedicated.92
Although seemingly progressive and forward-
thinking, Justice Murphy’s remarks have been used to both 
bolster the rights of  lawfully present immigrants, and to deny 
Constitutional rights to undocumented immigrants.  Justice 
Murphy recognized the limitations of  the Constitution, 
noting that “[s]ince an alien obviously brings with him no 
constitutional rights,” Congress may enact laws excluding 
him or her as it sees fit.93  Murphy reasoned, “once an 
alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to 
all people within our borders . . . [including] the First and 
the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of  the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”94
In 1982, the Supreme Court seemingly defied earlier 
case law regarding the Constitutional rights of  immigrants 
when it found valid a California statute requiring United 
States citizenship for employment as a government officer. 
The court explained that, 
[t]he exclusion of  aliens from basic 
governmental processes is not a deficiency 
in the democratic system but a necessary 
consequence of  the community’s process 
of  political self-definition.  Self-government 
. . . begins by defining the scope of  the 
community of  the governed and thus of  the 
governors as well: Aliens are by definition 
those outside of  this community.95
The exclusion of  aliens from the definition of  community 
stands in contrast to prior declarations that aliens are 
included within the definition of  “people” protected under 
the Constitution.96
Diverging interpretations of  whether immigrants 
should be afforded Constitutional protections continue to 
result in differing and sometimes conflicting case law.  A 
recent local case in a Virginia circuit court held that an 
undocumented immigrant was barred from bringing a 
workers’ compensation claim against his employer.97  The 
court determined that, although Virginia code defined 
“employee” as “every person, including aliens and minors, in 
the service of  another under any contract of  hire . . . whether 
lawfully or unlawfully employed[,]” an undocumented 
immigrant could not be included in that definition “without 
subverting federal immigration policy.”98  Relief  like worker’s 
compensation “is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, 
as expressed by Congress in the Immigration Reform and 
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Control Act of  1986.”99
Looking back, the Plyler decision may have been 
either an aberration on a historical tradition of  denying 
rights to immigrants, or it may be a turning point towards 
broader assurance of  rights for aliens in the United States. 
While some immigrants are afforded Constitutional and 
other legal protections, others are excluded due to various 
interpretations of  “person,” “people,” “employee,” and 
even “immigrant.”  Still, precedent set by Plyler assures that 
all immigrants (documented and undocumented alike) are 
protected by the Equal Protection clause.  Considering both 
the broad power of  Congress with respect to immigration, 
and the rights that immigrants maintain under the 
Constitution, is Secure Communities a permissible exercise 
of  government power?
III. Secure Communities: An Equal Protection 
Analysis
A law violates the Equal Protection clause when 
it denies a benefit to a discrete class of  people while it is 
afforded to others similarly situated.  In analyzing the 
constitutionality of  a law under Equal Protection, a court 
will first determine what level of  scrutiny must be applied. 
A law is presumed valid unless a challenger shows that the 
law in question falls within exceptions to this presumption: 
if  the law infringes upon a fundamental right; if  the law 
distorts the political process; if  the law targets a racial or 
religious minority; or if  the law targets another “discrete 
and insular minority.”100
The next step in an Equal Protection analysis is 
discerning whether the law seeks to achieve a permissible 
government purpose.  If  the purported goal of  the law is 
impermissible, it fails an Equal Protection review, and is 
unconstitutional.  However, the actual purpose of  a law 
may differ from its purported goal.  If  the actual purpose 
of  a law is impermissible, it also fails an Equal Protection 
review, and is unconstitutional.  If  the government purpose 
is legitimate, the final step is to determine whether the law is 
related to the achievement of  its goal.
a. What Level of  Scrutiny Should be Applied?
For the purposes of  an Equal Protection challenge, 
a law is presumed valid, and subject to rational basis review, 
unless a challenger can show either that the benefit denied 
is a fundamental right, or that individuals denied the benefit 
are part of  a discrete or suspect class.101  If  the benefit denied 
is a fundamental right, the court will review the questionable 
law or practice with strict scrutiny.  If  the law discriminately 
affords the benefit, and denies it to a group of  individuals 
on the basis of  race or religion, the court similarly applies 
strict scrutiny review.  However, if  the law denies a benefit 
on the basis of  legitimate differences between differentiated 
classes, or the characteristic upon which the discrimination 
is based is not an immutable characteristic, the court 
may apply an intermediate level of  review, less stringent 
than strict scrutiny, but more stringent than rational basis 
review.102  Although discrimination on the basis of  race 
103 and national origin are afforded strict scrutiny review, 
discrimination on the basis of  immigration status is analyzed 
under intermediate scrutiny.104  Immigration status is largely 
considered a voluntary condition, and therefore not an 
immutable characteristic.105  Still, immigrants are a discrete 
and vulnerable class, and often the target of  discrimination. 
While laws analyzed under rational basis review are given 
much deference, and only rarely overturned, laws evaluated 
under intermediate review or strict scrutiny are subject to a 
higher standard; as such, they are examined more critically 
to determine if  the discrimination in question is sufficiently 
invidious to be deemed unconstitutional.
According to Plyler, although immigrants are a 
discrete class of  individuals, and frequently discriminated 
against, their status is at least partly voluntary (and not 
immutable); therefore, their Equal Protection claim may 
be subject to an intermediate level of  scrutiny.  One could 
argue that the immigration status of  most undocumented 
immigrants is involuntary because there are few and near-
impossible legal avenues for an undocumented immigrant 
to adjust his/her status.  Furthermore, many individuals 
faced with poverty, political persecution, or gang violence 
in their home country, feel as though they have no choice 
but to immigrate to the United States.  Still, some would 
argue that, albeit an unappealing choice between remaining 
in the United States undocumented or returning to one’s 
country of  origin, the fact that an individual chooses to 
remain in the United States without documentation is 
evidence of  his/her voluntarily determined status; therefore 
an Equal Protection claim would require an analysis under 
intermediate scrutiny.
b. Permissible Government Purpose
i. Purported Purpose
Does the Secure Communities program seek to 
achieve a permissible government goal?  ICE’s purported 
goals of  Secure Communities are to identify aliens in law 
enforcement custody, prioritize apprehending and removing 
criminal aliens who pose the greatest threat to public safety, 
and efficiently identify, process and remove criminal aliens 
from the United States.106
First, identifying aliens in law enforcement 
custody may be problematic.  Although deportation was 
THE MODERN AMERICAN28
always considered a civil penalty, the current process and 
consequences of  deportation make the reality of  deportation 
more like criminal punishment.107  If  deportation is more akin 
to a criminal punishment, aliens in custody should be given 
proper due process, including notice, an opportunity to be 
heard, and an opportunity to contest charges against them, 
before punishment is exacted.  Identifying, apprehending 
and removing criminal aliens from the United States may 
be a permissible goal for the federal government, but is it 
a permissible responsibility for localities?  Surely efficiency 
in the process of  identifying and removing criminal 
aliens should be a permissible government goal, but is it 
permissible to delegate this power to localities, and require 
locality compliance?  It is likely permissible if  localities opt-
in to the program on their own accord, but ICE expects to 
have the Secure Communities program in effect nation-wide 
by 2013.108  Requiring states and localities to enforce federal 
law is a violation of  the Tenth Amendment.109  If  Secure 
Communities defies the Tenth Amendment by unlawfully 
forcing state participation in the enforcement of  federal 
law, it will have an impermissible goal and will consequently 
violate Equal Protection principles as well.
ii. Actual Purpose
Where a facially-neutral law has a dubiously 
impermissible actual purpose, the court will take into account 
the actual purpose in analyzing whether the law violates the 
Equal Protection clause.  However, the court most often 
defers to decisions of  the legislature where the level of  
scrutiny is not heightened.110  If  the impermissible outcome 
of  the law is simply an unintended effect, a law may not 
necessarily be invalidated for having an impermissible 
purpose.  However, if  the court determines that a law has 
an impermissible intended purpose, despite being facially 
neutral, the court may invalidate it for violating Equal 
Protection.111
ICE maintains that the actual purpose of  Secure 
Communities is to ensure community safety by removing 
dangerous criminal aliens.  However, ICE’s own statistics 
show that the majority of  those identified and removed 
through Secure Communities have been Level 2 and Level 
3 offenders.112  Indeed, only 8-10% of  those identified 
through the program are Level 1 offenders, those specifically 
targeted as dangerous and high-risk threats.  Interestingly, 
the number of  Level 1 offenders is only slightly higher than 
the number of  U.S. citizens who are identified as a “hit” 
through the Secure Communities program (5%).113
Specific data on the race and national origin 
of  individuals identified and deported through Secure 
Communities is seriously lacking, and is the subject of  both 
FOIA investigations and complaints.114  If  this specific data 
were published, it may very likely show that the overwhelming 
majority of  individuals identified through the program are 
Latino.  Although the program does not overtly require 
discrimination on the basis of  race, its intended effect is to 
remove as many Latino immigrants from the United States 
as possible.  If  this were the case, the program would fail an 
Equal Protection challenge, for promoting an impermissible 
government objective.
c. Ends and Means Nexus
i. How Closely Should the Program Fit its 
Purported Goals?
Assuming that an analyzing court determines that 
the purpose of  the Secure Communities program is not 
dubious, but rather a permissible government goal, how 
broad or narrow must be program be tailored to remain 
constitutionally valid under Equal Protection?  Under a 
rational basis review, a law challenged under Equal Protection 
must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. 
It is unlikely that Secure Communities, a program highly 
contested for its overwhelming reliance on racial profiling, 
would be subject to such a low level of  constitutional review. 
If  Secure Communities were analyzed under rational basis 
review, because the court pays high deference to existing 
laws and administrative programs, Secure Communities 
would likely be found constitutionally permissible.
Under strict scrutiny review, a challenged program 
is presumed invalid.  In order to remain valid, the program 
must be necessary to achieve a compelling government 
purpose.  Under intermediate scrutiny review, a challenged 
program must be narrowly tailored to achieve an important 
government goal.  If  ICE’s important government goal 
is prioritizing the identification and removal of  criminal 
aliens, it may need to clarify the definition of  a “criminal 
alien.”  If  violating a civil immigration law is not a crime, 
undocumented aliens who have never been convicted 
of  criminal offenses would not be “criminal aliens,” and 
therefore would not be reached by the Secure Communities 
program.  If  this is the case, the fact that some non-criminal 
undocumented workers have been removed under the Secure 
Communities program may constitute prima facie evidence 
that the government’s program is not sufficiently tailored 
to meet its goal.  It is unlawfully over-inclusive, catching 
in its net far more individuals than it purports to identify 
and deport.  If  the program is too broad in attempting to 
achieve its purported goal, it may be an unconstitutional 
violation of  Equal Protection.
ii. Negative Externalities and Policy Concern 
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If  the goal of  Secure Communities is to promote 
safety, it is deeply and ironically flawed since a troubling 
consequence of  Secure Communities is its profound chilling 
effect on immigrants with respect to reporting crimes. 
Concerned about their potential vulnerability to inquiries 
about immigration status, fewer immigrants who are crime 
witnesses or victims will come forward to the authorities.115 
Increased reluctance to report criminal activity can only 
result in insecure communities, where criminals remain free 
to commit more crimes.
Additionally, although ICE admitted that 5% of  
individuals identified through the Program are U.S. citizens, 
it never mentioned how many of  those identified were 
Lawful Permanent Residents. ICE’s data fails to include 
how often U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents 
were arrested, fingerprinted, identified, and detained by 
ICE as a result of  Secure Communities.  The Supreme 
Court cautioned against imposing substantial burdens on 
lawful immigrants, because “our traditional policy [is] not 
treating aliens as a thing apart.”116  Highlighting Congress’s 
role in specifically regulating immigration, the Court held 
that the purpose of  immigration regulation is to “protect 
the personal liberties of  law-abiding aliens . . . and to leave 
them free from the possibility of  inquisitorial practices 
and police surveillance.”117  Because Secure Communities 
effectively facilitates removals for many individuals who, 
though arrested and fingerprinted, have never have been 
convicted of  a crime, the Program inherently stands in stark 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s mandate of  leaving law-
abiding aliens free from invasive police practices.
Furthermore, the Secure Communities program 
relies heavily on racial profiling to achieve its goal of  
identifying and removing alien immigrants.  The practice of  
racial profiling alone is problematic because it perpetuates 
negative stereotypes and bias-related crime against 
individuals on the basis of  their skin color.  Furthermore, 
it makes already-vulnerable groups even more vulnerable to 
discrimination and socio-economic oppression.  It reinforces 
despicable notions of  inferiority, and deeply offends the 
dignity of  people of  color, regarding both an individual’s 
sense of  self-worth and the presumptive social value of  
such and individual in the community.118  As Justice Murphy 
remarked in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
giv[ing] constitutional sanction to that 
inference [that race could be used as a 
proxy for criminal suspicion] . . . is to adopt 
one of  the cruelest of  the rationales used 
by our enemies to destroy the dignity of  
the individual and to encourage and open 
the door to discriminatory actions against 
other minority groups in the passions of  
tomorrow.119
More recently, Justice Goldberg, reflecting upon the 
Civil Rights Act of  1964, emphasized the importance of  
protecting the dignity of  individuals discriminated against 
on the basis of  race: “Discrimination is not simply dollars 
and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, 
frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely 
feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of  
the public because of  his race or color.”120
Governmental utilization of  racial profiling 
programs serves to aggravate these issues.  Condoning 
racial profiling tactics is not only unethical, but may soon 
be explicitly unlawful as well.121  Considering the multitude 
of  negative externalities of  Secure Communities program, 
Congress must specifically address the program, and local 
governments must reconsider their involvement in the 
enforcement of  federal immigration law.
IV. The Future of  Secure Communities
a. Litigation Against Secure Communities
In February 2010, the National Day Laborer 
Organizing Network, Center for Constitutional Rights, and 
Immigration Justice Clinic of  the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of  Law (the “Network”) filed a Freedom of  
Information Act (FOIA) request, to obtain data related to 
the two-year old Secure Communities program.122  In late 
April 2010, they commenced a lawsuit against ICE, DHS, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, the FBI, and 
the Office of  Legal Counsel, for failing to release agency 
records under the Freedom of  Information Act.123  After 
much delay, ICE and DHS reluctantly disclosed information 
about the Secure Communities program, confirming what 
advocates at the Network feared: the Program functions 
as a “dragnet,” funneling individuals into a highly flawed 
detention and removal system; 79% of  those caught in 
the Program’s net are not criminals or were picked up for 
minor offenses; the Program serves as a smokescreen for 
racial profiling, allowing police officers to make arrests that 
could lead to deportations, rather than to convictions; and 
although the Program is not mandatory, there is no clear 
opt-out procedure.124  Although ICE complied with FOIA 
requests, many of  the questionable practices inherent in 
Secure Communities remain.  As such, it is likely that the 
Network, or other like-minded advocacy organizations, will 
continue to pursue litigation against ICE to remedy these 
issues.
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b. Effect of  Judicial Findings in United States v. Arizona
If  Arizona’s SB 1070 withstands Constitutional 
scrutiny, it may provide a dangerous foundation for racial 
profiling and the expansion of  Secure Communities.  Like 
Secure Communities, Arizona’s recent anti-immigration bill 
has been the subject of  much political debate.  Both programs 
involve delegating significant responsibility to unsupervised 
local law enforcement officers, which implicates a grave 
potential for racial profiling tactics to be tacitly enacted in 
day-to-day policing.
The most prominent argument in the Federal 
Government’s case against the State of  Arizona regarding 
Arizona’s anti-immigration law, SB 1070, is that the state 
impermissibly attempts to preempt an area of  law specifically 
reserved for the Federal Government.  Control over 
immigration policy and enforcement, a clear responsibility 
of  the Federal Government,125 is reinforced by the Tenth 
Amendment.126  However, considering the proliferation 
of  ICE programs that delegate significant power in 
immigration enforcement to localities, this argument may 
no longer be persuasive.  Arizona District Court Judge 
Bolton granted a preliminary injunction against SB1070,127 
concurring with the Federal Government’s argument that 
Arizona unlawfully attempted to preempt Federal law, but 
in the absence of  clear Congressional discussion of  ICE’s 
current programs, and authority to delegate the power 
of  immigration enforcement, the Secure Communities 
program may similarly be found to be an impermissible co-
opting of  Federal authority.  Furthermore, ICE’s attempt to 
delegate its clearly federal responsibility to state and local 
governments may violate the Tenth Amendment.128
c. The Impact of  Congressional Legislation: The End Racial 
Profiling Act of  2010
Legislative efforts to end discrimination are evident 
in HR 5748, also known as the End Racial Profiling Act 
of  2010.  The bill, introduced in Congress in July of  2010, 
seeks to eliminate racial profiling by law enforcement by 
giving individual victims of  racial profiling a private right 
of  action to sue; by creating a disparate impact private 
right of  action; by requiring the Attorney General’s 
oversight; and by requiring data collection and publication, 
allowing the public to provide external oversight.129
If  passed, this bill has the potential to change the 
current state of  immigration enforcement radically, and 
ensure the liberty and dignity of  all citizens, immigrants, 
residents and visitors to the United States.  Granting 
individual victims of  racial profiling a private right of  
action to sue would force ICE and local law enforcement 
to exercise discretion and care in routine practices.  Rather 
than receiving measly declarative relief, victims may finally 
witness unlawful government action being judicially 
sanctioned.  Rather than receiving apologies, victims would 
receive financial compensation.  Additionally, allowing 
a disparate impact private right of  action ensures that 
facially-neutral, or even unintentional discrimination is 
avoided.  Perhaps most significantly, the bill would require 
agencies like ICE to regularly publish data to show how its 
program functions, and whether it is achieving its goals.  
Making such data available to the public would force ICE 
to be responsible for the way in which its programs are 
executed.  It would better equip advocacy organizations 
to ensure that civil rights are not violated.  The bill would 
require steadfast and dedicated oversight to ensure that 
racial profiling be eradicated.  Still, although this bill would 
deeply de-claw some of  the problematic aspects of  the 
Secure Communities program, it would not rectify all of  its 
injustices.
d. Alternative Approaches to Immigration Enforcement
Rather than engaging in complicated, ad-hoc, non-
congressionally authorized, federal-local collaborations 
to identify and deport all undocumented immigrants, the 
Federal government needs to re-examine and reinstate 
comprehensive immigration reform, including just and fair 
immigration enforcement.  This reform should consider 
why individuals come into the United States illegally.  As 
experts at the Migration Policy Institute point out, “our 
immigration laws provide inadequate legal avenues to enter 
the United States for employment purposes at levels that 
our economy demands.”130
By issuing visas like the H1-A and H1-B, U.S. 
Customs and Immigration Services grants temporary 
legal status to immigrants coming to work in the United 
States.  Unfortunately, the government offers only 66,000 
visas to individuals coming to work in low-skilled, non-
agricultural settings inside the United States; this number 
falls grossly below the number of  people interested, and 
actually performing this work.131  If  the U.S. issued more 
visas to low-skilled workers, more people would follow 
legal avenues to obtain employment here.  Furthermore, 
because applying for and obtaining visas through family 
members take many immigrants nearly a decade,132 there 
is little incentive to follow government rules.  Rather, 
as experts note, immigrants and their employers follow 
market rules.133
Indeed, changes in immigration enforcement 
are an empty and fool-hardy attempt to solve what 
is a tremendously decisive issue to all sides of  the 
contemporary political debate.  Before reforming 
immigration enforcement, the federal government 
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first needs to address much-needed reforms to federal 
immigration policy.
e. Local Advocacy Efforts Against Secure Communities
Rights Working Group (RWG) a group of  
hundreds of  progressive local, state and national 
organizations, committed to protecting civil liberties and 
human rights, spearheads two campaigns closely tied to 
addressing and reforming recent changes in immigration 
enforcement: Face the Truth (addressing racial profiling), 
and Hold DHS Accountable (urging President Obama to 
issue a moratorium on current immigration enforcement 
policies that deny due process).  In addition to supporting 
pending legislation by the Network and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, RWG also worked closely with 
Virginia-based attorneys in Arlington to investigate the 
possibility of  Arlington opting-out of  the state-mandated 
Secure Communities program.  After Secretary Napolitano 
announced to Congress that jurisdictions could opt-out, 
the Arlington County Board voted to officially withdraw 
from participating in the program, despite Virginia’s state-
wide activation of  Secure Communities.134  Despite this 
seemingly successful event, the outcome of  which remains 
vague, Secure Communities continues to spread rapidly 
across the country.
Conclusion
In the wake of  Virginia Attorney General Ken 
Cuccinelli’s recent opinion, authorizing law enforcement to 
check the immigration status of  anyone stopped by police 
officers for any reason, it is likely that local immigration 
enforcement policies will be thrust further into the center 
of  political debate.135
Is Secure Communities Constitutional?  Probably 
not.  The Supreme Court has held and reaffirmed that 
immigrants constitute a discrete class of  individuals, 
worthy of  at least an intermediate standard of  review in an 
Equal Protection claim.  The program relies substantially 
on racial profiling, and laws enabling or condoning racial 
classifications are always strictly scrutinized by a reviewing 
court.  Considering the heightened level of  scrutiny to 
be applied, the program certainly is not narrowly tailored 
enough to warrant deference.  ICE’s own data proves 
that Secure Communities broadly overreaches its goal 
of  identifying and removing dangerous criminal aliens; 
nearly 80% of  the immigrants removed through Secure 
Communities since 2008 were neither dangerous, nor 
criminals. 
Too many people get caught up in popular 
political fervor, repeating uninformed rhetoric without 
fully considering the realities of  the debate.  Despite our 
embarrassing history of  slavery, oppression and racism, 
the United States has a strong history of  protecting the 
disenfranchised, impoverished, and vulnerable from 
tyranny of  an unrelenting majority.136  This nation was 
founded upon the premise that all individuals, even the 
politically unpopular, are free from persecution, and 
afforded due process and equal protection of  the laws.  
However contentious this debate may be, considering the 
high stakes of  constitutional and human rights violations 
at hand, legal advocacy cannot wait.
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CASTER SEMENYA AND THE MYTH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
By: Erin Buzuvis 1
 In August of  2009, policies and 
procedures to verify the sex of  female 
athletes were called into question when 
South African runner Caster Semenya 
won the 800 meter event of  the World 
Championships in Berlin.  Responding 
to rumors of  gender fraud, and fueled 
by Semenya’s speed, musculature, 
and deep voice, the International 
Association of  Athletics Federations 
(IAAF) requested that Semenya 
submit to sex verification to confirm 
her eligibility for the women’s division.2
Some saw the suspicion cast on 
Semenya as the product of  intersecting 
racism and sexism, namely, Semenya’s 
failure to conform to standards of  
white femininity and to stereotypes 
about women’s inferior athleticism. 
The scrutiny of  Semenya’s personal 
life is reportedly taking a heavy toll, 
as evidenced by reports that she has 
gone into hiding due to the distress 
and embarrassment generated by the 
controversy.  Underscoring concerns 
for Semenya’s emotional well-
being are comparisons of  Semenya 
to Santhi Soundarajan, an Indian 
runner who was stripped of  her 
silver medal in the 2006 Asia Games 
after failing a sex test and was later 
rumored to have attempted suicide.3
 The IAAF did not publicize 
its sex-verification testing methods, but 
according to its policy, an athlete whose 
sex is challenged or raises suspicion can 
be asked to submit to a multidimensional 
medical evaluation conducted by a 
panel comprised of  a gynecologist, 
endocrinologist, psychologist, internal 
medicine specialist, and an “expert on 
gender/transgender issues.”4  While 
the IAAF will not officially disclose 
the results of  these tests,5 unconfirmed 
reports leaked to the media suggest 
that Semenya has an intersex condition 
related to the presence of  internal testes 
and testosterone levels that are higher 
(perhaps three times higher) than those 
of  the average woman.  In November 
of  2009 the IAAF announced that 
Semenya would not lose the gold medal 
and prize money she won in Berlin.6 
Shortly thereafter, the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) held a 
conference but was not successful in 
producing guidelines to help governing 
bodies address the eligibility of  athletes 
with “disorders of  sex development.”7
 The IAAF recently cleared 
Semenya to run in future events.8 
Still, the confidential nature of  the 
decision, coupled with a failure to 
repudiate current policy allowing for 
sex-verification testing on a case-by-
case basis, holds open the possibility 
that the IAAF could disqualify other 
athletes for failing a sex verification 
test, even without accompanying 
evidence or a charge that the athlete 
or her agents intentionally attempted 
to deceive the sporting world as to 
her sex.  Similarly, the IOC allows 
sex-verification testing in response to 
charges or suspicion that an athlete 
competing in a women’s sport or 
event is not physically eligible to do so. 
Most recently, the Chinese organizers 
of  the 2008 summer Olympics in 
Beijing boasted famously that a state-
of-the-art sex verification laboratory 
would be available throughout the 
games to run expedient sex tests 
on “suspicious looking women.”9
 The controversy surrounding 
Caster Semenya’s sex provides a useful 
touchstone for an analysis of  sex-
verification testing at the Olympic 
level as well as within the IAAF.  The 
justification for sex-verification testing 
incorporates two presumptions: 
first, that sex exists in a binary, and 
second, that fairness in sport requires 
a strict separation of  the sexes.  Once 
both of  these presumptions are 
exposed as myths, it becomes clear 
that attempts to medically police the 
boundary between men’s and women’s 
sports are futile and unwarranted. 
As long as we continue to organize 
separate athletic contests for men and 
women, athletes should be allowed 
to participate in events consistent 
with their bona fide gender identity.
I. IOC Policy on Sex Testing: 
History and Current Practice
 
The ancient Olympic Games 
excluded women from both participation 
and attendance, due to fear that their 
presence would usurp the strength 
of  Hercules, the hero and warrior in 
whose honor the Games were held.10 
Some historians consider enforced 
nudity at the ancient games to be the 
first Olympic sex verification policy.11
 Female athletes have been 
allowed to attend and participate in 
the Olympic Games for most of  the 
modern Olympic era, but they have 
been subject to sex scrutiny throughout 
this time.  During the Cold War, the 
IOC required female athletes to submit 
their bodies to visual inspections by 
medical officials.  In 1968, the IOC 
abandoned the “nude parades” in 
favor of  a less invasive and humiliating 
chromosomal test on cells swabbed 
from the lining of  the athlete’s mouth.12 
Until 1998, and subject to limited 
exceptions, athletes were only allowed 
to participate in women’s events if  a 
compulsory chromosomal sex testing 
As long as we continue to organize 
separate athletic contests for men and 
women, athletes should be allowed to 
participate in events consistent with their 
bona fide gender identity.
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confirmed an XX genotype.13  Today, 
such testing is not mandatory, but 
Olympic organizing committees (such 
as in Beijing) and athletic federations 
(such as the IAAF) may conduct 
testing on a case-by-case basis.
 The IOC has justified sex 
verification policies as necessary 
to prevent men from cheating by 
disguising themselves as women and 
entering women’s athletic events.14 
Yet there is only one known instance 
in Olympic history of  this actually 
happening.  In 1936, “Dora” Ratjen 
of  Germany finished fourth in the 
women’s high jump.15  Twenty years 
later, the athlete admitted that he was 
actually Hermann Ratjen, a former 
Hitler Youth member whom the Nazis 
had forced to compete as a woman.16 
During the Cold War era, in which the 
Olympic medal count became politically 
significant, suspicions of  gender fraud 
by Communist countries—such as 
suspicions surrounding masculine-
looking Soviet throwers Tashana and 
Irina Press—motivated the IOC to 
impose sex verification testing.17  The 
testing methods, which merely looked 
for evidence of  the second inactive X 
chromosome, would not have been 
effective at detecting other kinds of  
cheating, such as doping female athletes 
with high doses of  testosterone.  This 
inconsistency casts doubt on the 
IOC’s stated objective, to police fraud, 
and suggests instead an objective of  
policing gender—that is, replicating 
hegemonic femininity by narrowly 
defining the category “woman.”18
 Sex-verification testing has also 
affected women with chromosomal 
anomalies that likely or demonstrably 
produce no competitive advantage. 
The first athlete to fail a sex-verification 
test was a Polish sprinter named Ewa 
Klobukowska.19  In 1967, she was 
banned from sports and stripped of  her 
Olympic medals after genetic testing 
revealed anomalous sex chromosomes 
in some cells (likely an XX/XY 
mosaicism20)—notwithstanding the 
fact that she passed a visual inspection 
the year before.21  Twenty years later, 
another runner, Maria Jose Martinez 
Patino, discovered for the first time 
during a sex verification test that 
she lacked a second X chromosome 
typical of  most women.22  Patino, 
who was encouraged to fake an injury 
and withdraw quietly, was not a man 
despite her XY chromosomes.23 
She had Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome (AIS), an inability to process 
testosterone, effectively neutralizing 
the development in utero of  male sex 
characteristics typically triggered by the 
Y chromosome.24  Patino challenged 
the IAAF’s decision and was reinstated 
two years later.25  By then, Patino was 
past her athletic prime, but due to her 
efforts, the IAAF’s sex-verification 
policy today includes AIS on its list 
of  conditions that will not preclude 
athletes from competing in women’s 
sport.26  In the 1990s, the IOC updated 
its sex verification methods and 
adopted a Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR) process designed to test for 
the presence of  a Y chromosome 
rather than the absence of  a second 
X chromosome.27  Even PCR testing 
resulted in many false positives.  Eight 
of  the over 3,000 female athletes at 
the Summer Games in Atlanta tested 
positive for the Y chromosome but were 
permitted to compete either because 
further testing revealed AIS or another 
condition that inhibits the masculinizing 
function of  testosterone.28
 In 1999, the IOC Executive 
Board responded to mounting 
criticism, including criticism by the 
American Medical Association and 
other professional associations,29 that 
compulsory sex-verification testing was 
expensive, unreliable, and an affront 
to the dignity of  female athletes, by 
voting to abandon it.  The IOC was 
also responding to the argument that 
existing drug testing procedures, 
including monitored urine sample 
requirements, were effective protection 
against intentional fraud.  However, in 
abandoning the compulsory sex test, 
the IOC endorsed a policy that, like 
the IAAF’s policy, permits “suspicion-
based testing” on a case-by-case 
basis.30  Organizers of  Olympic 
Games in Beijing were responding 
to that policy when they established 
a laboratory to verify the sex of  
suspicious-looking women at the 2008 
Summer Games.  Recognizing the 
possibility that athletes could present 
with “ambiguous gender orientation,” 
the Chinese organizers planned 
comprehensive evaluations of  sexual 
hormones, chromosomes and genes as 
well as clinical observation, should the 
need arise.31  While no such testing was 
conducted, the laboratory’s existence 
underscores the fact that IOC policy 
would have permitted sex-verification 
testing to occur at the Olympic Games.
II. The Myth of  Sex-Verification 
Testing 
Even in the comprehensive 
form anticipated by Beijing Olympic 
organizers and used in the case of  Caster 
Semenya, sex verification is problematic 
for two main reasons.  The first reason 
is that sex verification supposes that 
every athlete can be assigned to one 
of  two sex categories and ignores 
the reality of  gender multiplicity.  As 
suggested by the brief  overview of  
the history of  sex-verification testing 
provided here, scientific inquiry into 
sex is often inconclusive.  Sex cannot 
be distilled to a single, determinable 
factor.  Many biological and social 
factors—including chromosomes, 
hormones, genitals, gender identity 
and gender expression—contribute 
to our interpretation of  whether an 
the laboratory’s existence underscores 
the fact that IOC policy would have 
permitted sex-verification testing to occur 
at the Olympic Games.
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individual is male or female.  In most 
people, these factors appear consistent: 
sex chromosomes that are either 
XX or XY will trigger hormones in 
utero, and again in puberty, that cause 
genitalia and other sex-related physical 
features to develop in the “typical” 
way.  Most individuals identify with 
and experience themselves to be the 
sex that matches those chromosomes, 
hormones, and physical features.
 However, variations at the 
chromosomal, hormonal, physical, 
and psychological levels preclude 
conclusive assignment of  “male” and 
“female” labels in all cases.  As Ewa 
Kloubowska’s case demonstrates, 
sex chromosomes can defy the usual 
XX or XY categories.  Individuals 
may present with XO, XXY, XYY, 
XXX or a mosaic condition in which 
different cells in the same individual’s 
body have different sex chromosomes. 
Conditions like AIS produce a body 
that might be chromosomally male 
but hormonally female, while other 
conditions like congenital adrenal 
hyperplasia cause individuals with 
XX chromosomes to have masculine 
genitalia.  Other conditions affecting 
physical development produce 
internal or external genitalia that 
defy classification as entirely male or 
female; indeed, for one out of  every 
1500 to 2000 births, an expert in sex 
differentiation must be called in to 
interpret atypical presentation of  
the baby’s gender.32  Transsexual and 
transgender individuals, who have 
a gender identity that differs from 
their physical sex, also challenge 
the assumption that sex and gender 
indicators are always consistent.  Based 
on variations such as these, Brown 
University scientist and author Anne 
Fausto-Sterling dismiss Euro-American 
culture’s rigid insistence on only two 
sexes, stating, “The body’s sex is simply 
too complex.  There is no either/or. 
Rather, there are shades of  difference.”33
 By permitting sex-verification 
testing, the IOC and other athletic 
governing bodies impose a binary 
structure onto a reality in which sex 
exists on a continuum.34  The IOC’s 
recent policy allowing for participation 
by transsexual athletes, while a 
progressive step toward including 
athletes who would have otherwise been 
excluded from women’s events due to 
their Y chromosomes, still operates 
on and underscores the false premise 
that sex is a binary.35  By requiring 
transsexual athletes to have undergone 
sex reassignment surgery, completed at 
least two years of  hormone treatment, 
and obtained legal recognition of  the 
new sex, the policy only allows for 
participation by those gender non-
normative individuals most able and 
willing to conform to the gender 
binary by placing themselves through 
surgical, medical, and legal means, 
firmly on one side of  the continuum or 
the other.36  It excludes any individual 
whose physical sex or gender identity 
places them in the gray area in between.
In sum, “sex verification” 
testing is a myth.  It operates on, 
and harmfully reinforces, the false 
premise that medical testing can 
determine sex as either male or female.
III. The Myth of  the Level Playing 
Field
The second reason that sex 
verification is problematic is that 
it places undue emphasis on sex-
segregation as a means for achieving 
fairness.  The idea that fairness 
requires the strict separation of  men’s 
and women’s sports is simultaneously 
overinclusive and underinclusive.  It 
is overinclusive in that it applies even 
in situations where strict separation 
does not produce fairness.  It is 
underinclusive because it ignores factors 
other than sex that are more likely to 
create an uneven field for competition.
 My first point, that sex 
segregation is applied more than fairness 
requires, is another way of  saying that 
sex, or more precisely, male-ness, is 
an imperfect proxy for competitive 
advantage in sport.37  Sorting athletes 
by sex does not necessarily sort them 
by physical characteristics that are 
considered relevant to sport.  Owing 
to the wide variation of  physical 
characteristics within sex categories 
(a term I use loosely, in light of  my 
criticism above), some of  the athletes 
in the female group will be similar in 
size, shape, and musculature to those 
in the male group.  An approach more 
narrowly tailored to producing a level 
playing field would sort athletes by 
physical characteristics, much the 
same way sports like wrestling group 
athletes by weight.  Even this approach, 
however, would not necessarily produce 
a level playing field, as correlations 
between physical characteristics 
and athletic performance, thought 
widely assumed, are largely illusory. 
 Research about competitive 
advantage and race illustrates this 
point.  When scientists demonstrated 
that blacks generally have narrower 
pelvic girdles than whites, many people 
interpreted this as support for widely 
held assumptions about the competitive 
advantage of  black sprinters.  Yet there 
is no evidence that narrower pelvic 
girdles are, independent of  race, a 
predictor of  speed.  As one physiologist 
told Sports Illustrated in 1997, “there’s 
not a single characteristic that is unique 
and always present and responsible 
for [athletic] performance.”38  He 
was discussing generalizations about 
physical differences based on race, but 
the same point—that physical traits do 
not predict performance—applies to 
sex differences as well.  The absence of  
a perfect correlation between sex and 
athletic performance explains examples 
of  men competing against women and 
it is underinclusive because it ignores 
factors other than sex that are more likely 
to create an uneven field for competition.
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losing—such as when Hitler Youth 
Hermann Ratjen finished fourth in 
the women’s high jump, or when 
tennis player Bobby Riggs famously 
lost to Billy Jean King.  The absence 
of  a perfect correlation between sex 
and athletic performance also explains 
why the existing gender gap in athletic 
performance is demonstrably waning as 
female athletes begin to overcome their 
historical exclusion and marginalization 
from sports.  One Oxford University 
study predicts that, at the rate women’s 
running speed is improving, women 
will be outrunning men at certain 
track events sometime after 2064.39
 Thus, separating men and 
women is neither a perfect way, nor the 
best way, to ensure that athletes only 
compete against those with comparable 
physical features and athletic ability.  It 
also fails to ensure fairness because 
disparities other than sex-related 
physical differences tilt the playing field.
 In the sporting world, 
“fairness” is defined as universal 
adherence to the same rules.  It is unfair 
to give a runner a head start, break 
the rules of  play, or gain a physical 
advantage through such unnatural 
means as doping.  While unnaturally 
obtained physical advantages may run 
afoul of  fairness, fairness requires no 
such categorical limitation on naturally 
obtained physical advantages.  Saying 
that no one can use natural advantage 
is antithetical to sport.  The average 
individual does not become a world-
class or Olympic athlete; indeed, it has 
been said that “elite sport selects for 
physiological outliers whose genetic 
potential for excellence has been 
realised through fortuitous interaction 
with environmental and cultural 
factors.”40  Yet variation due to non-
sex-related conditions is not challenged 
as beyond the bounds of  fair play.  For 
example, the sport of  volleyball does 
not exclude athletes with Marfan’s 
syndrome, even though individuals 
with that condition have physical 
characteristics, including tallness 
and long arms, that could provide a 
competitive advantage in that sport.41 
The IAAF may determine that Caster 
Semenya has high testosterone levels 
resulting from an intersex condition, 
but it is possible—if  not likely—that 
her opponents have physical features 
or testosterone levels that are outside 
the typical range of  most women. 
If  those opponents conform to the 
arbitrary, heteronormative and white 
standards of  femininity, they are not 
“suspicious,” and they are not tested.
 To underscore even further the 
shortcomings of  sex-segregation as a 
means of  ensuring fairness, consider 
that the so-called level playing field 
accommodates athletes not just with 
natural physical advantages, but social 
and environmental advantages as well.42 
Some athletes receive coaching at an 
early age, some have financial advantage 
due to class or affiliation with sponsors, 
and some have technologically superior 
equipment such as shark skin swimsuits 
or clap-skates.43  In some sports, players 
are advantaged or disadvantaged 
by changes in the weather44 or the 
position of  the sun.  Even some 
physical advantages obtained by 
unnatural means,45 such as laser eye 
surgery or ligament replacement, are 
permissible.  These variables are likely 
to enhance an athlete’s performance in 
the same way that sex-related variables 
can.  Thus, the idea that segregation 
of  athletes by sex produces a level 
playing field is nothing short of  myth.
IV. Proposal: Prohibit Sex 
Verification Testing
I am not proposing, at least 
not here, that the IOC should abandon 
sex-segregated athletics.  I do support 
reconceptualizing sports to allow 
for more integrated competitions 
that group athletes by physical 
characteristics other than sex.  Weight 
classes in wrestling, handicapping in 
golf, grouping of  common times in 
road racing are examples of  how similar 
principles are already being applied. 
In this new paradigm, sex verification 
would be unnecessary because an 
athlete’s sex would be irrelevant to 
determining the field of  competition 
most appropriate for each competitor. 
By abandoning the constraints of  the 
sex binary, this paradigm would reflect 
a more intellectually honest approach 
to sport and would be inclusive of  
intersex and transgender athletes.
While such a paradigm shift may be a 
valid long term goal, sex-segregation 
of  sports is not going away in the 
short term.  I simply argue here 
that, as an intermediate step, the 
IOC should prohibit sex-verification 
testing.  The concept of  testing for 
sex defies reality in which sex is a 
construct—a reality in which our 
interpretation of  a person is based on 
a number of  factors (genes, hormones, 
anatomy, identity, expression) that may 
or may not consistently conform to 
the concept of  male and female.  If  
sport is to continue to rely on the myth 
of  discernable sex categories, it must 
acknowledge it as such, rather than 
insist that categorization is possible or 
that categorization is determinative of  
a level playing field.  In short, the IOC 
and other athletic governing bodies 
must shed the overly rigid application 
of  a sex binary in favor of  a more 
flexible approach that allows athletes 
to participate in the category that is 
consistent with, or at least most closely 
approximates, their gender identity.
 The IOC could implement a 
flexible approach by prohibiting sex 
verification testing and ensuring that 
the only participants disqualified from 
women’s events are those intentionally 
committing gender fraud.  Under this 
approach, an intersex athlete like Caster 
the idea that segregation of  athletes 
by sex produces a level playing field is 
nothing short of  myth
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Semenya would be eligible for women’s 
track events because her female gender 
identity is not in dispute.  Under this 
proposal, the only sex-related challenges 
that the IOC or other governing bodies 
would consider would be those rooted 
in evidence tending to show that an 
athlete’s self-selection into women’s 
competition is not consistent with 
the life she leads outside of  sport.46 
This intent-based standard should be 
interpreted to exclude competitors like 
Hermann Ratjen who are manipulated 
or forced to cheat by a government. 
An intent-based standard should not 
be used to exclude transsexual athletes 
who comply with the IOC’s policy on 
transgender athlete participation; such 
competitors should have an absolute 
defense to charges that their gender 
identity at the time of  competition is 
inconsistent with their gender expression 
earlier in their lives or athletic careers.
 Currently, sex-verification 
policies treat an athlete’s eligibility based 
on sex similarly to an athlete’s eligibility 
based on involvement with banned 
substances.  In both contexts, eligibility 
is determined by medical evidence, with 
no consideration given to whether the 
athlete intended to cheat.47  However, 
the strict liability that applies in doping 
cases is not warranted in cases where 
sex is in dispute.  One important 
difference is that doping policies target 
individual and categorical substances 
“because of  their potential to enhance 
performance.”48  Sex-verification 
policies, however, are not so narrowly 
tailored.  The risk of  unfairness that 
strict liability poses in the context of  
sex, compared to the risk in the context 
of  doping, is not as strongly outweighed 
by a benefit to the field of  competition. 
Moreover, the risk of  unfairness posed 
by a strict liability approach is arguably 
stronger when the ground for exclusion 
is a naturally occurring chromosomal 
or hormonal variation than when the 
ground for exclusion is an exogenously-
obtained competitive advantage.
 This proposal does not seek to 
create a level playing field.  Rather, it 
recognizes that sex-verification and the 
level playing field are illusory goals,49 
and in so doing avoids many of  the 
problems that result from the IOC’s 
current policy of  suspicion-based 
sex-verification testing.  As Caster 
Semenya’s case shows, the policy is rife 
with abuse and selective application. 
Moreover, considering the myth of  the 
level playing field created by numerous 
personal advantages that all athletes 
bring to the starting line, sex-verification 
testing inflicts harm on the athlete’s 
dignity, privacy and personal life that are 
far disproportionate to any unfairness 
that is being targeted by examining sex.
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live with ambiguity, and make peace 
with a world in which things are not 
always quantifiable and clear”). 
See Katy Bosse’s “Inside the Authors’ Studio” interview on our website to learn more about her inspiration for the article, and her 
thoughts about the issues and questions emerging from the following article. 
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A PRICE TAG ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: GEORGIA V. WEIS 
AND INDIGENT RIGHT TO CONTINUED COUNSEL
By: Katy Bosse 1
“Thou shalt not ration justice.” –Judge 
Learned Hand2
 On February 2, 2006, Jamie 
Weis was arrested and charged with the 
robbery and murder of  a local senior 
citizen.3  Nearly seven months after 
his initial arrest, the state notified the 
Griffin trial court of  its intention to 
seek the death penalty.4  In the Georgia 
Public Defender system, created by the 
Georgia Indigent Defense Act of  2003, 
all death penalty cases are assigned 
to the Georgia Capital Defender 
Division instead of  the local public 
defender’s office.5  In Weis’s case, the 
overseeing Georgia Public Defender 
Standards Council determined that 
the Capital Defenders Division had a 
tremendous caseload.6  And instead of  
assigning another case to the already 
overtaxed Capital Defenders Division, 
the Council decided to assign private 
attorneys Robert Citronberg and 
Thomas West on a contractual basis.7
  From January 24, 2007 
through November 26, 2007, the 
defense attorneys filed over sixty 
motions on Weis’s behalf.8  During that 
time, the Georgia Capital Defenders 
also handled the high profile case of  
Brian Nichols,9 which exhausted most 
of  its 2007 annual budget and depleted 
the funds available for other cases.10 
Citronberg and West filed for four 
continuances between January 24 and 
November 26, 2007,11 because the state 
could no longer afford to pay them for 
their time.12  On November 26, 2007, 
District Attorney Scott Ballard made 
an oral motion to remove Citronberg 
and West from the case, and suggested 
that attorneys from the local public 
defender’s office be placed on the case 
instead.13  Judge Caldwell sustained the 
state’s motion and removed Citronberg 
and West.14  Subsequently, two public 
defenders, Tamara Jacobs and Joseph 
Saia, were assigned as counsel.15 
 This article explores the 
origins of  an indigent defendant’s right 
to counsel and demonstrates how the 
facts of  the Weis case illustrate the 
need for a definitive right to continued 
counsel.  Part I traces the procedural 
history of  Weis, the history of  the 
right to counsel in America, and the 
current jurisdictional split on the right 
to continued counsel.  Part II analyzes 
the current Supreme Court language 
on indigent right to continued counsel, 
and suggests how Weis provides an 
opportunity for the Court to resolve the 
issue in favor of  indigent defendants. 
Analyzing the procedural history and 
arguments described below, it is evident 
that denying Weis the right to retain 
his court appointed counsel violates 
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, because he was without effective 
counsel for over a year during which the 
prosecution continued to mount its case.
I. How We Got to a Continued 
Counsel Split
a. The Georgia Decision
“I guess the Supreme Court will 
have to earn their money.” –Judge 
Caldwell16
 
On  December 10, 2007, the 
two public defenders assigned to Weis’s 
case, Jacobs and Saia, filed a motion 
to withdraw as counsel due to “their 
inability to duplicate the familiarity 
with the case.”17  The motion was 
denied.18  Subsequently, Weis filed 
another motion on December 20, 
which contained an affidavit from 
Joseph Saia that detailed the current 
workload of  his office and his ninety-
one open felony cases.19  Additionally, 
Weis and his public defenders filed 
several other motions to withdraw, 
along with a motion requesting Judge 
Caldwell recuse himself  from the 
case, and a petition for mandamus and 
prohibition against Judge Caldwell.20
 On April 25, 2008, the 
Georgia Capital Defenders indicated in 
discussions that funding would again 
be available to Citronberg and West. 
However, when provided a contract, 
the Georgia Capital Defenders refused 
to process the bills.21  On December 
31, 2008, Weis filed a petition for a writ 
of  mandamus against the judge and the 
Public Defender Standards Council, 
which was dropped after the judge agreed 
to reinstate Citronberg and West.22
 Citronberg and West were re-
assigned as counsel on February 11, 
2009.23  However, as a New York Times 
article describes, “[the][p]rosecutors 
had steadily built a case while the 
defense did nothing. Leads went 
cold, memories faded, witnesses went 
missing.”24  Nevertheless, the trial 
was set for August 3rd, 2009, with 
evidentiary motions scheduled for July 
8, 2009.25  On July 8, Weis filed a motion 
to dismiss due to the denial of  his right 
to a speedy trial.26  The motion was 
denied and counsel appealed.27  The 
decision was affirmed by the Georgia 
Supreme Court on March 25, 2010.28
 The Georgia Supreme Court 
analyzed the case under the Barker 
v. Wingo four-part balancing test for 
assessing a speedy trial claim.29  Under 
the test, a court must balance (1) the 
length of  the delay and (2) the reasons 
for the delay with (3) the defendant’s 
assertion of  a right to a speedy trial and 
(4) the prejudice to the defendant.30  The 
court found that the length of  the delay 
did not violate the defendant’s right to 
a speedy trial, and that the reasons for 
the delay did not constitute a “systemic 
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breakdown of  the public defender 
system.”31  The court concluded that 
the delay was due to Weis’s failure 
to cooperate with Jacobs and Saia, 
the public defenders appointed after 
Citronberg and West were removed.32
  Specifically, the court ruled 
that a defendant could not assert the 
right of  counsel of  choice to delay 
judicial proceedings.33  The court 
acknowledged that the lack of  funding 
contributed to the delay but decided 
that it was not the sole factor.34  The 
court ruled that a lack of  funding from 
the Georgia Capital Defenders was 
not a “systemic breakdown” of  the 
public defender system, and thus was 
not the primary reason for the delay.35 
Instead, the court found that the 
defendant’s conduct and the conduct 
of  Citronberg and West, i.e., not being 
able to work without compensation, 
was the primary reason for the delay.36 
Rather than acknowledge that the 
state’s public defender system had 
failed the very people it was designed 
to protect, the court chose to blame the 
two appointed public defenders, Jacobs 
and Saia, and Weis for not being able 
to easily replicate an attorney-client 
relationship.37  The court also ruled 
that Weis did not assert his right to a 
speedy trial in a timely manner,38 and 
there was no evidence of  oppressive 
pre-trial incarceration or proof  that 
Weis had been subjected to substandard 
conditions in the county jail.39
 Conversely, the dissent 
examined the right of  an indigent 
defendant to continued counsel, 
citing the Alabama Court of  Criminal 
Appeals decision Lane v. Alabama, 
which quotes Smith v. Superior 
Court of  Los Angeles County:
[O]nce counsel is 
appointed to represent 
an indigent defendant, 
whether it [is] the public 
defender or a volunteer 
private attorney, the 
parties enter into 
an attorney-client 
relationship which 
is no less inviolable 
than if  counsel had 
been retained.  To 
hold otherwise 
would be to subject 
that relationship 
to an unwarranted 
and invidious 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
arising merely from 
the poverty of  the 
accused.40
 The dissent concluded that 
a defendant should not be forced to 
choose between his original counsel 
and new counsel in order to receive 
a speedy trial at the hands of  the 
state.41  The dissent also correctly 
assailed the majority’s argument by 
emphasizing that Weis could hardly 
be held responsible for the delay when 
the public defenders assigned to the 
case requested to be removed almost 
immediately.42  The majority also erred, 
the dissent indicated, in finding that 
Weis and his attorneys were at fault, 
when it was the state’s organization 
that initially hired and then could not 
compensate Citronberg and West.43 
The dissent reasoned that even though 
the state agency is focused on the 
defense rather than the prosecution of  
criminals, the state is still obligated to 
provide adequate funding, concluding 
that the state’s budgetary constraints 
were not a valid excuse for depriving 
a citizen his appointed counsel.44
 After the unfavorable Georgia 
Supreme Court decision, Citronberg 
and West filed a petition for writ of  
certiorari before the Supreme Court of  
the United States.45  The writ called for 
the Court to resolve the division among 
state courts regarding indigent defense 
and the continuity of  representation.46 
On October 4th, 2010, the Court denied 
the petition for writ without comment.47
b. The History of  the Right to 
Counsel
“[T]here [is] an absolute right to 
appointment of  counsel in felony 
cases. . . . [A]ppointment of  counsel 
for an indigent is required at every 
stage of  a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of  a criminal 
accused might be affected.”48
 The Sixth Amendment of  the 
United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial . . . and to 
have the [a]ssistance of  [c]ounsel for 
his defen[s]e.”49  The Supreme Court 
first recognized the fundamental 
nature of  the right to counsel in 1932 
in Powell v. Alabama, noting that the 
assistance of  counsel was essential to 
a fair trial.50  Later, in the landmark 
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright, the 
Supreme Court recognized this 
right for indigent defendants, stating 
“[t]he right of  one charged with [a] 
crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials 
in some countries, but it is in ours.”51 
The Gideon Court held that when a 
defendant is unable to obtain counsel, 
the state must assign counsel because 
“[t]his noble ideal cannot be realized if  
the poor man charged with crime has 
to face his accusers without a lawyer to 
assist him.”52  However, the decision 
in Gideon, while obligating the states to 
appoint counsel, maintained a narrow 
focus that did not identify to what 
extent the right to counsel extended.53
 While states instituted Gideon’s 
mandate with varying success, the 
Supreme Court continued to attempt 
to define the right to counsel and its 
effect on the practice of  criminal law. 
In 1970, the Court indirectly analogized 
that the right to counsel was the right to 
competent counsel.  In 1983, in Morris 
v. Slappy, the assigned public defender 
fell ill and the client was assigned 
a new public defender rather than 
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being granted a continuance.54  The 
Supreme Court in Morris held that the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
a meaningful relationship between a 
defendant and counsel.55  However, in 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, 
he argued that judicial efficiency should 
not stand in the way of  an indigent 
defendant’s continued representation 
by an attorney with whom he has a 
relationship of  trust and confidence.56
 This point aside, viewing the 
Court’s decisions from 1970-1983 
retrospectively, had the court drafted 
clearer language regarding the right 
to counsel, the Court could have 
reshaped attitudes and created a much 
more organized and superior indigent 
defense system.57  Had the Court been 
more willing to provide guidelines 
for what constitutes meaningful 
representation, the Court would 
have likely drafted a set of  minimum 
requirements that all public defenders 
must meet when conducting a criminal 
defense.  Furthermore, State legislatures 
could have taken such standards into 
account when drafting legislation 
and appropriating funds to the state 
criminal defense agencies.  However, 
without such standards, many states 
are unable to effectively allocate the 
appropriate level of  funds needed by 
these agencies, and as a result, those 
needing representation, the state 
agencies, and the already dwindling 
budgets suffered.58  The vague 
standard of  “effective” allowed state 
legislatures to both design and fund 
the bare minimum of  criminal defense.
 Finally, in 1984 in Strickland 
v. Washington, the Court attempted to 
address the guidelines of  what should 
constitute “effective counsel.”59  In 
an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the 
Court adopted the standard adopted by 
all the Federal Courts of  Appeals and 
held that assistance of  counsel should 
be “reasonably effective.”60  The Court 
adopted a two-prong analysis that 
considers “(1) whether the lawyer’s 
performance fell below acceptable 
levels and (2) whether that performance 
prejudiced the accused.”61  Although 
the Court refused to set rigid standards 
for what qualifies as reasonable, 
Justice O’Connor enumerated basic 
duties of  counsel: to be loyal, to avoid 
conflicts of  interest, to advocate the 
defendant’s cause, and to consult with 
the defendant on important decisions.62 
Justice O’Connor also suggested that 
American Bar Association (ABA) 
guidelines should help to determine 
what is reasonable, and that strict 
rules on reasonableness should be 
avoided so as to give counsel flexibility 
in making strategic decisions.63
 Justice Marshall, in his dissent 
in Strickland, laments the majority’s 
refusal to set stricter standards for the 
definition of  “reasonably effective.”64 
He describes the many aspects of  
the criminal defense system, such 
as preparing for trial, applying for 
bail, making timely objections, and 
filing for appeals, that would all 
benefit from judicial oversight.65  As 
Justice Marshall’s dissent points out, 
the majority’s vague language in 
Strickland left the states on their own 
to determine how to enforce Gideon’s 
right to counsel mandate.66  Justice 
Marshall reasoned that if  stricter and 
more specific standards for the various 
aspects of  trial had been concretely set, 
states would have had a clearer idea of  
how to build and fund their criminal 
defense systems.67  More importantly, 
the criminal justice system around 
the country could operate on a more 
uniform level, providing equal access 
and fair processing for all defendants.68
c. Varied State Responses 
 In the years since Strickland 
and Gideon, states have individually 
fashioned their own standards in 
defining what constitutes “reasonably 
effective” counsel.  Unfortunately, 
these standards can vary greatly from 
state to state.69  In 2004, forty years 
after Gideon, the ABA published 
a scathing report on the nation’s 
indigent defense systems.70  The 
report noted the extreme disparities 
in funding between the prosecution 
and the defense, the excessive caseload 
of  public defense attorneys, and 
the inadequate assistance provided 
to indigent defendants as a result.71
No standard provides more 
evidence of  the disparities in state 
systems than the right to continued 
counsel, also known as vertical 
representation.72  While Georgia and 
Louisiana still do not recognize an 
indigent defendant’s right to continued 
counsel, state courts have ruled that 
indigent defendants have a right to 
continued counsel as part of  their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  This 
point is evidenced by the fact that even 
the states surrounding Georgia have 
chosen to support and uphold the right 
to counsel for indigent defendants.73
 For example, in Lane v. 
Alabama, a defendant’s initial attorney 
was removed because of  the state’s 
intention to call him as a necessary 
witness.74  In assessing whether such 
an act violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, the 
court claimed that “[w]ith respect to 
continued representation . . . there is no 
distinction between indigent defendants 
and non-indigent defendants.”75 
Essentially, once counsel has been 
appointed, the trial judge is required to 
respect the attorney-client relationship 
as if  it were privately retained counsel.76 
Similarly, in Weaver v. Florida, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that the attorney-
client relationship is not dependant on 
the source of  compensation because 
the attorney should be loyal to the 
person he or she represents, not to 
the person who pays for the services.77
 States that recognize the right 
to continued counsel for indigent 
defendants have created exceptions 
to this right.  The Weaver court laid 
out several reasons why it may be 
appropriate to substitute counsel, such as 
incompetence, physical incapacitation, 
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inappropriate conduct, or the efficient 
administration of  justice.78  In Tennessee 
v. Huskey, a case in which the trial judge 
attempted to dismiss counsel for filing 
an abundance of  motions, the court 
analogized that an attorney-client 
relationship involves “an intimate 
process of  consultation and planning 
which culminates in a state of  trust 
and confidence between the client and 
his attorney.”79  The Tennessee court 
concluded that based on case law from 
other states, the removal of  original 
counsel is only permitted when all 
other remedies have been exhausted.80
  While many states have 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Gideon and Strickland to 
include an indigent right to continued 
counsel, Georgia and Louisiana have 
expressly denied the right of  an indigent 
defendant to retain counsel.81  In Weis, 
the Georgia Supreme court relied on the 
Louisiana decision, Louisiana v. Reeves, 
to support its holding that moving the 
case forward was a sufficient reason to 
justify the substitution of  counsel.82 
The facts of  Reeves are extremely similar 
to Weis, in that in Reeves the court 
removed non-local counsel who was 
paid by the Capital Defense Project, 
and replaced him with the local Chief  
Public Defender.83  The court justified 
the removal by claiming that the right 
to counsel of  choice does not extend 
to defendants who require court 
appointed counsel.84  In Louisiana, 
an indigent defendant is entitled 
only to “effective representation.”85
 The Sixth Circuit of  the 
United States Court of  Appeals 
upheld this interpretation of  the Sixth 
Amendment in Daniels v. Lafler.86  The 
Daniels court held that an indigent 
defendant represented by a court 
appointed attorney has no right to 
his or her choice of  counsel.87  While 
serving on the Second Circuit of  
the United States Court of  Appeals, 
current Supreme Court Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor also ruled that 
“there is no constitutional right to 
continuity of  appointed counsel.”88
II. Indigent Continued Counsel 
Needs More Support
a. A Meaningful Relationship
 The Supreme Court needs to 
clarify its dicta in Morris and hold that 
the non-existence of  a right to chosen 
counsel is not the denial of  a right to 
continued counsel once an attorney-
client relationship has been established. 
Determining that the Sixty Amendment 
guarantees a right to continued counsel 
does not overturn Morris, nor does it 
affect the Court’s decision that an 
indigent defendant does not have the 
right to choose his initial counsel. 
Instead, it extends the rights of  indigent 
defendants and grants them rights 
equal to defendants with paid counsel.
 The language used in Morris 
makes it clear that the Court was 
referring only to the creation of  
a new Sixth Amendment right to 
“meaningful representation.”  The 
frequently quoted language reads:
No court could 
possibly guarantee 
that a defendant will 
develop the kind 
of  rapport with his 
attorney – privately 
retained or provided 
by the public – that 
the Court of  Appeals 
thought part of  the 
Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of  counsel.  
Accordingly, we reject 
the claim that the 
Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a 
“ m e a n i n g f u l 
relationship” between 
an accused and his 
counsel.89
 Rejecting the idea that the Sixth 
Amendment contains a guarantee of  a 
“meaningful relationship” between the 
defendant and counsel is not the same 
as rejecting an indigent defendant’s 
right to retain his original counsel 
once an attorney-client relationship 
has been forged.  While the court has 
been explicit that it will not create 
a constitutional guarantee that the 
relationship will be meaningful, they 
have not denied a defendant’s right 
to continuity of  appointed counsel. 
b. Strickland’s Vagueness Problem
 The reasonableness standard 
set forth in Strickland is intentionally 
vague.  While the court does not set 
specific standards, Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion makes it clear that standard legal 
practice and ABA guidelines should guide 
both lawyers and judges to determine 
what constitutes a reasonably effective 
level of  counsel.90  Unfortunately, as 
Kim Taylor-Thompson, a veteran 
Washington, D.C. public defender, 
explains, “[t]he unappreciated cost of  
the Court’s lack of  specificity has been 
a legacy of  ineffective assistance that 
has now shifted the onus of  defining 
the components of  the right to counsel 
to the indigent defense community.”91 
As a result of  the vague standard in 
Strickland, an indigent defendant is 
currently only entitled to relief  if  the 
court appoints a new attorney and 
does not allow for sufficient time to 
prepare, thus forcing the counsel’s 
representation to be ineffective.92
 The current ABA Ten Principles 
of  a Public Defender System guide maintains 
that “the same attorney continuously 
represents the client until completion 
of  the case.”93  Additionally, the guide 
further asserts that the same attorney 
should represent the client from the 
initial assignment through the trial and 
sentencing.94  In Gideon’s Broken Promise, 
the ABA’s 2004 study of  the nation’s 
indigent criminal defense standards, 
the ABA reported that national 
standards have long recognized a right 
to continued counsel as an essential 
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component of  an effective defense 
practice.95  The same study also 
found that many states still practiced 
“horizontal representation,” where 
multiple public defenders handled 
different aspects of  a single case.96 
In contrast, the study reported that, 
in some states, the same prosecutor 
handled the prosecution of  a defendant 
from beginning to end, largely due 
to the ample funding available to 
the state’s prosecuting agency.97
c. Strickland’s Guidelines
 The language used in Strickland 
demonstrates that even though the court 
has been vague in its rulings on what 
constitutes “effective representation,” 
the duties they believe apply to all 
defense attorneys are more effectively 
performed when there is a right to 
continued counsel.  The Court stated 
that “the Sixth Amendment imposes 
on counsel a duty to investigate,”98 
and that “access to counsel’s skill and 
knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the ‘ample opportunity 
to meet the case of  the prosecution’ 
to which they are entitled.”99  Based 
on the author’s experience observing 
and clerking in several public defender 
offices and local criminal court 
systems, when multiple attorneys 
handle a single case, investigation is 
often neglected or left until witnesses’ 
memories have faded and the “trail” 
has gone cold.  Similarly, the author 
has also found that each attorney 
might have different knowledge and 
defense strategies that will affect the 
outcome of  a case.  Switching between 
attorneys causes confusion not only 
for the defendant, but also for the 
prosecuting attorney who must adjust 
to different defense strategies, and 
the judges who must rule on differing 
motions filed by different attorneys 
or rule on the same motion several 
times due to the change in counsel. 
 The Strickland Court also 
imposed a “duty of  loyalty” and “the 
more particular duties to consult with 
the defendant on important decisions 
and to keep the defendant informed of  
important developments in the course 
of  the prosecution.”100  Continuing to 
keep the client informed of  important 
developments, seeking the client’s 
opinion on important decisions, 
and guiding the client through those 
decisions are extremely difficult when 
the same attorney does not represent 
the client throughout the entire case.
d. The Benefits of  Continued Counsel
 The language in Strickland, 
though vague, makes it clear that 
the Supreme Court upholds certain 
standards for effective criminal defense, 
all of  which are easier to adhere to 
when there is continued counsel.  A 
lack of  continued counsel generates 
the following problems: (1) it prevents 
the establishment of  an attorney-client 
relationship, (2) it encourages a lack 
of  accountability, and (3) it increases 
the likelihood that necessary and 
important work will be neglected as 
the case moves between attorneys.101
i. The Attorney-Client 
Relationship
 The relationship between 
an attorney and a client is a vital 
component of  conducting an effective 
defense.  Ideally, a defense attorney 
creates a collaborative relationship with 
a client, instead of  merely dictating 
to the client his decisions and legal 
strategy.  A collaborative relationship 
requires open communication, which 
necessitates a substantial amount of  
interaction between the attorney and 
client.  Through this communication, 
the attorney and the client will 
collaboratively answer many of  the 
essential questions that are presented 
during a criminal trial, such as how 
to plead, whether to proceed to trial, 
and whether or not the client should 
testify.  To answer these questions 
and facilitate open communication, 
many public defender offices view 
continued counsel as a fundamental 
requirement.102  By being involved in a 
case from beginning to end, an attorney 
can track the case’s investigation, 
and become better informed about 
the facts and key issues, allowing 
for more effective representation. 
ii. Lack of  Accountability
 Similarly, when a client moves 
between multiple attorneys during the 
progression of  a case, files get lost, 
motions are not filed, and discovery 
does not get examined.  Because a new 
attorney may have been assigned to a 
specific portion of  the case, or perhaps 
has taken over the case completely, a 
predicament is created in which the 
client does not know who to go to for 
information, or even what information 
is needed.  This disorganization 
fosters a lack of  accountability and 
usually results in inadequate defense. 
A client, particularly an indigent 
client, is generally unaware and does 
not understand the legal process and 
procedural requirements for motions 
for continuances, or the steps to 
assure that previous motions were 
filed correctly.  When more than one 
attorney represents a client at different 
junctures throughout the case, the 
client does not know whom to hold 
accountable, and thus, is without 
recourse.  A right to continued counsel 
ensures that the client knows exactly 
who to contact and would also hold the 
specific attorney accountable for all files 
and motions associated with the case. 
iii. Neglected Work
 Attorneys also differ in 
their trial strategy, oratory skills, and 
the weight they give to certain legal 
issues.103  The same case in the hands 
of  two different attorneys can look 
extremely different; thus, a client may 
suffer from an involuntary change in 
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counsel.  Following an involuntary 
change in counsel, the new attorney 
may develop a divergent strategy or 
need to re-conduct investigation. 
But most important, a new attorney 
must gain the defendant’s trust.  The 
chances of  discovery being overlooked 
or a motion not being filed in a 
timely manner increase exponentially 
when a case shifts between attorneys.
 A right to continued counsel 
permits continued communication 
between the client and counsel that 
builds client confidence and enables 
the relationship to evolve over 
time.104  Evidenced by the irrefutable 
benefits of  continued counsel detailed 
above, to deny a defendant continued 
counsel undermines their Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance 
of  counsel.  As Anne Poulin, a 
Villanova law professor and prolific 
writer on Criminal Procedure, argues 
in Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s 
Right to Counsel, “[a] defendant 
should not be forced to reestablish 
an attorney-client relationship 
with each of  a series of  attorneys, 
repeatedly explaining the case and her 
understanding of  it to new counsel.”105
e. Jamie Weis’s Lasting Legacy
“Whenever possible, substitution of  
counsel over the defendant’s objection 
should be avoided. Changing 
counsel without the defendant’s 
consent reduces the likelihood that 
the defendant will receive effective 
assistance, and will perceive the 
process as fair.”106
 In Weis, Citronberg and West, 
Weis’s original counsel, though court 
appointed, worked tirelessly for over 
a year to investigate and prepare 
Weis’s capital murder defense.  They 
developed an open communication 
with Weis and learned about his mental 
health problems, family history, and his 
life both before and after the alleged 
murder.  Weis submitted an affidavit 
stating that he could “trust Mr. West 
and Mr. Citronberg with my case and 
. . . my life.  They truly care about me 
and I believe they have the knowledge 
and skill to prepare a defense.”107 
The public defenders assigned to 
replace Citronberg and West did 
not have access to investigators 
trained in uncovering the mitigating 
circumstances surrounding Weis’s case, 
which can be pivotal in a capital murder 
defense.  When Citronberg and West 
were removed from the case, more than 
a year lapsed in which there was no 
investigation.  Based on the Supreme 
Court’s language in Strickland, it is 
evident that once West and Citronberg 
were removed from the case, there was 
no longer “effective” representation. 
 The procedural history of  this 
case raises a myriad of  issues.  Ranging 
from the state’s burden to fund its 
criminal defense and prosecution 
agencies equally, to the attempts on 
the part of  Citronberg and West to use 
Weis’s case as a test case for structural 
litigation to improve Georgia’s indigent 
defense system.  The most obvious, 
however, is whether Weis has the same 
right to keep his original counsel, as 
he would if  he had privately retained 
counsel with his own funds.  When 
Judge Caldwell removed Citronberg 
and West, despite Weis’s objections, and 
replaced them with public defenders 
who were unable to continue the 
work necessary to provide Weis with 
effective counsel, they effectively 
denied Weis’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
 The Supreme Court of  
Georgia and the Supreme Court of  
Louisiana both cite Morris in their 
rulings. Both courts held that there is 
no right to “meaningful representation” 
between an attorney and a client, 
and also that there is no right for an 
indigent defendant to choose his 
initial attorney.  Accordingly, both 
concluded that an indigent defendant 
has no right to continuity of  appointed 
counsel, regardless of  the established 
attorney-client relationship.  Both the 
prosecution and the Georgia Supreme 
Court have misinterpreted these rulings 
when they connote that there is no 
right to continued counsel to be found 
in the Sixth Amendment.108   While the 
obvious solution to the prosecution 
in Weis was to replace Citronberg and 
West, who refused to continue without 
pay, with already salaried public 
defenders, the Constitutional rights 
of  an indigent defendant are no less 
substantial because he or she is indigent. 
The benefits of  an attorney-client 
relationship and the continuity of  that 
relationship have been discussed above. 
These benefits are constitutionally 
guaranteed to those who retain private 
counsel, and should not be diminished 
for those who cannot.  Although they 
declined to do so in the Weis case, the 
Supreme Court needs to find that its 
language in Strickland and in Morris 
does not preclude it from holding 
that an indigent defendant has a right 
to retain counsel as if  he or she had 
privately retained the counsel.  To find 
otherwise is to put a price tag on our 
constitutional rights and continue to 
ignore the injustice that Gideon sought 
to correct over forty-five years ago.
Conclusion
 The Supreme Court has 
continually refused to set specific 
guidelines for effective counsel, 
assuming that states and local bar 
associations would conform to certain 
agreed-upon standards. However, 
twenty-five years after Strickland, it is 
clear that this is not always the case. 
The Court needs to recognize many of  
the base standards of  effective defense 
counsel, beginning with the right 
to continued counsel.  The Georgia 
Supreme Court erred in finding that 
Weis and his attorneys were to blame 
for the delay in his case, and thus, erred 
in concluding that it was acceptable 
to remove Weis’ original appointed 
counsel despite Weis’ objections.  The 
dissent in Weis was correct; a state 
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cannot adequately fund its prosecution 
and underfund its defense.109  However, 
the real harm done by the state’s lack 
of  funding was to deprive Weis of  his 
appointed counsel.  Depriving Weis 
of  his appointed counsel gave the 
prosecution an automatic advantage, 
and thus, denied Weis of  his 
Constitutional right to a fair trial.  The 
Supreme Court erred in not granting 
certiorari to Weis’s case and taking the 
opportunity to rule that a state cannot 
deny an indigent defendant his right 
to continued counsel. The State of  
Georgia has already begun applying its 
decision in Weis to other cases and will 
continue to deprive Georgia’s indigent 
defendants of  their constitutional rights 
until the Supreme Court takes action.110
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BUYING INTO PRISONS, AND SELLING KIDS SHORT
By: Lizbet Simmons1
 There is an increasing need to account for the role 
of  the nation’s failing public school system in structuring 
incarceration risk among minority populations and to 
link theories of  the minority achievement gap with those 
of  disproportionate minority confinement.  The minority 
achievement gap is so named, because, on average, minority 
students’ school performance is much lower than that 
of  White students.2  The disparity is greatest between 
African-American and White students and persists in a 
range of  assessments, including standardized test scores, 
dropout rates, and graduation rates.3  Disproportionate 
minority confinement refers to racial disparities in 
incarceration rates, and again, the disparity is greatest 
when comparing African-Americans and Whites.4
 The incarceration rate for minorities is highly 
disproportionate to their total percentage in the population.5 
African-Americans represent about 12% of  the national 
population but make up 40 % of  the U.S. prison population.6 
If  the current trend of  incarceration holds, one in three 
African-American male children born in 2001 will go to 
prison at some point during their lives.7  For Latino males, 
the ratio is one in seven, and for Caucasian males, the ratio 
is one in seventeen.  These data shows that extant race 
and gender dynamics put African-American male children 
at significant risk for incarceration. Educational failure 
within this population only increases this vulnerability.
 The prison system began a massive expansion 
during the War on Crime era.  In 1980, 300,000 people 
were in prison in the United States.8  By 2005, there were 
1.5 million individuals in prison. Today, it is estimated 
that the prison and jail system holds 2.3 million.9  One 
explanation for a steep rise in incarceration rates should be a 
corresponding steep rise in crime.  However, crime rates in 
the 20-year span between 1980 and 2000 either dropped or 
stagnated;10 the rapid rise in incarceration does not actually 
correspond to a rise in crime.  A significant factor in prison 
expansion was a 975% increase in commitments for non-
violent offenses, such as drug charges, between 1982 and 
1999.11  During that time, African-Americans were at an 
extreme disadvantage in drug charge processing and were 
ultimately incarcerated at significantly higher rates than 
Whites even for virtually identical crimes.12  The terrain of  
these data, which is well charted with respect to race and 
incarceration, undergirds my inquiry into how the war on 
crime has directly affected minority populations in childhood.
 The ideologies and policies of  the War on Crime 
are made manifest in disciplinary arrangements in urban 
public schools.  As French philosopher Michel Foucault 
suggests, schools have always been disciplinary institutions.13 
Schools organize students, control them, grade them, rank 
them, track them; this is the making of  Foucault’s docile 
body.14  Presently, though, we are experiencing a unique 
cultural moment in which the gold standard of  school 
discipline is punitive. In this era, youth are exposed to the 
criminal justice system by way of  their public education and 
prior to criminal activity.15  The consequences include the 
expansion of  the minority achievement gap and increased 
risk of  incarceration that leads to disproportionate 
minority confinement.  What is at stake here is the loss 
of  educational opportunity, the acculturation of  youth to 
criminalization, and a negative redirection of  students’ life 
paths.  These risks are borne not only by individual students, 
but also by their communities and the larger democracy.16
 The criminal justice system has significantly 
influenced schools nationally in terms of  policy, cultural 
practice, staffing and technology.17  School disciplinary 
policies are increasingly designed to mirror criminal justice 
enforcements, and zero-tolerance measures originating 
in the war on crime are now common in the education 
system.18  In fact, zero-tolerance became a requirement 
for school funding by way of  the Gun-Free Schools Act 
of  1994.19 Though the term “zero-tolerance” is not used 
in the Gun-Free Schools Act, the law dictated an automatic 
punishment of  school expulsion of  at least one year for 
gun possession on school grounds.20  In time, this kind 
of  strict disciplinary enforcement came to be known 
as zero-tolerance and began to play a significant role in 
regulating a wide range of  student behaviors, including 
tardiness, disrespectful language, the expression of  violent 
threats, and inadvertent transgressions of  school rules.21
 Zero-tolerance policies sponsor exclusionary school 
disciplinary practices, such as suspension and expulsion. 
Because these policies do not allow for discretion, even 
minor offenses can be deemed intolerable.  Fairly recently, 
an adolescent boy with a hyperactive diagnosis was punished 
under a zero-tolerance policy for saying during a cafeteria 
conversation, “I am going to get you,” to classmates whom 
he suspected of  eating potatoes intended for him.22  The 
child was suspended from school, placed in the custody 
of  the local police, charged with “terrorist threats,” 
and incarcerated for two weeks while awaiting his trial.
 The penchant for youth criminalization has 
sponsored increased police presence at schools, including 
uniformed and armed guards.  The field of  school 
policing is expanding faster than every other division of  
law enforcement.23  Carceral technologies have also been 
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employed at schools, and surveillance cameras are now 
common features of  school security.24  A large majority 
of  newly built schools are fully equipped with surveillance 
systems.25  With the addition of  metal detectors, biometric 
devices, and similar technologies, the school security market 
has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry – big business 
in the neo-liberal state.26  This privatization of  the public 
sphere supports capital expansion and sponsors social control 
ideologies.  Further, it reinforces a shift in governance away 
from the social welfare state and toward the penal state.27
 The new punitive culture of  public schools is deeply 
troubling, because it negatively affects the lives of  children. 
While children are vulnerable, it is a gross error to reduce 
their vulnerability to the “problem” of  crime – especially 
when doing so masks more significant challenges.28 We 
should also be clear that children are victims of  crime less 
frequently in school than out of  school.  Less than 1% of  
child homicides happen in school, and non-fatal school 
crime has been reduced over 60% between 1992 and 
2004.29  While it would be convenient to interpret this crime 
decline as proof  that school security 
is effective, it would be inaccurate.30 
Crime began dropping in school prior 
to the institutionalization of  zero 
tolerance policies and prior to advances 
in school surveillance and fortification. 
Crime against youth continued to drop 
in schools just as it dropped in society at large, suggesting 
that school security features were not the catalyst.31
 Is it possible that crime in schools could have 
dropped further had it not been for the ramping up of  
school security?  Pedro Noguera, an expert in urban 
education, has argued that punitive school disciplinary 
policies dehumanize students and, thereby, produce a harsh 
school climate that sponsors violence.32  Recently, other 
scholars have joined Noguera in focusing on the negative 
effect of  criminalizing school cultures.  The sociologist Paul 
Hirschfield claims that the harsh school disciplinary policies 
that result in student suspension and expulsion label youth as 
“future prisoners in need of  coercive control or exclusion” 
and generate “a self-fulfilling prophesy.”33  This claim is 
supported by the work of  educational scholars, Richard 
Arum and Irenee Beattie, who have statistically proven 
that punitive treatments in school, such as suspension, 
increase the risk of  adult incarceration.34  In short, these 
data suggests that we are expanding childhood vulnerability 
with the very measures we have employed to provide safety.
 The research on school discipline indicates that 
punitive policies, practices, and ideologies are magnifying 
the vulnerability of  our most marginalized student groups.35 
Compared to Whites in their peer group, African-American 
students experience nearly 6% more school surveillance, 
24 % more campus security guards, and navigate five 
times more metal detectors.36  African-American students 
comprise about 17% of  all students but are over 33% of  
those suspended from school for disciplinary reasons.37 
This punishment falls disproportionately on African-
American males and has significant consequences for 
incarceration risk.38  The experience of  school suspension 
more than doubles the likelihood of  adult incarceration.39 
In other words, punitive school disciplinary policies 
further the expansion of  the prison system itself, largely 
at the expense of  the African-American community.
 New Orleans, where I have conducted research 
since 2002, provides the quintessential example of  school 
and prison coordination.  The disciplinary culture of  New 
Orleans Public Schools is influenced by the war on crime’s 
priority for law and order in governance.  I began my research 
in New Orleans when a small group of  local students 
were suspended or expelled from their schools – most for 
minor and non-violent offenses such as insubordination or 
tardiness.  The students were reassigned to a new school that 
opened at the Orleans Parish Prison, 
and this institution became the center 
of  my interpretive case study and the 
focus of  my field note observations 
and locally conducted interviews, 
which spanned approximately 
two years.  I contextualized the 
qualitative data I gathered with statistical information 
on school performance and school punishment from 
local school and district archives, and I supplemented 
the data set with a vast collection of  local documents 
including school board minutes and newspaper clippings.
 The school was in a building on the grounds of  
the prison complex, and the students were there for twelve 
hours a day.  At the school, the law and order paradigm 
was palpable.  There were surveillance cameras at every 
corner, bars on the windows, and armed deputies to keep 
the students in line.  Educational advancement was de-
prioritized.  There were no credentialed teachers, no 
textbooks, and no courses leading to high school graduation. 
This program was actually a school reform initiative designed 
by the Criminal Sheriff  and supported by the superintendent 
of  schools, who was a former colonel in the Marines.
 In 2002, the year the prison school opened, there 
were many signs of  socioeconomic distress in New Orleans 
that preceded Hurricane Katrina and then exacerbated the 
storm’s effects.  The severely underperforming Orleans 
Parish Public Schools were serving a student population 
that was 93% African-American and 80% low-income, and 
the schools ranked at the bottom of  the nation.40  In 2000, 
only 25% of  third graders and 29% of  ninth graders in New 
Orleans met national averages on the standardized Iowa Test 
punitive school disciplinary policies further 
the expansion of  the prison system itself, 
largely at the expense of  the African-
American community.
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of  Basic Skills.41  Two of  the young boys I came to know in 
my research reflected these larger patterns.  They were low-
income, African-American boys, each with a long history of  
academic failure.  Both attended a middle school where 40 
% of  the eighth grade class in one year did not advance to 
the ninth grade.  When I asked the students what traditional 
school was like for them, one explained that he always felt 
behind in his lessons and could not seem to catch up in his 
classes, where the student-teacher ratio was as high as thirty-
three to one.42  His mother said he often came home in tears.
 The academic failure of  New Orleans Public Schools 
is further revealed by school disciplinary measures.  On the 
district level in 2000-2001, almost 16% of  all district students 
were suspended during the school year.43  When these data is 
analyzed by race and gender, however, the numbers become 
even more striking.  In the 2002-2003 school year, for 
example, over 25% of  African-American males in the New 
Orleans Public School System were suspended at least once 
and lost instruction time as a result.44  One of  the students 
in my research was suspended and sent to the prison school 
because he had skipped classes; another because he had 
often been late to homeroom.  Neither saw their disciplinary 
offenses as warranting a prison-style punishment.
 The space and experience of  the school in the 
prison were completely baffling to the New Orleans public 
school students who found themselves constantly restricted, 
regimented and surveilled.  One student explained that the 
security arrangements at the school forced him to confront a 
negative image of  himself, which he rejected.  He explained 
that he was the exception in this regard, as most kids responded 
to the aggressive treatment in kind and started acting even 
more “crazy.”  There is a great deal of  educational research 
on the powerful role that expectations play in youth identity 
development.  The theory of  the self-fulfilling prophecy 
suggests that when we treat children like criminals, we help 
them construct a sense of  themselves that aligns with the 
criminal identity we have assigned to them.  What motivation 
is there for them to behave otherwise?  Even students who 
find ways to resist the criminalizing power relations at school 
must struggle to cast themselves in a more positive light.
 As the story of  the students at the prison school 
suggests, tough on crime policies in school exacerbate 
societal and educational disenfranchisement.  The low-
income, underperforming, African-American male 
students from New Orleans were socially, economically, 
and educationally disadvantaged before they were ever sent 
to school at a prison.  By obsessing over their disciplinary 
infractions rather than addressing their academic challenges, 
we nearly ensure that these students will drag further behind.
 Incarceration poses the ultimate risk of  harsh 
disciplinary treatment in school because imprisonment marks 
an individual for his or her lifetime, as well as his or her family 
and community.  Imprisonment means total confinement 
and a loss of  identity, and it is attended by deprivation and 
violence.  In his research on incarceration and the life course, 
sociologist Bruce Western has shown that a prison term 
shapes an individual’s job, marriage, and family prospects.45 
Incarceration also significantly shapes voting rights, as Jeff  
Manza and Chris Uggen and have shown in their study of  
felon disenfranchisement.46  They reveal that one in forty 
Americans cannot vote due to a past felony.  When you 
consider voter disenfranchisement along the axis of  race, 
an even larger problem emerges.  In some states one in four 
African-American men are ineligible to vote.  Suddenly, the 
problem is not one borne solely by the individual or even 
by the group.  Voter disenfranchisement is a problem for 
democracy, since it poses a threat to full representation.
 There are many ways to interrupt the trend of  
disproportionate minority confinement, beginning with a 
rethinking of  our priorities for public education.  The first step 
is in the direction of  schools that reflect educational priorities 
and serve as positive sources of  social capital.  Positive social 
capital, according to sociologist Loïc Wacquant, are those 
accrued institutional resources that promote a community.47 
For schools to be positive sources of  social capital they 
must embrace tenets of  inclusion rather than exclusion and 
build school communities that students and their families 
can be proud of  and want to be a part of.  A further step in 
the right direction is engendered by a commitment to high 
expectations for all students.  Roslyn Mickelson’s work on 
the achievement gap has shown that students who have clear 
and positive future goals are more successful in school.48
 Punitive school discipline does not engender a 
positive student trajectory, while an elaboration of  positive 
school resources does.  A recent study by scholars, Richard 
Arum and Gary LaFree, proves a theory long-held by 
school advocates that “states and schools with higher 
teacher-student ratios produce adults who face lower risks 
of  incarceration.”49  Similar investments in education–
focusing on teaching staff  and classroom resources–could 
have the same positive result.  These investments are costly, 
but the financial and social cost of  school security may, 
indeed, be even higher.  In New Orleans post-Katrina, 
the Recovery School District spent nearly $22 million 
dollars for school security.50  The students in New Orleans 
needed this investment in academic opportunities, and 
not in the technologies and tactics of  criminalization.
 Ultimately, the students I studied in New Orleans 
left the prison school when local activists, some of  whom 
had been formerly incarcerated, protested the institution 
and pressured the school board to shut it down.  None of  
the students I worked with ever re-enrolled in traditional 
public schools, and they now formally occupy the status 
of  the African-American male high school dropout.  The 
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chances that they will end up in prison are higher than the chances that they won’t. So far, they’ve defied the odds.
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BOOK INTERVIEW:
 THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
By: Richael Faithful 1
 As a summer law clerk at Advancement Project 
I read an excited e-mail chain about a newly-published 
book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of  
Colorblindness, by Michelle Alexander, a professor at Ohio 
State Moritz College of  Law.  In my experience, racial justice 
advocates are always excited about race-related progressive-
minded works that receive a scintilla of  national attention, 
because the sad truth is that much of  America’s public 
racial dialogue is simplistic, sterilized, and sound-bited.  My 
co-workers were most thrilled by the book’s provocative 
name—“The New Jim Crow”—a name that accurately 
colors the present crisis in the American criminal system. 
 Beyond the book’s name is an equally firm punch 
from cover to cover.  The New Jim Crow has received rave 
reviews by the public interest community in particular 
and social justice advocates in general.  By mid-summer 
I knew that I needed to interview Michelle Alexander for 
The Modern American to learn more about her as an author 
and advocate and her personal reasons for writing such an 
inevitably controversial book.  Her message is plain and 
poignant: mass incarceration is the new racial caste system 
of  the twenty-first century, built on colorblindness’s dual 
weapons of  systemic racism and willful ambivalence, and 
racial caste must be finally confronted and dismantled in 
the United States once and for all.  Her ambitious vision is 
well-outlined in The New Jim Crow, a self-described “call to 
action,” which meticulously details the history and law of  
mass incarceration, namely through the “War on Drugs,” 
and the devastation wrought by the so-called war on racial 
politics and communities of  color, from black-brown 
criminalization to the creation of  a new underclass.  Our hour-
long conversation explored: why this book and why now? 
 Michelle Alexander makes clear that her book is 
written for racial justice advocates who need to care more 
about mass incarceration.  In other words, she wrote this 
book for people who are now in the position that she was 
in about a decade ago.  She acknowledged that she had 
always been acutely aware of  racial injustice, as a child 
of  an inter-racial marriage between a white mother and 
black father.  When younger, Alexander noticed that her 
parents’ marriage had drastic consequences—both families 
disapproved, but her mother was ex-communicated from 
her church and disowned by her family.  “My mother was 
treated radically different,” Alexander observed, elaborating 
that her parents faced rental discrimination, and other 
mistreatment, which her mother had not experienced before. 
Their hardships occurred in the backdrop of  a landmark 
Supreme Court case, Loving v. Virginia, which ruled bans 
against inter-racial marriage as unconstitutional.  Alexander 
was born within months of  Loving, and she developed a 
sensitivity to issues of  race in America from an early age. 
 But, like most racially-conscience people, her political 
analysis was deepened by more personal experiences.  During 
college, Alexander volunteered at a newly de-segregated high 
school attended by poor Black children.  The severity of  the 
segregation was so stark and so dire that in her mind it was 
the first time she witnessed “how race operated to lock poor 
people of  color into inferior status.”  Her experience at the 
schools, along with another volunteer experience during 
college at a women’s prison, impressed the meaning of  
systemic racism onto her political awareness.  It was during this 
time that she learned that race served to mark certain people 
as second-class citizens in the present, even if  less overtly. 
 This is the level at which most racial justice 
advocates operate today.  Many advocates defensively resist 
systemic racism through policy reform at national or state 
levels.  In contrast, The New Jim Crow, emphasizes that 
systemic racism is the tip of  the stratification iceberg, and 
our criminal system is the Titanic about to come to head. 
 Alexander explained that the inspiration for the 
book came during her time as the former American Civil 
Liberties Union-Northern California (ACLU-NC) Racial 
Justice Project Director.  At the time, the ACLU-NC’s 
main project was the Driving While Black Campaign, an 
effort against law enforcement racial profiling.  One of  the 
strategies adopted by the organization was litigation, which 
led Alexander in search of  potential plaintiffs.  Screening 
interviews proved to be a rigorous task, consisting of  
speaking to “one young African-American man after 
the other,” hearing one shocking story after the other. 
One young man in particular help guide her to 
“enlightenment.”  He was yet another young African-
American man who entered the interview room.  Unlike the 
others, though, he carried a stack of  papers, the weight of  
which reverberated with a “plunk” when dropped onto a 
table in front of  Alexander.  He was a clean-shaven young 
man who easily articulated his numerous racial profiling 
experiences.  He had even painstakingly documented every 
stop and search he had experienced in the last nine months. 
By all accounts he was a perfect plaintiff—certainly a rare find. 
 Alexander was eager and ready to take his case 
and assumed, because of  a pre-interview screening, that 
he had no criminal history.  But during the course of  the 
interview, he let it slip that he had been convicted of  a 
drug felony.  He tried to explain that he was set up in a 
drug bust during which his friend was beaten by a specific 
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police officer.  Before he continued, Alexander simply 
told him that she was sorry that she could not represent 
him, but that she had no other choice.  He was obviously 
disappointed.  Alexander tried to explain, “they [state 
lawyers] would tear you apart because of  your record.” 
Another otherwise ideal plaintiff  was struck off  the list, 
leaving Alexander sorry that he was no longer a candidate. 
It was clear, however, that he was even sorrier. 
He jolted up from his seat and yelled that because of  his 
conviction he couldn’t get a job, public 
housing, food stamps, or other benefits 
that he desperately needed to re-start 
his life.  He was trapped living with 
his grandmother, unable to find work, 
or a way to get unstuck.  He poised 
his words and said, “You’re no better 
than the police…doing the same thing 
that they did to me.”  He told her that 
she had written him off, like all of  the 
others had done, for no other reason 
than that he was labeled a felon. 
Several months later, the 
Oakland police scandal broke on the 
front page of  a local paper, naming 
the same officer that the young man 
identified in his interview.  Alexander 
immediately realized that the young 
man was telling the truth in more ways 
than one.  She had made a terrible 
mistake—he was right.  She reflected 
that, even as a civil rights lawyer, 
“I replicated the very same kind of  discrimination and 
marginalization that I was fighting against.”  The reality set in 
that although she intellectually knew that labels were empty 
brands, “management and control of  dispossessed people 
trapped in second class status is eerily reminiscent of  Jim 
Crow”—a bygone, but familiar era of  her childhood—and 
she had perpetuated the same stereotyping that kept that 
young man locked into the convicted persons’ underclass. 
He “shook me from a colorblind slumber,” 
Alexander said.  “[I]t was like an optical illusion, 
but now, being able to see the picture clearly, the 
outline was traced where it was hidden before.” 
Alexander’s revelation after her interview 
experience is the driving force of  the book.  She stresses 
that because the caste system, melded together by mass 
incarceration, has become literally set—normalized by 
false crime rationalizations—its future depends on one 
factor alone: complicity.  Historians are quick to point out 
that Jim Crow was also an accepted way-of-life until, over 
several decades, the popular movement had swelled to its 
climax.  As she explains in the book, just like with the Jim 
Crow myth that “races couldn’t mix together,” American 
society has bought into crime and punishment myths that 
justify the War on Drugs against poor Blacks.  The truth 
is that drug crime was declining when the War on Drugs 
was declared,2 crime rates have remained steady in recent 
years even as incarceration rates have sky-rocketed,3 and 
whites, more than any other racial group, are perpetrators 
of  most drug crimes, despite the fact that Blacks and 
Latino/as are locked up at alarmingly high disproportions.4
 The New Jim Crow goes a long way 
to explain these contradictions within 
the colorblind and mass incarceration 
phenomena.  The book’s first chapter, 
The Rebirth of  Caste, explains 
that the “law and order” rhetoric 
strategically deployed in the 1960s 
to quell the Civil Rights Movement 
ripened into justification for the 
Black drug “crackdown” of  the 
1980s.  The lucidity of  these historical 
cycles, Alexander suggested in our 
interview, puts forth the question, 
“what will historians say about us?” 
After all, she explained, “people 
thought that they understood Jim 
Crow until it was challenged in the 
1960s,” because fundamentally, it was 
racial indifference, not racial hostility, 
that kept the caste system intact. 
 The same ambivalence also feeds the 
colorblindness myth—the myth that 
racism no longer exists and that race is therefore irrelevant—
as the United States willfully ignores the staggering truth 
that it locks up more of  its racial minorities than does any 
other country in the world.5  Moreover, Alexander shared, 
colorblindness actually depends on racial exceptionalism to 
survive.  In other words, without the Barack and Michelle 
Obamas, which are fewer in number but greater in visibility, 
mass incarceration would be exposed as so evidently a racial 
caste system that its indictment of  the United States would be 
“unavoidable,” as was Jim Crow exploitation during the Cold 
War.  Alexander argued to me that, unless the “opportunity 
to move people utterly indifferent to the harm and suffering 
that the system has inflicted” is seized, the magnitude of  
harm caused by mass incarceration will never be appreciated. 
 When I asked Alexander why she wrote this 
book, her reply, in essence, was because she could.  As an 
accomplished civil rights lawyer-turned-law professor, she 
lends credibility to the words, stories, and realities of  less 
privileged people lost in the mass incarceration underworld. 
Her ultimate challenge to racial justice advocates is that 
“reform is not enough—we need to work toward movement 
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building work…not just to end mass incarceration but to 
end racial caste in America.”  In her mind, this enormous 
undertaking begins with a very simple belief: “care, 
compassion, and concern across racial lines” is necessary 
to build racial empathy, the skill to “hear the voices of  
people who are handcuffed” and to do something about it. 
 She further stressed that racial justice advocates 
must send more than a political message—they must 
send the message that real change means “all of  us or 
none of  us.”  She emphasized that advocates urgently 
need to turn their focus to removing the stigma attached 
to people convicted of  felonies in the Black church and 
other community pillars, so that the paralyzing fear in 
these communities can transform into grassroots action. 
 The promise or peril of  American racial justice 
may hang by a thread of  shared compassion, a message 
pushed by then-candidate Barack Obama in his well-known 
Philadelphia address.  Alexander takes a sobered view of  
President Barack Obama’s racial agenda, but hopes to remind 
communities of  color that they cannot expect anything 
more from the President, who operates in a precarious, 
colorblind political landscape.  If  anything, she urges, 
“we need to be more willing to engage around aggressive 
advocacy and organizing” and to rouse America from its 
colorblind dream.  She writes in the final chapter, “The 
Fire This Time,” that Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream had 
evolved in the Poor People’s Movement into a recognition 
that “the time had come for racial justice advocates to 
shift from a civil rights to human rights paradigm, and 
that the real work of  movement building had just begun.”6
To learn more about this crisis see, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of  Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander, 
The New Press (2010). http://www.newjimcrow.com/
1 Richael Faithful is a third-year law student at American 
University, Washington College of  Law, and outgoing 
Editor-In-Chief  of  The Modern American.
2 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010).
3 Id. at 97.
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 245. 
For more commentary on mass incarceration, see Modern America: Law & Politics Blog posts, “A Modern Twist on the Prison Indus-
trial Complex,” by Isis Goldberg and “Prison Labor, Human Experimentation, & The BP Oil Disaster” by Zannie Carlson.  
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PERSONAL ESSAY: MY ORDEAL OF REGAINING VOTING RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA
By: Frank Anderson 1
I was convicted of  burglary in 1998, and I served two 
years and two months in jail and prison.  Several years after 
serving my time, I got interested in politics and learned of  a 
process where I could restore my voting rights.  Although the 
struggle of  incarceration was long over, I didn’t know that I was 
about to begin another struggle to become a full citizen again.
In the Commonwealth of  Virginia an ex-offender can 
get a job, get married, get a driver’s license, even raise children; 
but he or she cannot vote unless restored by the Governor.
I applied in 2008 to have my rights restored, but a 
few months later I was denied.  No reason was given.  There 
is no appeals process, and there was a two-year waiting 
period to reapply.  I thought I had done everything right. 
I met all the requirements specified on the application:  I 
was off  parole for over three years, paid all my fines, and 
had not been convicted of  a misdemeanor since 1998.
Working with some voting rights groups, activists, 
and local elected officials, we tried to get Governor Tim 
Kaine to reconsider his decision in my case. 
But beyond that, we wanted him to take action 
to restore the rights of  the 300,000 Virginians 
who were disenfranchised like myself.  The 
Virginia State Constitution gives the Governor 
the power to restore rights in any way he sees 
fit, and the type of  action we were asking for 
was not without precedent.  Other governors 
had issued Executive Orders to automatically 
restore rights, such as Governor Vilsak of  
Iowa and Governor Crist of  Florida.  Even 
Texas, under then-governor George W. Bush, 
moved to a system of  automatic restoration.
But time was running out.  Governor 
Tim Kaine’s term was set to expire in January, 
2010.  It was exactly one month before that, 
December 2009, that I received an email from 
the Virginia Secretary of  the Commonwealth’s Office:
It is the policy of  the Office of  the 
Governor not to provide specific reasons why 
the Governor exercises his discretion not to 
grant requests for restoration of  rights. . . .  
However, one requirement is that applicants 
have no convictions for violations of  the 
law . . . prior to applying for restoration of  
rights.  This includes moving violations, such as 
speeding.
I had two reactions.  First, I thought, “moving 
violations?  What kind of  policy denies basic rights based 
on speeding tickets?”  My second thought was can you really 
call it a policy when, until that point, it had been a complete 
secret, and probably was never written down that moving 
violations could affect restoration applications.  (Not to 
mention the fact that they broke their other supposed 
policy of  not giving specific reasons why the Governor 
exercised his discretion to deny my application).  I’m not a 
lawyer, but it was clear to me—it was not a policy, it was an 
arbitrary and capricious decision of  the Governor’s Office.
It was December 2009, and a coalition of  groups 
that I joined called Virginia Restore Our Vote (which 
included the Virginia ACLU, NAACP, Poverty Law Center, 
League of  Women Voters, Progressive Democrats of  
America, interfaith and many others) had recently formed 
to address the felony disenfranchisement issue on several 
fronts.  Many of  the coalition groups had been trying for 
quite some time, even for years, to convince the Governor 
to take action to restore rights before he left office.  We 
tried conventional methods; we tried working 
behind-the-scenes.  But Governor Kaine was 
unwilling to do the right thing.  We also knew 
that in less than a month, Kaine was going to 
be succeeded by a Republican Governor who 
may not be as willing to make any progress on 
the issue.  That’s when I decided to go public 
with this new information that they were 
denying restorations because of  traffic tickets.
We hoped that putting some public 
pressure on the Governor would convince 
him to act.  We held two demonstrations, had 
frequent media coverage, and made numerous 
public calls for Kaine.  Legal teams had gone 
into great detail to show exactly how, and why, he 
had the authority to issue a blanket restoration 
if  he chose to do so.  Even the Washington Post 
agreed with our position that Governor Kaine should issue a 
blanket restoration and create an automatic restoration system.
Unfortunately he lacked the courage, and in January 
Tim Kaine went on to devote himself  full-time to his position 
as Chairman of  the Democratic National Committee 
as Governor Bob McDonnell was sworn into office.
In the beginning of  2010, Governor Bob 
McDonnell declared April to be Confederate History 
Month.  It was at this time his office announced that they 
would be requiring rights restoration applicants to submit 
a letter explaining why they think their rights should be 
restored.  Officials also stated that this letter should include 
any community service, including church activities.  This 
“essay requirement,” as people were calling it, seemed 
Above: Frank 
Anderson; 
Credit:Kenton Ngo
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legally wrong on so many levels, posing potential First and 
Fifteenth Amendment problems.  It was hard to believe 
that this development could be ignored by the public.
It turned out that the essay requirement was a public 
relations nightmare for the McDonnell Administration, just 
on the heels of  the flap over Confederate History Month. 
So once again, advocacy groups met with the Governor 
and a few weeks later, they announced a new “policy” for 
nonviolent offenders applying for restoration of  rights. 
There would be no essay requirement.  Applications were to 
be processed in 60 days or less.  The waiting period to apply 
was shortened, and the period to re-apply was also shortened.
Moreover, I learned through unofficial channels 
that the Governor would no longer be using traffic tickets 
as a sole reason to deny applicants.  I immediately drove 
to Richmond to hand-deliver my application.  About one 
month later, I received a certificate from the Governor. 
The big golden seal both formalized my regained rights 
and at long last, my full citizenship.  The very next day, 
I went to the Board of  Elections to register to vote.  A 
few days after later, I received my voter card in the mail.
I thank Governor McDonnell for making the 
restoration process even easier than it was under his 
predecessors.  I encourage him to do even more to 
expand voting rights for every ex-offender in Virginia 
who has completed his or her sentence.  But the 
problem remains that as long as Virginia’s Constitution 
puts the power of  restoration solely in the hands of  
the Governor, thousands of  Virginians can and will be 
disenfranchised.  The fact that Governor McDonnell was 
able to change the “policy” so significantly from that of  
his predecessor proves that the process is truly arbitrary.
During this process, I was surprised at how many 
people, even some supposed progressives, actually believed 
that I shouldn’t be allowed to vote.  I was being held to 
a higher standard than people who run for office, just to 
get my right to vote restored.  I ask them: what are the 
requirements of  citizenship?  Didn’t I meet the requirements 
when I was released from prison and I was able to work and 
pay taxes?  Those who say that I shouldn’t be allowed to 
vote are in essence saying that my sentence was too light 
and that my punishment should continue.  Although I’m 
out here, they insist that my civil rights remain incarcerated. 
This is the moral hypocrisy that Virginians need to confront.
The Commonwealth of  Virginia’s political hypocrisy 
is that forty-eight other states have better restoration 
laws.  Why don’t people from the other states complain 
about the fact that ex-offenders have their rights restored 
automatically?  Because it’s normal.  Virginia is abnormal.
This is why we need Congress to act.  Legislators 
are currently considering the Democracy Restoration 
Act, which will grant automatic restoration for all people 
convicted of  felonies (who are no longer incarcerated) to 
vote in federal elections.  People like me shouldn’t have to 
go through years of  uncertainty about whether they would 
be able to vote again.  They shouldn’t have to re-live the 
entire conviction and incarceration process as they pore 
through archived records to find the right information 
to send to the Secretary of  the Commonwealth, in the 
hopes that the Governor would be nice enough to grant 
them a right that should never have been taken away.
I urge you to remember my story, and push Congress 
to act now.  Free people should not be relegated to second-
class citizenship after they have paid their debt to society.
1 Frank Anderson is an advocate against felon disenfranchisement who recently re-gained his own right-to-vote in 
Virginia where he is currently is a resident.  This essay is based on remarks that he made at the University of  the 
District of  Columbia Law School in October 2010.
Endnotes
For more commentary on rights restoration for people convicted of  felonies, see Modern America: Law & Politics Blog posts, “Modern 
Day Poll Tax,” by Richael Faithful. 
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CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHT: FIFTEENTH ANNUAL LATCRIT CONFERENCE
By: Alex Bernshteyn1
The Fifteenth Annual Latino/a Critical Legal 
Theory Conference, which took place from October 8-
10, 2010 in Denver, Colorado, was themed “The Color of  
the Economic Crisis: Exploring the Downturn From the 
Bottom Up.”  The conference explored how the economic 
crisis affects marginalized populations differently—such as 
socio-economically disadvantaged people, racial minorities, 
immigrants, and domestic violence victims—and how 
their realities must be a central point of  discussion when 
considering economic justice and reform.  Most of  the 
conference attendees were law school professors who shared 
their relevant research.  Students, practitioners, and advocates 
also came to present ideas, learn from others, and build 
collective support for a 
call to progressive action.
 A main focus of  
the conference was the 
impact of  the economic 
crisis on immigrants 
living in the United States. 
Immigrants, broadly 
speaking, are vulnerable 
to scapegoating during 
economic downturns, 
as evidenced by the new 
Arizona immigration 
law.  The opening lunch 
presentation included an 
engaging speech by Hans 
Meyer, from the Colorado 
Immigrants’ Rights 
Coalition, who began 
by asking immigrants in 
the room to stand.  Only 
a handful of  people 
stood up.  He then asked 
those whose parents or 
grandparents were immigrants to stand, those who were in 
love with an immigrant to stand, those who had immigrants 
living in their neighborhood to stand, and, finally, those 
who simply were in solidarity with immigrants to stand. 
By the end of  the speech, the whole room was on its feet.
Many of  the panel discussions on opening day 
focused on the current immigrants’ rights battle.  For 
example, experts on a panel titled “Immigration, Economic 
Crisis, & the State” examined U.S. immigration policy from 
a number of  angles.  Gabriella Sanchez, from the Arizona 
State University School of  Justice and Social Inquiry, gave 
an anthropological evaluation of  how Arizona’s immigration 
law isolates, ostracizes, and places immigrants in Maricopa 
County under a spotlight of  criminal investigation.  Tania 
Valdez, a student at the University of  California, Berkeley 
Boalt Hall School of  Law, reminded attendees that American 
laws that affect immigrants often have unintended yet severe 
consequences on immigrants’ families who were left behind 
in home countries.  Valdez’s paper focused on The North 
American Free Trade Agreement’s effect on indigenous 
women in Mexico and laid the foundation for a critical 
analysis of  how the inherent inequalities of  that regional 
trade agreement push men to migrate for work, leaving their 
wives wholly dependent on remittances for their family’s 
survival.  Maria Pabon Lopez, from Indiana University 
Maurer School of  Law, 
gave a comparative 
overview of  how Spain 
has developed a creative 
solution to deal with its 
shrinking economy and 
influx of  immigrants—the 
country has begun paying 
immigrants to return 
to the countries from 
which they came.  While 
she did not advocate 
for a similar solution in 
the United States, she 
did argue for innovative 
immigration reform 
that acknowledges the 
potential clash between 
an influx of  immigrants 
and an economic 
downturn, and for a 
solution that preserves 
the dignity of  all people.
During the event’s 
main dinner, Mary Romero, from Arizona State University, 
gave a powerful speech, bolstered by photographs, focusing 
on Arizona’s new unjust immigration laws.  She offered 
anecdotal information related to the new laws, including 
how listening to Mexican music or not looking directly 
into the eyes of  police officers may constitute reasonable 
suspicion for police to stop a person for “papers.”  Some of  
the photographs featured Latinos and Latinas being shoved 
into the back of  police cars.  Other photographs were 
captioned and showed children crying out hysterically, “they 
told me to shut up and that mommy was leaving.”  The 
real impact of  anti-immigrant backlash during the current 
Above: Plenary speakers of “Latina/o Education and Justice: Leading Voices, 
Lessons Learned.” Credit: Tayyab Mahmud
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Great Recession spoke for itself  in these photographs.
Other panels explored the experiences of  people 
who not only suffer economically, but also endure other 
forms of  injustice.  Robert Ashford, from Syracuse 
University, conveyed his thesis that the economic crisis 
did not cause poverty, but rather that poverty caused 
the economic crisis.  Judy Goldscheid, from The City 
University of  New York School of  Law, spoke on the 
hidden dangers of  economic fluctuations in the family 
setting, where domestic violence tends to increase with 
economic hardship.  James Hackney, from Northeastern 
University School of  Law, made the case that critical 
race theory must be examined as an inherent element in 
LatCrit student Scholars and one of the LatCrit founders cutting a cake to mark LatCrit’s Quinceañera. 
Credit: Tayyab Mahmud
economic crises because race is a critical part of  every 
aspect of  solution-building.  Danne Johnson, from 
Oklahoma City University School of  Law, argued that 
lifeline non-governmental organizations, which provide 
food and shelter to those in poverty, should benefit from 
government bailouts because they provide essential 
services that the government has neglected to offer.
These examples of  innovative and thoughtful 
speakers, theories, and arguments are just a small sample from 
the Fifteenth Annual LatCrit Conference.  Over 200 attendees 
gathered for meals and ideas.  Each of  us exchanged smiles 
and handshakes upon recognizing that we were advocates 
for the same issue: social justice during economic crisis.
1 Alexandra Bernshteyn is a third-year law student at American University, Washington College of  Law. She serves 
as an Assistant Marketing Editor for The Modern American, and she attended this year’s LatCrit conference on the 
publication’s behalf. 
Endnotes
For brief  interviews of  LatCrit attendees and participants, see The Modern American 
website at www.wcl.american.edu/modernamerican. 
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Honoring the Past, Celebrating the Future, 
The Women’s Bar Association of  DC, and 
The Modern American Third Annual Dinner
Above: Former and current 
TMA staff members, Cheryl 
Chado, Heron Greenesmith, 
and Julia Saladino, at pre-din-
ner reception.
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Bottom: Caption: Associate 
Dean for Library and Infor-
mation Resources, Billie Jo 
Kaufman, and former TMA 
Editor-In-Chief, Mara Gior-
gio, Volume 4. 
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Above: TMA staff member 
and WBA and WBA Foun-
dation attendees at 
pre-dinner reception. 
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Left: Keynote speaker, 
Professor Brenda Smith, 
American University, The 
Washington College of Law, 
November 3, 2010. 
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Above: Representatives from three student organizations, in-
cluding TMA, presenting donation to Jessica Salsbury of The 
Tahirih Justice Center from month-long fundraising efforts 
for the organization. Credit: Hilary Schwab
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COMMENTARY: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE BP OIL SPILL: DOES ANYONE CARE 
ABOUT THE “SMALL PEOPLE” OF COLOR?
By: Perry E. Wallace1
Introduction
 “We care about the small people” declared BP 
Chairman Carl-Henric Svanburg on June 16, 2010, just eight 
weeks after the start of  the company’s now-famous oil spill. 
Ironically, the Swedish corporate chief  uttered those clumsy 
words while leading a campaign to stem the growing, spill-
related reputational damage to BP. Compounding the irony 
in Mr. Svanburg’s statement is the fact that he had been sent 
as a substitute for British CEO Tony Hayward, whose earlier 
efforts to repair BP’s corporate image had also failed miserably.
  Throughout these missteps, the media were 
providing the world with daily images of  the spill.  Every 
day, we watched as 2.6 million gallons of  oil surged out of  
the ocean floor, constantly and uncontrolled, into the Gulf  
of  Mexico.  Surely this was a time for curative action and 
adroit public relations.  Against this background, the highly-
publicized gaffe was an especially aggravating contribution to 
BP’s loss of  favor in a time of  great crisis.  The spill betrayed 
a gigantic, multi-dimensional corporate ineptitude—not 
merely in linguistic and cultural facility but also, more broadly, 
in corporate governance and social responsibility.  With the 
oil leak finally plugged (we hope), one would think that 
the flow of  BP corporate governance failures should have 
similarly been plugged.  But this apparently has not happened. 
Moreover, BP is not the only actor facing disapproval on 
the long and arduous path to recovery.  Governmental 
and other actors have also incurred the wrath of  many 
and varied critics ranging from environmental groups and 
ordinary citizens to politicians, businesses and the media. 
 On the other hand, certain affected groups 
have scarcely been mentioned in efforts to address the 
environmental, economic, social and cultural impacts of  
the oil spill.  These forgotten groups include minorities, 
(small) businesses and communities that have also suffered. 
In fact—as usually happens with environmental justice 
matters—they have endured disproportionately greater 
injury and they have received disproportionately less 
assistance, by comparison with other impacted persons and 
groups.  The following discussion explores the general nature 
and status of  environmental justice, describes the plight of  
traditionally forgotten groups in the BP oil spill recovery 
efforts, and makes some observations about the elements 
of  a curative approach to the problems of  those groups.
Environmental Justice: Of  People, Power and 
Pollution 
 One commonality between environmental justice 
and other social and economic justice topics is the notion 
of power imbalances: (1) the relative powerlessness of  
those being harmed and (2) the superior power of  those 
causing, or allowing, that harm.  Whatever the technical 
classification of  the more powerful forces (governmental, 
corporate or individual) and whatever the impetus to 
cause or allow the harm (animus, greed, negligence, 
or mere thoughtlessness), the imbalance of  power is 
a core operative element in social and economic injustice.
 Obviously, the environmental or other injustice 
is grounded in some actual or perceived difference 
between those with power and those without it.  Equally 
clear is the fact that the more powerful groups view 
themselves as being more privileged or entitled based 
on that difference.  Focusing on power highlights a key 
enabling feature of  the negative interaction between the two 
opposing groups.  Further, certain pivotal characteristics 
of  powerlessness (ignorance, lack of  resources, lack of  
organization and lack of  leadership) not only shed light 
on its causes but also contain the keys to the cures for the 
powerlessness and perhaps even the power imbalance itself.
Environmental Justice Executive Order 12898, 
“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,” 
signed by President William J. Clinton in 1994, sought 
to establish an official federal policy on environmental 
justice.2  The Executive Order required each federal 
agency to “make achieving environmental justice part of  
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of  its programs, policies, and activities 
on minority populations and low-income populations.”
 This policy was a welcome development and 
appears to have resulted in some improvement in 
environmental justice matters, but a thorough analysis of  
the years since the Executive Order confirms that progress 
has not been, and will not be, automatic.  Only determined 
advocacy and leadership will produce successful solutions 
to environmental justice problems.  Frederick Douglass 
once famously declared that “Power concedes nothing 
without a demand.  It never did and it never will.”3  The 
following discussion of  the BP oil spill’s impact on people 
of  color illustrates the truth of  Douglass’ declaration.
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The Devastating Impact of  the Oil Spill: 
Interconnected and Cumulative Harm to People of  
Color
 From the start of  the spill, there was both lay 
speculation and professional study on the magnitude 
and types of  harms that would result from it.  Although 
BP and the federal government at times downplayed 
the potential impact, the overwhelming public and 
scientific consensus was that we were witnessing a 
historic environmental, economic and social catastrophe 
in the making.  In fact, we were: BP was creating the 
largest environmental catastrophe in American history.
On the other hand, United States Representatives Mike 
Honda (D-Calif.) and Anh “Joseph” Cao (R-La.) concluded 
that the particularly harsh way in which minority communities 
were affected during the recovery period was not well-reported:
What is equally disastrous, but less 
frequently reported, is the impact to the 
physical health, economy and livelihoods 
of  communities living adjacent to the Gulf  
Coast.  Among these communities, perhaps the 
most vulnerable are thousands of  Southeast Asian 
and African-American families. The adverse effects 
experienced by this population are potent and 
unique.4 (Emphasis added)
 As these observations become public knowledge, 
they shed light on the paucity of  basic understandings 
about the minority communities in that region.  For 
example, most Americans (including many in the 
local media) hardly knew about the African-American 
commercial fishing community on the Gulf  Coast.  Many 
of  these families have been in the fishing business for 
generations, going back to a time when people in the area 
spoke mainly French.  These and other African-Americans 
are now beginning to explain how the BP spill not only 
brought to them the same harms affecting others in the 
region but also exacerbated historic race-based problems.
Specifically, African-American businesses are not 
receiving many of  the oil spill cleanup contracts.  Nor 
are they as likely to be hired by white-owned business as 
employees when those contracts are let—other than for 
the most hazardous and dangerous of  jobs.  Additionally, 
the substantial lingering effects of  Hurricane Katrina had 
already weakened this community in fundamental and 
disproportionate ways.  Finally, there is the matter of  waste 
disposal from the oil spill.  Where is the waste being sent?  Here, 
the BP oil spill matter becomes both symbol and substance 
of  the environmental justice dilemma.  The following quote 
from Robert Bullard, Director of  the Environmental Justice 
Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, puts it this way:
Given the sad history of  waste disposal in 
the southern United States, it should be no 
surprise to anyone that the BP disposal plan 
looks a lot like “Dumping in Dixie,” and 
has become a core environmental justice 
concern, especially among low-income and 
people of  color communities in the Gulf  
coast—communities whose residents have 
historically borne more than their fair share 
of  solid waste landfills and hazardous waste 
facilities before and after natural and man-
made disasters.5
 Similarly, Southeast Asian fishermen make up one-
third of  the 13,000 fishing vessels registered in the Gulf  
Coast.  Among the phenomena creating special challenges 
for Southeast Asians is the language barrier, which, along 
with general problems of  discrimination and distrust of  
government, makes for a stultifying blockage in gaining 
access to mainstream services and information.  Their 
history, like of  that of  the African-American communities, 
is one of  challenges and difficulties that left them especially 
vulnerable to the oil spill: arrival in the U.S. as political 
refugees, harsh resettlement camp conditions, racial 
discrimination and isolation, and, of  course, Katrina.
The United Houma Nation of  that region has been 
recognized by Louisiana but not by the federal government. 
Sources allege that oil-related interests have successfully 
opposed federal recognition in order to have access to their 
lands for oil and gas operations.  Federal protection would 
bestow significant rights, benefits and protections to this 
group and increase their prospects for responding properly to 
the devastations of  Katrina and the oil spill.  In the meantime, 
oil from the spill is slowly threatening their livelihood and 
culture.  It has destroyed oyster plots, ruined crab traps 
and blocked shrimp trawlers from choice fishing grounds.
 These examples tell an all-too-typical story of  
environmental injustice in action, replete with all the usual 
characteristics of  power imbalance, unequal treatment, 
widespread indifference and tragic consequences.  It is 
with these examples in mind that the search for solutions 
must proceed.  What should be the nature of  solutions 
to this particular environmental justice dilemma?
Seeking Solutions to Environmental 
Injustice; Some Considerations 
 From May 27 through June 10, the National 
Office of  the National Association for the Advancement 
of  Colored People (NAACP) conducted an extensive 
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investigation of  the BP oil spill.  After touring 
affected areas in the Gulf  and meeting with important 
constituencies involved in, or affected by, the spill, the 
NAACP issued a report, BP Oil Drilling Disaster—NAACP 
Investigation (the NAACP Report) containing a list of  
Recommendations.6  Those Recommendations were the 
result of  a thorough and considered process and deserve 
serious consideration in seeking solutions to the BP oil spill. 
The main points of  the Recommendations are as follows:
•	 Financial	Support	for	Community	Based	
Organizations
•	 Accessible	and	Effective	Claims	Process
•	 Physical	and	Mental	Health	Care	for	All
•	 Equal	Access	to	Contracting	Opportunities	for	
Businesses Owned by People of  Color
•	 Community	and	Worker	Safety	Provisions
•	 Impact	Assessments—Analysis	of 	Physical	and	
Mental	Health,	Financial,	and	Socio-Cultural	Short	
and	Long	Term	Impacts
•	 Safe,	Quality	Housing	Provisions	for	Displaced	
Persons
•	 Federal	Recognition	for	the	Houma	Tribe
•	 Direct	Troubled	Asset	Relief 	Program	and	Small	
Business	Administration	Funding	to	Community	
Development	Financial	Institutions
•	 Improved	Information	Dissemination
•	 Comprehensive	Ongoing	Environmental	
Assessments
•	 Preservation	of 	the	Gulf,	Marshlands,	Estuaries,	
and	Other	Waterways	and	Dependent	Sea	Life
•	 Clean	Energy,	Green	Jobs,	and	Increased	
Regulation	of 	Oil	Drilling
	 Without	 question,	 the	 Recommendations	 are	
expansive	and	would	require	considerable	expenditures	of 	
money	and	time.		The	simple	reality	is	that	such	a	sacrifice	
is necessary to bring about a true and permanent solution 
to	 the	problems	of 	 the	 affected	communities.	 	First,	 to	 a	
great degree, these expenditures would comprise resources 
that should have already been applied over many past 
years.  Past failures set the stage for the disproportionately 
calamitous	impact	of 	the	oil	spill	on	these	groups.		Second,	
the expenditures would address the larger economic and 
socio-cultural	 infrastructure	 of 	 the	 communities	 and	
make	 them	 stronger	 and	 less	 vulnerable—a	 benefit	 that	
would be shared far beyond the communities themselves. 
These considerations speak to the dire need for just the 
sort of  expansive, comprehensive approach suggested 
by the Recommendations in the NAACP Report.
Conclusion
 The BP oil spill, unfortunately, has generated 
yet another sad example of  environmental injustice. 
Moreover,	 the	 stakes	 are	 higher	 than	 ever	 before,	 as	
the tragedies associated with it promise to be greater 
than ever before.  As discussed in this article, the 
elements of  environmental justice dilemmas are always 
profound and they set the stage for profoundly adverse 
consequences	 for	 the	 affected	 communities	 and	 others.
 Yet, lawmakers and other leaders could turn 
this tragedy into something more like a victory, if  they 
have	the	will	and	the	courage.	 	Failure	to	do	so,	 in	an	era	
in	 which	 natural	 threats	 are	 now	 augmented	 by	 human-
made errors such as anthropogenic global warming and 
in	 which	 human-made	 political	 and	 economic	 instability	
reign, only promises great trouble for us all.  Guidance 
such as that so thoughtfully prepared and offered in the 
NAACP Report should be the basis for forceful action 
by all those concerned with good governance in society.
1	Professor	Perry	Wallace	is	a	professor	of 	law	at	
American	University,	Washington	College	of 	Law,	
specializing	in	Environmental	Law,	Corporate	Law	
and	Finance.	He	is	a	member	of 	the	National	Panel	of 	
Arbitrators,	National	Association	of 	Securities	Dealers	
Dispute	Resolution	and	has	recently	been	elected	to	
the	Board	of 	Directors	of 	the	Environmental	Working	
Group. 
2	Exec.	Order	No.12898,	59	Fed.	Reg.	32	(Feb.	16,	1994).
3 The Frederick douglass PaPers. series one: 
sPeeches, debaTes, and inTerviews, volume 3: 1855-63 
204	(John	W.	Blassingame,	ed.)(1986)	available at http://
www.buildingequality.us/Quotes/Frederick_Douglass.htm.
4	Posting	of 	Reps.	Mike	Honda	(D-Cal.)	and	Anh	
“Joseph”	Cao	(R-La)	to	The	Hill’s	Congress	Blog,	
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-
a-environment/113325-bp-oil-spills-impacts-on-
vulnerable-minority-communities-reps-mike-honda-and-
anh-qjosephq-cao	(August	9,	2010	12:26PM	EST).
5 Robert Bullard, Government Allows BP to Dump Oil-Spill 
Waste on Black Communities, oPednews,	July	22,	2010,	
available at http://www.opednews.com/articles/Government-
Allows-BP-to-Du-by-Robert-Bullard-100721-879.html.
6 See naTional associaTion For The advancemenT oF 
colored PeoPle, bP oil drilling disasTer—naacP 
invesTigaTion overview, available at http://naacp.3cdn.
net/b827a4ea75a4bbbd5c_jfm6bee32.pdf 	(summarizing	
the	report’s	key	findings).
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By: Keyla Bade 
H.R.5136 “National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011” and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
The National Defense Authorization Act is the 
annual appropriations bill, approving Department of  Defense 
military activities for fiscal year 2011.2  An amendment 
to the National Defense Authorization Act, which the 
House has already approved and included in Section 536 
of  the National Defense Authorization Act, would repeal 
of  the ban on homosexuals from serving openly in the 
military.3  The 1993 law, widely known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell”(DADT), is mandated by federal law and codified in 
10 U.S.C. § 654 and prohibits homosexuals from serving 
in the military stating that it would “create an unacceptable 
risk to the high standards of  morale, good order and 
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of  military 
capability.”4  More than 13,000 people in the military have 
been forced to leave since the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy has been in place, including more than 400 last year.5
The language of  Section 536 allows Congress to 
vote to repeal DADT“with actual repeal occurring 60 days 
after the completion of  a study due December 1, 2010.6 
The study conducted by the Pentagon Working Group 
examined the effects of  fully integrating homosexuals into 
the armed forces, considering such issues as whether gay 
and heterosexual troops could be required to share housing 
and whether the military would be required to extend 
benefits to same-sex partners.7  President Obama, Defense 
Secretary Robert M. Gates, and the Chairman of  the Joint 
Chiefs of  Staff  Mike Mullen, must then certify that this 
new policy would not impede military effectiveness or “unit 
cohesion.”8  Army Chief  of  Staff  General George Casey, 
Jr. said that “[r]epealing the law before the completion 
of  the review will be seen by the men and women of  the 
Army as a reversal of  our commitment to hear their views 
before moving forward.”9  This legislation represents a 
major step for gay rights advocates who have been trying 
to repeal this policy since its inception in 1993, arguing 
that it effectively allows one of  the nation’s most powerful 
agencies to discriminate on the basis of  sexual orientation.10
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and other critics 
of  the bill argue that repealing DADT “would “be really 
harmful to the morale and battle effectiveness of  our 
military.”11  Supporters believe that the repeal would be a 
positive change reflective of  the U.S.’s shifting sentiments 
towards gay and lesbian people.  “In the land of  the free 
and the home of  the brave, it is long past time for Congress 
to end this un-American policy,” said Representative 
Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), who is the first female openly 
gay congressional representative.12  President Obama 
is also pleased with the House’s passage of  the repeal 
saying, “[t]his legislation will help make our armed forces 
even stronger and more inclusive by allowing gay and 
lesbian soldiers to serve honestly and with integrity.”13
Patrick Murphy (D-PA) first introduced the 
amendment on April 10, 2010.  It was first referred to 
the House Committee on Armed Services.  On May 
27, 2010, the House of  Representatives approved the 
amendment.  The bill was passed on May 28, 2010 
with 229 Democrats and five Republicans in favor. 
Senate received it on June 28, 2010 and placed it on the 
Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
On September 21, 2010, the National Defense 
Authorization Act was stalled on a 56-43 vote, four short 
of  the sixty votes needed to overcome the Republican 
opposition and begin the debate.14  On October 12, 2010, a 
federal district court judge, Judge Virginia Phillips, ordered 
the military to immediately stop enforcing DADT.15  The 
case was brought forth by the Log Cabin Republicans, a 
19,000-member partisan gay advocacy group that includes 
current and former military members.  The group argued 
during a two-week trial in July 2010 that the policy is 
unconstitutional and should be struck down.16  The judge 
ultimately ruled in their favor on the grounds that DADT 
violated Due Process and the First Amendment rights of  
gay service members.17  On October 14, the Department 
of  Justice asked the judge to suspend her ruling while the 
government prepared a formal appeal.18  In its appeal, the 
Department of  Justice argued that repeated and sudden 
changes in DADT would be “enormously disruptive and 
time-consuming, particularly at a time when this nation is 
involved in combat operations overseas.”19  Although the 
District Court upheld the injunction, effectively repealing 
DADT, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay requested by the 
Department of  Justice, which re-instated the policy.20
The Pentagon announced that it will comply with 
the Ninth Circuit order to retain the policy, but gay rights 
advocates have cautioned service members to avoid revealing 
their sexual orientation in the meantime.21  On October 
21, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced 
that the Pentagon, in order to mitigate any confusion or 
unjust discharges, is changing the way under which DADT 
discharges are processed.22  He issued a directive instructing 
the secretaries of  each branch of  the armed services to 
personally sign off  on the dismissal of  any gay or lesbian 
service member under the policy.  Further, the Pentagon’s 
chief  legal counsel and its top personnel official have to 
coordinate all DADT discharges.23  At the time of  print, 
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time of  print, a DADT repeal bill had just passed into 
law, after vigorous efforts were made to pass the measure.
S.729 “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act of  2009”
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act of  2009 (DREAM Act) is legislation that 
would allow certain undocumented immigrant students 
the opportunity to apply for permanent residency.25  The 
Act would amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996 “to repeal the 
denial of  an unlawful alien’s eligibility for higher education 
benefits based on state residence unless a U.S. national is 
similarly eligible without regard to such state residence.”26
Under the DREAM Act, those eligible are 
undocumented students between the ages of  twelve and 
thirty-five of  “good moral character”, who arrived to the 
United States before the age of  sixteen, have lived in the 
United States for five consecutive years prior to the Act’s 
enactment, and who have graduated from a high school in the 
United States or have earned a GED.  These students would 
then have the opportunity to gain conditional permanent 
residency.27  Within six years of  approval for conditional 
permanent residency, the individual must complete at least 
two years in a program for a bachelor’s degree or higher 
in the United States or serve in the uniformed services for 
at least two years and, if  discharged, receive an honorable 
discharge.28  If  the individual does not meet these 
qualifications within six years, the conditional residency 
will be revoked and he or she will be once again removable.
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced this 
Act on March 26, 2009 and it currently has forty sponsors. 
After its introduction in the Senate, the Act was referred 
to the Committee on the Judiciary.  The companion 
bill in the House of  Representatives, the American 
Dream Act of  2009, was also introduced on March 26, 
2009 and was referred to the Subcommittee on Higher 
Education, Lifelong Learning, and Competitiveness.
Similar forms of  this bill have been introduced in 
Congress before but have not progressed.29  The DREAM 
Act has received a lot of  media attention though, stirring up 
documented and undocumented people alike to place pressure 
on Congress to move this bill forward.  On September 
14, 2010, the DREAM Act was placed on the agenda to 
be included as an amendment to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for 2011.  The Senate was scheduled to 
vote on September 21, 2010 on whether to attach the measure 
to the Act but a Republican filibuster  halted the debate.  As 
of  September 22, 2010, Richard Durbin introduced the bill 
once again along with Richard Lugar, and it had two sponsors.
The possibility for full immigration reform this 
year is looking bleak, but the passage of  the DREAM 
Act would be a significant step in that direction.  As 
Majority Leader Reid assured, “We must have immigration 
reform.  When we have enough groups telling me 
that we can’t do it this year, then we will consider the 
DREAM Act alone.  But we are not at that point now.”30
The Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  
Discrimination against Women
 The Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is often regarded 
as an international bill of  rights for women.  CEDAW defines 
what constitutes discrimination against women and designs 
an implementation plan, to be fulfilled by each country in 
agreement to end it.31  The convention asserts women’s rights 
and freedoms to political, economic, and social equality.32
The Convention was adopted by the United Nations’ 
General Assembly in 1976 and has been ratified by 186 
countries.  The United States is one of  only seven countries 
that have not ratified CEDAW.  The others are Iran, Sudan, 
Somalia, Palau, Nauru, and Tonga.33  Commentators believe 
that the U.S. may have put off  ratifying CEDAW partly 
because of  national conservative sentiments that oppose or 
fail to fully support the Convention’s affirmation of  women’s 
right to reproductive choice.  For example, the Convention 
provides for the right to equally shared responsibility for 
child-rearing by both sexes, the right of  child-care including 
mandated child-care facilities and maternity leave, and the 
right to reproductive choice and family planning.34  CEDAW 
is the only treaty that has made such specific provisions for 
reproductive rights and family planning.  Because CEDAW 
is an international convention, the Senate must ratify it. 
According to CEDAW, discrimination is “. . . any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of  sex which has the effect or purpose of  impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by 
women . . .” 35  Countries that ratify the Convention are 
required to implement measures that would eradicate 
any kind of  discrimination against women.36  These 
measures must include acknowledging the equality 
between men and women in the country’s constitution. 
Further, the country must establish and enforce equal 
legal protection through legislative measures.37  Countries 
that have ratified the Convention are legally bound to 
put its provisions into practice and must submit national 
reports at least once every four years concerning measures 
they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.38
The Obama Administration put CEDAW on the list 
of  priorities for ratification in May 2009.39  In November 
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6, 2009, Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton said during a 
speech in Washington, DC, “there is nothing that has been 
more important to me over the course of  my lifetime than 
advancing the rights of  women and girls.  And it is now a 
cornerstone of  American foreign policy.”40  Secretary Clinton 
has been expected to revive the discussion of  women’s 
issues on Capitol Hill.  In March 2010, Secretary Clinton 
reassured the United Nations Commission on the Status of  
Women that the administration would “continue to work 
for the ratification of  CEDAW.”41  However, months have 
passed since this statement and there has been no substantial 
action from executive and legislative bodies.  Several human 
rights groups emphasize the importance of  CEDAW’s 
ratification, believing that it would add credence to the equal 
status of  women internationally as well as domestically.42 
The Obama Administration faces continued pressure to 
urge the Senate to introduce this Convention and schedule 
hearings in order to seriously contemplate ratification.
S.3113 “Refugee Protection Act of  2010”
 The Refugee Protection Act amends the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that would 
strengthen the United States’ commitment to refugees who 
have fled  their countries due to persecution or torture.43 
One of  the major provisions of  this Act is the elimination 
of  the one-year limit for filing asylum claims currently 
placed on refugees in the U.S.44  The Act also authorizes the 
U.S. Attorney General to appoint counsel for refugees to 
represent them throughout their proceedings.45  Previously, 
many refugees have had to advocate for themselves during 
their proceedings.  Studies have shown that asylum seekers, 
of  whom a third have counsel, are six times more likely to 
be granted asylum if  they have legal representation.46  The 
Refugee Protection Act also deals with concerns regarding 
aliens’ detention periods.  The Act directs the Secretary 
of  Homeland Security to establish specific conditions 
of  detention and to give notice of  charges to the court 
and to the individuals within forty-eight hours of  the 
alien’s detention, guaranteeing a system of  faster review.47
Furthermore, the Act develops the list of  social 
categories upon which asylum claims can be based.  As of  
now, when an individual claims to be seeking asylum based on 
“membership in a particular social group”, it has generally been 
difficult for individuals who have fled a country because of  
gang violence, gender discrimination, or gender orientation. 
The broader definition of  “social groups” in S.3113 can 
be used to include these individuals.48  The definitions of  
“terrorist activity” and “terrorist organization” are also 
refined and narrowed in order to protect refugees that do not 
pose a threat to U.S. security from inappropriate exclusion.49
This Act emerges from numerous criticisms of  the 
United States’ lack of  commitment to refugees.  It comes 
thirty years after the landmark Refugee Protection Act of  
1980 led by the late Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA). 
Many people believe that since the passage the 1980 Refugee 
Protection Act, the United States has fallen short of  meeting 
its obligations.  The advocacy organization, Human Rights 
First, elucidates this point in stating, “ . . . [A] barrage of  
new laws and policies have undermined the institution of  
asylum in the United States, leading this country to deny 
asylum or other protection to victims of  persecution.”50
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-
VT) introduced the Refugee Protection Act of  2010 in 
the Senate on March 15, 2010 with four sponsors.  After 
it was introduced, it was referred to the Committee on 
Judiciary. Hearings were held and the Act was discussed 
on May 19, 2010.  This Act is the Senate’s solid attempt 
to address and resolve some of  the refugee and asylum 
systems’ most serious issues and to sincerely consider and 
recommit to the interests of  refugees and asylum seekers.
H.R. 3564 “Children’s Act for Responsible 
Employment of  2009”
The Children’s Act for Responsible Employment 
of  2009 (CARE Act) amends the child labor provisions 
relating to agricultural work in the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).51  Currently, FLSA law allows for children as young 
as twelve years old to be hired to work agricultural jobs, such 
as harvesting fruits and vegetables.  The law does not place 
any limits on the number of  hours per week a child can work 
or on how early an employer can require the child to report 
to work.52  Critics argue that this lack of  regulations exposes 
children to risks of  exploitation as well as educational 
compromises, since at present, FLSA does not mandate 
hourly limits for children’s work on school days.53  Human 
rights groups report that the drop-out rate for children who 
work in agriculture is four times higher than the national rate.54 
The CARE Act revises the age requirement for agricultural 
employment under FLSA regulations, authorizing it to apply 
to any child under the age of  eighteen unless that child is 
working for his or her parents or on a family-owned farm.55 
The Act also increases civil and criminal penalties for 
violating the law in order to ensure employer compliance.56
Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
introduced the CARE Act on November 15, 2009, and it 
currently has ninety-one sponsors.  After its introduction, 
the Act was referred to the Subcommittee on Workforce 
Protections on November 16, 2009.  The Act is supported 
by over eighty leading organizations including the American 
Federation for Teachers (AFT), the National Association for 
the Advancement of  Colored People (NAACP), the National 
Parent Teacher Association (PTA), and Human Rights 
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Watch.  “The United States is a developing country when 
it comes to child farm workers,” said Zama Coursen-Neff, 
deputy director of  the Children’s Rights Division at Human 
Rights Watch.  “Children who pick America’s food should 
at least have the same protections as those who serve it.”57
Children and human rights advocates were 
encouraged recently after the Labor Department announced 
a large increase in the fines that farmers can face for 
employing children, to as much as $11,000 per child58.  For 
a deeper rooted and longer lasting change to come about, 
however, the law has to change and it is unlikely that the 
CARE Act will get out of  committee during this Congress.
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As The Modern American reaches its seventh volume, a lot has changed since we published our first issue in 
Spring 2005—including our readership.
One of  TMA’s most unique attributes is its audience and how the publication’s content is shaped by our 
audience. Unlike most law publications, TMA strives to publish accessible legal scholarship, rather than 
esoteric law articles. In other words, we want all readers, particularly those without legal training, to readily 
understand our content, and clearly appreciate how the valuable information contained within each article 
is relevant to our lives. Accessibility has always been one of  TMA’s goals, yet, over the years, we know 
less and less about YOU, our audience. Even as we begin to offer TMA on a variety of  new platforms, 
including the Digital Commons, which allows TMA to learn about its subscribers, we still know little about 
our readers. 
In an effort to learn about who you are, what you like, and how you read TMA, we are launching a readers’ 
survey during winter 2010. From December until February, all TMA readers—whether you are a devoted 
reader or just picked TMA up at an office or news-stand—are invited to participate in the readers’ audit. 
Tell us who you are, what you enjoy, and how we can improve. 
There are two ways to participate: 1) you may fill-out the survey printed on the back of  this page, enclose it 
in a self-stamped envelope, and send it by March 1 to: 
The Modern American 
American University Washington College of  Law 
4801 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 615
Washington D.C., 20016 
OR 
2) you may go to our online survey at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/556X3Q6.
You are welcomed to offer us as little or as much information as you like. Most importantly, we want to 
learn more about you, as a reader, and we want to learn more about what you think of  our publication. The 
information you provide is for TMA purposes only and will not be shared with third parties. 
And, to thank you for your participation, a completed survey submitted by March 1, will automatically 
enter you into a raffle for an Ipod shuffle.
TMA continues to grow and change, specifically as a result of  our Strategic Plan initiative completed 
this year. The current Executive Board was able to re-structure the publication, attract fresh and exciting 
content, add new content through our digital platforms, and build our visibility in the legal field and 
beyond. We are energized to continue our engagement with you—our readers—and look forward to at 
least six more groundbreaking years as one of  the leading publications dedicated to diversity in the U.S.
Thank you!
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